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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the first chapter, I investigate reputational effects of the disclosure of negative information in a 
market affected by adverse selection. A series of recent discoveries has increased consumer 
concern over the presence of counterfeits in the market for fine and rare wine. For the thousands 
of bottles sold at auction each year, house reputation is used as a quality assurance mechanism to 
signal product authenticity.  Using sales data from 2005-2015 for the ten largest auction houses, I 
study consumer reaction following two recent disclosures of an auction house having offered or 
sold counterfeit wine. My identification strategy to examine reputation involves a series of triple 
difference regressions analyzing equilibrium prices and quantities.  I discover one house 
experienced no losses following a 2008 incident involving 107 counterfeit bottles. However, 
three houses associated with a 2012 incident involving thousands of bottles were found to have 
suffered significant reputation losses following the incident. These losses are demonstrated by a 
3-8% decrease in equilibrium sales prices and a 6-9% decrease in sales quantities in the year 
following the disclosure.  
 The second chapter of my dissertation involves the transitivity of stated preferences. 
Revealed preference theory states that, in order for an individual’s preferences to be consistent 
with utility maximization, they must satisfy the principle of transitivity. Any deviations from this 
principle result in a logically inconsistent response pattern. I develop a new framework to study 
the rationality of stated preferences, accounting for both the number and severity of non-
transitive responses an individual makes. I implement this method using a nationally 
vii 
 
representative survey of 3,234 respondents from the U.S. general population and discover that 
more than 52% of the population exhibit non-transitive preferences. In addition to measuring the 
number and severity of non-transitive preferences exhibited by each respondent, another aim of 
this manuscript is to evaluate the relationship between response transitivity and the individual 
outcomes of each respondent under the premise that high quality decisions are the result of 
greater decision-making ability. After controlling for demographic characteristics including age, 
education, race, gender, ethnicity, and work status, non-transitive patterns are correlated with 
lower incomes and poorer health. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS OF CREDENCE GOODS: A STUDY OF FINE AND RARE  
WINE 
 
1. Introduction 
Information asymmetries between buyers and sellers at the time of trade cause many markets to 
suffer from adverse selection. Consumer uncertainty regarding product quality has the ability to 
depress prices, in turn lowering the overall quality of goods available in the market. To remedy 
this problem, markets have developed quality assurance mechanisms in the attempt to better 
inform consumers.  Common mechanisms include product branding, word of mouth, 
manufacturer guarantees/warrantees, industry disclosure reports (accreditation organizations), 
third-party agents (Consumer Reports), government mandated reports (vehicle safety), and 
licenses to practice (bar association).1 With the exception of government mandated reports and 
licenses to practice, many of these mechanisms require a carrot and stick approach where 
consumers reward and punish firms based upon reputation and past experiences.  
 The value that reputation provides is evidenced by discrepancies in price between like 
goods from multiple vendors. The stronger a firm’s reputation in comparison to its competitors, 
the higher the expected price differential.  Empirical research on the collectables market 
generally supports this assumption, while also finding:  
                                                          
1 See Dranove and Jin (2010) for a full description of these mechanisms. 
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1) A good reputation becomes even more valuable as product uncertainty increases (Dewan 
& Hsu, 2004; Elfenbein, Fisman, & McManus, 2015; Lewis, 2011; Melnik & Alm, 2005) 
2) A negative review has a greater impact on reputation than an additional positive review 
(Canals-Cerda, 2012)  
Both of these stylized facts play a critical role in the design of this study.  For a firm that sells 
multiple goods, a change in overall reputation may affect some products more than others. Items 
with more associated risk may see larger price fluctuations compared to those with less 
comparative uncertainty.   
 In this manuscript, I focus on auction sales of fine and rare wine to test these theories.  
Like other collectibles with a finite production, as rare wines are consumed, the remaining 
inventory increases in value. In addition, a wine’s quality is generally expected to improve with 
age.2  As the rarity and/or value of a wine increases, consumer concern regarding product 
authenticity is also expected to rise. Once a wine appreciates beyond a certain threshold 
(commonly considered in the $1,000 range), it becomes profitable to counterfeit.  Recent 
advancements in printer quality and graphics design have led to improvements in the appearance 
of counterfeit labels to a point where, for the average consumer, they appear identical to the 
genuine product. The more expensive the wine, the larger the potential financial loss if a bottle is 
later discovered as a counterfeit. Consumers may also have less collective experience with more 
valuable wines, decreasing the likelihood a fake bottle would be detected. The consumer’s 
inability to differentiate between authentic and counterfeit bottles, even after purchase, makes 
such wines a credence good.  
                                                          
2 While all wines do eventually spoil, many collectible wines have an expected “lifespan” upwards of a century 
under proper storage conditions.   
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 Utilizing the knowledge (e.g. type of glue used on the label of an authentic bottle, exact 
ink color, hidden bottle markings) and experience gathered over thousands of sales, auction 
houses have claimed the expertise to accurately assess product authenticity.  
 In total, wine auctions generated more than $3.3 billion in sales globally between 2006-
2015. Before all sales, auction house are expected to thoroughly inspect each bottle to ensure 
authenticity and overall bottle condition. Through repeated sales, auction houses have developed 
individual reputations for product authenticity, making them a preferred method to buy and sell 
fine wine.  Consumers expect that the likelihood of purchasing a counterfeit bottle is lower as a 
result of the authentication process; therefore, even a small negative review could potentially 
harm firm reputation.3   
 Yet, auction house inspections are not infallible.  The authentication process reveals 
conflicting incentives:  trust and reputation vs. sales. Lower standards and weaker certification 
measures could increase sales, particularly given the limited production and availability of the 
most expensive wines. However, doing so may decrease future sales and reputation if any 
counterfeit bottles are discovered.  Each house is thus faced with the task of determining the 
optimum level of authentication standards to maximize expected profits. Over time, as 
consumers make repeated purchases, each auction house develops a reputation for their 
authentication practices. The better the reputation, the greater the buyer’s belief that the wines 
offered are genuine.  
 Recent discoveries of international counterfeiting operations have brought the issue of 
product authenticity into the global spotlight. Multiple auction houses have been linked to the 
                                                          
3 It has been noted that most counterfeit wine goes undetected.  Because of this, one negative review could signal a 
much broader issue. 
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sale of wines produced by these operations, and it is important to understand whether firm 
reputation suffered as a result.  In this manuscript, I study consumer behavior following two 
recent counterfeiting disclosures.   
 To access any reputation losses, I test for shifts in the demand curve for the auction 
houses implicated.  Consumer demand for wine purchased from a specific auction house is a 
function of house reputation and various other factors (including the state of the global economy, 
customer service, and auction house experience). Through a series of difference-in-difference 
(DD) and triple difference (DDD) regression models estimating equilibrium prices and sales 
quantities, I isolate the effects of reputation on consumer demand.  A decrease in either the 
comparative prices or sales quantity for the house(s) implicated without an increase in the other 
is indicative of a downward shift in the demand curve, and thus, a loss of reputation. By 
grouping similar wines according to previous counterfeit discoveries and recommendations of 
third party experts, one can test whether the value of an auction house reputation varies for 
different wines. 
 Using a rich data set covering more than 100,000 observed sales, I find that consumer 
responses to negative information vary.  Consumers did not punish one auction house for 
authenticating counterfeit wine in April 2008.  However, a larger 2012 discovery and arrest of an 
individual for counterfeiting thousands of bottles caused the three auction houses he was 
associated with to suffer significant reputation losses following the disclosure. The reputation 
losses are inferred by a 3-8% decrease in the comparative prices for wines likely to be 
counterfeited and a 6-9% decrease quantity of wines sold. I also observe that the value of firm 
reputation increases with product uncertainty, confirming much of the previous research on 
credence goods.  
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 In addition to our main finding presented above, this manuscript makes several added 
contributions to the previous literature. To date, most studies on the effects of negative 
information on credence goods have utilized retail sales data (e.g., scanner data)  to track 
changes in reputation (De Paola & Scoppa, 2013; Freedman, Kearney, & Lederman, 2012; Rao 
& Wang, 2017; Schlenker & Villas-Boas, 2009). A potential issue with these studies involves a 
lack of variation in sales price. (Breidert, Hahsler, & Reutterer, 2006). If price remains constant 
over time, any decrease in the demand curve for a product can only be inferred by a reduction in 
the equilibrium sales quantity.  This matter is further complicated when researchers use 
competing products as a control group in the estimation strategy.  Other factors, independent of 
reputation, could be responsible for any decrease in equilibrium quantities.4 Potential 
confounders include the introduction of new competition, changes in consumer preferences 
regarding small differences between competing products, or adjustments to the shelf space a 
product occupies. The use of auction sales resolves both issues.  Auctions do not suffer from the 
same price restrictions as retail purchases, and I use sales of identical products from firms not 
associated with negative information as a control.  
 The outline of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a general overview of the wine 
market, Section 3 discusses the literature on adverse selection, and Section 4 develops a 
theoretical model to test for changes in consumer behavior.  Section 5 defines the estimation 
strategy, Section 6 describes the data, and Section 7 presents the results. Section 8 contains a 
brief discussion and concluding remarks.  
                                                          
4 A similar argument could be made towards the use of competing auction houses. Firms could improve their 
customer service and increase sales.  I propose a solution in the DDD models by including sales from wines unlikely 
to be counterfeited. 
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2. Reputations and Fraud in the Market for Wine 
2.1 Product Quality 
The quality of a wine is fundamentally determined by three variables: weather (temperature and 
rainfall patterns), vineyard, and winemaker/producer. For wines from known producers and 
vineyards, it is possible to predict the quality of a wine (and consequently price) as soon as 
grapes are harvested (Ashenfelter, 2008; Jones & Storchmann, 2001).  
 However, a recent expansion in both the number of producers, vineyards, and wine 
regions has made it much more difficult for consumers to ascertain the quality of wine before 
purchase (Wine Institute, 2015).  Without full knowledge of the producer, vineyard, and vintage, 
consumers may choose to rely on more generic quality signals (e.g., region of production, 
alcohol content, or, in worst cases, label appearance or price) when making a purchase.    
 Issues resulting from the noise of these generic signals have given rise to consumer 
reliance on third-party tasting experts to aid in the decision making process (e.g., Robert Parker, 
Wine Spectator). These reviews often contain a short tasting description and an overall rating on 
a 100-point scale.  Research on the effect of expert reviews on prices has been well documented, 
and the literature consistently shows a strong relationship between price and review score (Ali, 
Lecocq, & Visser, 2008; Friberg & Gronqvist, 2012; Hilger, Rafert, & Villas-Boas, 2011).  As 
with food, individual tastes and preferences for wine vary.  Yet, by comparing past personal 
experiences to expert reviews for those same wines, it is possible for consumers to accurately 
predict the quality of a wine they have never tasted.   
 The limited production of each wine has resulted in an active secondary market, 
including auction house sales and trades amongst individual consumers.  The secondary market 
is also where a majority of the adverse selection is introduced.  While consumers likely have 
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accurate expectations about the inherent quality of each wine, they are unable to judge the 
authenticity of each individual bottle.  To mitigate this problem, buyers use firm reputation as a 
signal for product authenticity. 
2.2 Auction Houses and Reputations for Product Authenticity 
Auctions are the preferred method for procuring old and rare bottles for many collectors, due in 
part to the selection and authentication process bottles must go through before a sale. It is widely 
regarded that consumers value the reputation of each firm, yet empirical research on the effects 
of auction house reputation on price remains limited. Obtaining data from sales outside auction 
presents a challenge.  Private trades are often untraceable, and the listed retail prices for 
expensive wines may have room for negotiation.  Thus, one is often left without a control group 
for comparison.  
 Instead of attempting to value the individual reputation of each firm, I compare sales 
from different auction houses over time to track changes in house reputation.  A portion of the 
price differential for the same wine between houses can be attributed to their record of suspected 
prior sales of counterfeit wines.  The better a firm’s reputation, the higher the demand for each 
wine. By tracking the equilibrium prices and quantities for a wine repeatedly sold at auction by 
multiple firms, one can test whether auction house reputation suffers after the public discovers an 
auction house authenticated counterfeit wine. For the remainder of the paper, reputation is 
associated with consumer beliefs towards the ratio of counterfeit to genuine wines an auction 
house offers for sale. 
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2.3 History of Counterfeit Wine 
Records of wine counterfeiting date back at least two thousand years to ancient Rome.   Pliny the 
Elder wrote in the first century that even the nobility were not able to obtain wine that had not 
been altered in some fashion (Robinson, 1999). Possibly the most common counterfeiting 
method involves rebranding a cheaper wine as a more expensive one. Counterfeiters can take a 
cheaper wine from a neighboring vineyard or less valuable vintage, remove the labels, and attach 
a new forged label of a more valuable wine.   
 Another method to counterfeit wine involves mixing different wines. In his seminal 
classic on wine, “A topography of Vineyards,” Andre Jullien noted that many Bordeaux 
merchants in the 18th century would mix expensive bottles with cheaper wines from Spain or the 
Rhone to increase profits (Jullien, 1816). It was common for producers to sell entire barrels of 
wine to merchants, allowing for the merchants to actually bottle the finished product.  Some 
merchants were known to have added cheaper wine to increase the quantity available for sale.  
 Over the past 200 years, strict marketing practices have been implemented in an effort to 
limit such counterfeiting practices  These included restricting the use of certain terms (e.g., 
Champagne5) to wines produced within a geographical boundary, quality classification systems 
(Bordeaux Classification of 18556), grape varietal restrictions (Burgundy), and lists of 
permissible additives (sulfates, yeast).  
 Most recently, as with other markets where counterfeit goods are present (e.g., currency, 
pharmaceuticals), winemakers have begun using technology to prevent fraud.  Advancements  
                                                          
5 In order for a wine to legally be named Champagne, it must originate from that specific region of France.   
6 The Bordeaux Classification of 1855 ranked the best of the wines from the Medoc region of Bordeaux by placing 
each estate into one of five categories ranging from First growth to Fifth growth.  Even though this classification is 
more than 150 years old, it remains relevant today.  Wines given First Growth Status may sell for twenty times that 
of a Fifth Growth and five times that of a Second Growth. Similar ranking classifications are also provided for other 
regions in Bordeaux (St. Emilion), Burgundy, and Champagne.  
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include the use of bubble strips to note if a bottle has been opened, laser-etched bottles, 
individually numbered bottles and cases, and special inks on labels and foil (Lecat & Chapuis, 
2017; McCoy, 2007).  
 However, these techniques have only become popular over the last few years. Many older 
wines were not produced under threat of counterfeiting. It was not until years later that they 
became valuable enough to counterfeit. Some wines even lack a basic production record, 
providing few details on how many bottles were produced, or if there were multiple versions of 
the same wine. Producer labels often changed from year to year, and wines sold in bulk could be 
bottled under multiple labels (Asimov, 2007). 
2.4 Identifying Counterfeit Wine 
Identifying counterfeit wine is a difficult task.  One authentication method commonly used in the 
past involved physically tasting bottles from a lot to be sold. However, many experts have 
challenged this method as a true authentication technique.  Not only is tasting expensive (i.e. it 
reduces the number of bottles available for sale), but it is highly imprecise.  If an individual has 
been previously duped by a counterfeit, all subsequent counterfeits would have the same taste. 
Even when experts or consumers have tasted a genuine example of the wine, older wines have 
substantial bottle variation. Storing wine at different temperatures will age bottles at a different 
pace, and the corks used to seal wine from air deteriorate over time.  A counterfeiter can also 
include one genuine bottle in the lot to be consumed that appears identical to the counterfeits.  
The label from an authentic bottle to be tasted by the expert could be replaced with a copied on 
that matches the counterfeits. The bottle tested by experts would be genuine while the others 
later offered for sale would be counterfeit.  
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 One technique to identify counterfeits that does not require the bottle to be opened 
involves mass spectrometry. By measuring the molecular compounds present in each bottle, 
scientists can determine a wine’s general age and characteristics (American Chemical Society, 
2010). For wines produced after 1945, it is possible to determine wine vintage by measuring the 
Carbon-14 content.  Atomic bombs dropped in World War II and subsequent nuclear testing 
during the Cold War released Carbon-14 into the atmosphere, and each living organism absorbs 
trace amounts of the element. The total presence of Carbon-14 in the atmosphere changes every 
year, and there is a commensurate shift in the amount present in each vintage of wine from 
similar locations.  However, there is no DNA level test to prove the exact vineyard.7 A 
counterfeiter could mimic a $10,000 bottle using wine from a $100 bottle of the same vintage. 
Given the issues with other methods, the use of authentication experts have proven to be one of 
the few reliable techniques to identify counterfeit bottles.   
 Today, authentication experts use a variety of techniques to measure a wine’s 
authenticity.  The glass is examined to study the age of the bottle.  Older bottles were hand 
blown, and for newer wines, the shape of the bottle may be unique to individual producers. Older 
bottles should have a certain amount of sediment covering the inside glass.  Labels are examined 
for misspelled words, correct font and color, and paper type.  Corks must be stamped with the 
proper branding, and the capsule used to cover the cork must be true.  Some bottles are dipped in 
wax while others have specific designs and labels on a metal capsule. If any one of these aspects 
appear incorrect, a wine may be determined as counterfeit and rejected from the consignment. 
                                                          
7 Even if the individual vineyard could be determined, certain vineyards in Burgundy (including Echezeaux and 
Richebourg) are divided among multiple producers. There is sometimes a large difference in price depending on 
who produced the wine.   
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2.5 Counterfeiting in This Study 
Both instances of wine fraud examined in this manuscript stem from the actions of one 
individual over the course of a decade (2003-2012). In the early 2000’s, Rudy Kurniawan 
cornered a large portion of the market for old and rare wine by spending upwards of  $1 million a 
month at auction (Wise, 2008). After the value of his collection had risen considerably, 
Kurniawan eventually began selling a portion of the wine he had previously required. Two 2006 
auctions of Kurniawan’s wines, titled “The Cellar I and II”, were conducted by Acker Merrall & 
Condit (Acker) and generated more than $35 million in sales. The second of these sales still 
holds the record for the largest single auction in terms of total sales ($24 million) (Robinson, 
2007).8  Kurniawan also sold wine privately outside the auction market.  
 However, over a series of events in 2007, doubts began to arise over the authenticity of 
many wines sold by Rudy Kurniawan.  Bottles of 1982 Le Pin, consigned by Kurniawan, were 
withdrawn from a Christie’s auction after an examination of the corks revealed the wines to be 
counterfeit (Hellman, 2007). In a separate event, a small tasting of eleven old Roumier bottles 
purchased from “The Cellar” auctions discovered six of the eleven to be counterfeits 
(Steinberger, 2012). Even after these events, a select group of auction houses continued to accept 
and authenticate consignments from Kurniawan, often “sight unseen” (Hellman, 2008).   
 The first critical counterfeiting case surfaced in 2008, when 22 lots of Domaine Ponsot 
wines were removed from an Acker Merrall & Condit auction at the request of the winemaker.  
According to the winemaker Laurent Ponsot, the bottles, on consignment by Rudy Kurniawan, 
could not be genuine because the purported wine was never produced. The Acker catalog for the 
                                                          
8 After Rudy Kurniawan’s arrest in 2012, it was revealed that a significant percentage of the wines offered in “The 
Cellar” auctions were counterfeits. 
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sale (provided before the wines were removed) confirmed Ponsot’s claims, yet the wines were 
still authenticated.  A bottle dating from 1929 was offered for sale, but the catalog mentions that 
wine from that particular winemaker and vineyard was not made until 1934 (Kapon, 2008). 
 Although there is an extensive history of suspicion regarding wine fraud/counterfeiting, 
2008 appears to be a turning point (McCoy, 2007; Wallace, 2009). Media reports and consumer 
posts on public wine forums began suggesting auction houses were failing to perform their due 
diligence in authenticating wines (Hellman, 2008; Wise, 2008). Some reports even questioned 
Acker’s complicity in the sale of counterfeits (Hellman & Frank, 2009; Squires, 2008).   In spite 
of this finding, multiple auction houses continued to discretely accept consignments from 
Kurniawan.  
 It was not until his arrest in 2012 that the scope of Kurniawan’s counterfeiting operation 
was uncovered. (Hellman & Frank, 2009; Hernandez, 2012; Steinberger, 2012; Wine Berserkers, 
2012).  In the Spring of 2012, a consignment from Kurniawan to Spectrum Wine Auctions was 
publicly contested on a popular wine forum on the basis that many bottles were clearly 
counterfeit (Wine Berserkers, 2012). A 2009 lawsuit against Kurniawan for selling counterfeit 
bottles began to make headway, and the FBI determined that Kurniawan was not a legal resident 
of the U.S. (as he claimed to be) (Wallace, 2012). On March 8, 2012, Kurniawan was arrested 
for crimes associated with counterfeiting wine.   
 At the time of his arrest, a search of Kurniawan’s home revealed a large counterfeiting 
operation complete with a corking machine, labels for expensive wines, empty bottles, and notes 
on mixtures of cheaper wines that mimicked more valuable ones.  Mr. Kurniawan would later 
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become the first person to be convicted of wine fraud in the U.S. (Hernandez, 2012).9 This case 
received more media attention than all previous accusations of fraud (Downey, 2012; Hirsch, 
2012; Lecat & Chapuis, 2017; Pfanner, 2012; Steinberger, 2012; Wallace, 2012; Wine 
Berserkers, 2012). While counterfeiting allegations have persisted in the years following 
Kurniawan’s arrest, very few have been documented, and no single case has approached a 
similar scale. 
3. Literature on Reputations Markets and Credence Goods 
3.1 Adverse Selection  
I use a framework similar to that adopted in several other papers on adverse selection. George 
Akerlof (1970) was the first to investigate the effects of adverse selection in a market for goods 
of uncertain quality . Akerlof’s model demonstrated that asymmetric information between the 
buyer and the seller at the time of trade may lower the welfare of both parties. Buyer uncertainty 
can depress market prices, decrease product quality, and diminish the size of the market. Under 
certain circumstances, asymmetric information may prevent all trade from occurring.  As a 
remedy, Akerlof suggested a market structure where quality assurance mechanisms (e.g. third-
party experts, brand names, licensing organizations) are generated for the sole purpose of 
identifying true product quality. Given that consumers place a higher value on known goods, 
these institutions can increase supplier profits and consumer welfare at the same time.  Buyers 
use the brand reputation of each mechanism as both a sign of quality and, “as a means of 
retaliation if the quality does not meet expectations.” Specifically, Akerlof illustrates this with 
the example of a restaurant chain using its brand value to attract out-of-town visitors with little 
                                                          
9 For those interested, a detailed description of the events is provided by Wallace (2012), Wine Berserkers (2012-), 
and the film, Sour Grapes (2016).  
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knowledge of the local area. Customers have confidence in the quality of products purchased 
from vendors with familiar positive reputations. 
 Darbi and Karni’s (1973) work extended Akerlof’s theory to include credence qualities; 
product qualities that cannot be observed or evaluated by normal use . In this case, the consumer 
will have no knowledge of whether or not the good purchased is either necessary or real (e.g. car 
maintenance, health care).  
 Due to the high costs and difficulty of obtaining reliable information about certain goods, 
Darbi and Karni note that individuals tend to obtain both the information and the product from 
the same source. For example, auction houses and used-car dealerships often act as a combined 
certification/sales agent. This reliance on a single firm for both may lead to a certain amount of 
fraud. Car mechanics could provide repairs that are not necessary, dentists might fill a cavity that 
does not exist, and auction houses may sell a counterfeit product.  
 When purchasing credence goods, consumers may be more likely to gather and share 
information from previous transactions to aid in the decision making process. As more 
information becomes available, a reputation for each firm develops. Positive experiences are 
expected to improve reputations, and a better reputation should coincide with the ability of a firm 
to obtain a higher price for a good or service. In consideration of this study, wines offered for 
sale from an auction house with a better reputation are expected to have a higher demand than 
wines from an auction house whose reputation and authentication standards are more suspect. 
The revelation of any new information, either positive or negative, is expected to affect future 
sales prices and/or quantities.  
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3.2 Firm Reputation 
Shapiro (1983) developed a model for the reputations market .  The model elicits an equilibrium, 
in which, once a firm establishes a reputation, it is expected to remain consistent for future time 
periods.   A strong reputation is noted to be especially valuable when the product is rare or 
infrequently sold or if product quality is difficult to assess. Shapiro also proved that as 
information improves, the equilibrium outcome approaches that under perfect information.  
 Chu and Chu (1994) introduced the idea of a manufacturer renting the reputation of 
another firm to facilitate the sales process .  A manufacturer of a high-quality good, but without 
an established reputation, can use the reputation of a respected dealer (e.g. auction house) as a 
signal to consumers. Reputable middlemen have an incentive to correctly represent the products 
they sell in order to maintain their individual reputation. Chu and Chu’s model obtains a 
separating equilibrium where reputable middlemen earn positive profits while non-reputable 
middlemen earn no profit.10   
 However, Chu and Chu’s model relies on the assumption that consumers can determine 
true product quality immediately after consumption. Baksi and Bose’s (2007) study of third-
party food labelers suggested that the separating equilibrium will not hold for credence goods. 
Reputable middlemen may find it profitable to misrepresent product quality if the chances of 
detection and prosecution are low.  Baksi and Bose describe a situation where non-eco-friendly 
firms may deceive customers by labelling the products as eco-friendly.  Consumers are willing to 
pay more for eco-friendly products but are unable to determine whether the product actually 
meets the criteria.  For example, a product using genetically modified ingredients may be falsely 
                                                          
10 In a separating equilibrium, information is disclosed, and consumers are able to differentiate between seller type.  
A seller of a genuine good or high quality good will use the reputable middlemen while the seller of the lower 
quality good will use the non-reputable middleman.  The reputable middlemen will have a financial incentive to 
only accept high quality or genuine goods, and will not find it profitable to cheat the consumer. 
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labelled as non-GMO.  Given that a non-GMO claim is nearly costless to make, there is an 
incentive for producers of GMO ingredients to mis-label the product. In a similar fashion, 
auction houses may find it profitable to certify a forged wine as authentic if consumers are 
unable to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit bottles. 
3.3 Reputations and Credence Goods 
Emons (1997) suggests a possible solution, involving the use of two separate entities for 
certification and sale to limit fraud in the market for credence goods.  If the certifier is 
independent of the seller (i.e. no financial interest), there is no incentive to defraud the consumer. 
However, this solution is often cost prohibitive.  Emons describes the market for automobile 
transmission repairs as an example. Both the independent certifier and mechanic (seller) would 
have to disassemble the transmission in order to diagnose the problem. While the consumer 
would never be deceived, the extra costs of an independent examination may outweigh the 
fraudulent mechanic’s misdiagnoses. In the market for wine, a seller may choose not to have his 
wines authenticated by a neutral third-party expert if the costs for verification exceed the 
expected increase in sales price.   
 Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2005, 2006) revisit the issues of previous models for credence 
goods and propose a less restrictive model to limit fraud. However, their model still requires a set 
of assumptions not applicable to all credence goods. In the event that the required assumptions 
do not hold, the authors describe a reputations market as a second-best solution. Consumer’s 
reliance upon reputation systems may be able to curb the amount of fraud in the market.  
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3.4 Empirical Research on Credence Goods 
Empirical research on the effects of fraud/negative product information on consumer demand for 
credence goods remains somewhat limited. One possible explanation is that obtaining data 
presents a major challenge, as companies caught defrauding customers are usually unwilling to 
provide information. Recent studies have analyzed consumer response to contaminated food (De 
Paola & Scoppa, 2013; Schlenker & Villas-Boas, 2009), product safety recalls (Freedman et al., 
2012; Garber & Adams, 1998; Prince & Rubin, 2002), accounting fraud (Toth, 2014), false 
advertising (Rao & Wang, 2017), and medical malpractice (Dranove, Ramanarayanan, & 
Watanabe, 2012).  These studies have provided contrasting results, even among cases within the 
same industry. Consumer responses have varied from no punishment at all to a decrease in 
demand for the entire industry. 
 Dranove et al. (2012) found physicians suffered a loss in reputation after medical 
malpractice lawsuits. A medical malpractice lawsuit often results in a shift in patient type from 
those using private insurance to those on government plans.  De Paola and Scoppa (2013) show 
that a producer caught mixing rotten ingredients in cheese experienced a loss in reputation, and 
both the producer and retailer (middleman) suffered financial consequences from the reputation 
loss. The consequences of the reputation loss were found to last more than a year after the 
negative information was disclosed.  Rao and Wang (2017) observe that firms discovered to have 
made false claims regarding the healthiness of their food products suffer a significant decrease in 
consumer demand. The four products studied experienced a decrease in monthly revenues of 
between 12-67% following the exposures. 
 Freedman et al. (2012; toy recalls) and Prince and Rubin (2002; automobile and 
pharmaceutical liability) observe incidents where the firm suffers financial consequences but no 
 18 
 
loss in reputation.  Toy manufacturers reported lower sales for the products directly affected by 
recalls but felt no impact on other items offered. For pharmaceutical and automobile 
manufacturers, losses are similar to the direct effect of the potential problem. No additional 
punishment is felt.  
 For some types of goods, consumers may infer that all related products are manufactured 
in a similar style.  The association of similar products may cause a decrease in the market 
demand for all goods.  The Freedman et al. (2012) study of toy recalls also discovered a 
punishment for all toys in the related industry. The sales of all toys in the product segment, 
including those from manufacturers whose products were not recalled, decreased by more than 
30% after the recall.  Schlenker and Villas-Boas (2009) discovered a similar effect following 
health warnings regarding contaminated meat.  Industry wide, beef sales dropped by nearly 20% 
following the 2003 outbreak of mad cow disease.  
 In certain circumstances, the disclosure of negative information may not result in any 
punishment. Garber and Adams (1998) examined the impact of two product liability verdicts on 
sales in the automobile industry and found no evidence of a decrease in sales or change in stock 
price following a verdict. The strong loyalty many consumers have to specific vehicle 
manufacturers may limit the effect a product recall has on future purchases.  
 3.5 Consumer Inexperience 
Low levels of consumer experience may reduce the importance of firm reputation. Inexperienced 
buyers may have limited knowledge or understanding of the market in general. They may not be 
aware of product fraud or the reputation systems used to combat it. An investigation of baseball 
card auctions by Jin and Kato (2006) found that sellers with poor reputations could increase sales 
prices by making non-verifiable claims about product quality . In other words, a seller could 
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increase the sales price by simply stating the card was in outstanding (mint) condition. 
Individuals not familiar with the market could be more likely to accept such quality statements at 
face value. The authors discovered that, while sellers with a better reputation were less likely to 
make false claims, consumers were unwilling to pay more for the same claim made by a firm 
with a better reputation.  
4. Auction House Reputation   
It has been estimated that as much as 20% of investment grade wines sold in the market today 
are counterfeit (Richard, 2013). Over time, each auction house develops a reputation for 
authenticity based upon their prior sales record. I use a variation of Shapiro’s (1983) model and 
Dewan and Hsu’s (2004) extension to test whether auction house reputation suffers following a 
discovery that the house has sold or offered counterfeit wine for sale.   
4.1 Buyer’s Decision 
For wines that are likely to be counterfeited, buyers are assumed to hold different values for 
authentic and counterfeit bottles.  The value for a genuine bottle of wine i, during time t, is VHit, 
while a counterfeit bottle has value VLit , where VHit>VLit. Buyers believe a bottle of wine i sold by 
house s during time t is genuine with probability Rist and counterfeit with probability (1-Rist). Rst 
represents the reputation of house s at time t.  House reputation may change over time as new 
information becomes available (e.g. lawsuits, media coverage, etc.). However, as with all 
reputation functions, the information used to determine each house’s reputation is based upon 
previous sales.   
 It is expected that some counterfeits will never be detected. For each different wine that 
an auction house makes available for sale, Qist corresponds to the proportion that are counterfeit 
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while (1-Qist) represents the proportion of authentic bottles a house authenticates during time t.11 
Authenticating and offering more counterfeit bottles for sale increases the likelihood that a 
counterfeiting claim will be realized.  During each time period, the probability of a counterfeiting 
disclosure, D, is equal to: 
 
 
P(𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(�(𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
+ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−1𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−11 + 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−2𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−2(1 + 𝜌𝜌)2 + ⋯ )) 
 
(4.1) 
where 𝑓𝑓 is an increasing function and 0 ≤ P(𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≤ 1. 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  is a dummy variable equal to one if, 
during the current time period, the auction house was discovered to have previously 
authenticated counterfeit wine. 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 represents the quantity of each wine i, offered for sale by 
house s, during time t, and j denotes the number of unique wines sold by the auction house. As 
time passes after a counterfeit bottle has been sold or offered for sale, the probability that it will 
be discovered as counterfeit decreases for each subsequent time period. In Equation 4.1, this is 
accounted for by the inclusion of a discount factor, 𝜌𝜌. 
 The individual values for Rist depend upon the specific characteristics of each wine, 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 
(namely price and vintage), and previous disclosures against each house. For wines not valuable 
enough to counterfeit, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is expected to be equal for all firms during all time periods (i.e. 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠=1). This assumption plays a critical role in the estimation strategy described in Section 5.  
 Consumers also discount previous discoveries of counterfeit wines as time passes 
(denoted by 𝜚𝜚 in Equation 4.2), so the effect of a disclosure years before carries less weight than 
a discovery during the previous time period. The reputation function for each wine is as follows: 
                                                          
11 Due to differing levels of knowledge, it is possible that some auction houses consciously accept counterfeits 
while others unknowingly make errors. Both cases are treated equally in this study.   
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 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑔𝑔( 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠, Dst, 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−11+𝜚𝜚 , 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−2(1+𝜚𝜚)2 , …) (4.2) 
 
For wines likely to be counterfeited, each additional disclosure is expected to decrease the value 
of 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 .  Using Equation 4.2, we can determine the expected value a consumer has for each wine: 
 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑉𝑉𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 + (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 (4.3) 
Values for authentic and counterfeit bottles, VHit and VLit, are independent of auction house 
reputation and equal for all firms.  
4.2 Auction House Prices 
To estimate the sales price for each bottle, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, we must also consider various other factors 
beyond 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠. These include transaction costs and the quantity of bottles sold by each house. As 
more bottles of the same wine are sold by the house during each time period, it is expected that 
the equilibrium price will decrease (i.e. 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′ < 0). Transactions costs (e.g. shipping fees, time and 
effort required as part of the bidding process, and customer service) also play a significant role in 
the sales price. Houses with lower transaction costs may have higher final sales prices than 
houses with better reputations.  In Section 5, I propose an estimation method that controls for 
outside factors, allowing us to determine if firm reputation suffers following the disclosure of 
negative information.  
5. Estimation Strategy and Methodology 
For each auction house, any change in the comparative equilibrium prices and/or quantities is the 
result of a shift in house supply or demand (or both). As our goal is to elicit if the auction houses 
suffered a reputation loss following the disclosures, we seek to uncover a downward shift in the 
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demand curve. A downward shift in the demand curve (and thus reputation) can be identified by 
a decrease in the comparative equilibrium prices or sales quantities without an increase in the 
other.  Through a series of difference-in-difference and triple difference regression models, I am 
able to test whether consumer demand shifted following the discovery that an auction house has 
authenticated counterfeit bottles for sale.  
5.1 Empirical Model for Auction House Prices 
Difference-in-difference (DD) and triple difference (DDD) approaches are commonly used in 
natural experiments to study the outcomes of a certain event or treatment and have become 
popular due to their ability to capture important variables omitted from the data (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009).  A description of each approach is provided in the following sections. 
5.1.1 Difference-in-Difference Price Model 
Following Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Greene (2012), the difference-in-difference approach 
first defines treatment and the time it occurred.  For this project, time is a binary variable 
denoting if a sale (of bottle i) occurred before (Time=0) or after (Time=1) an auction house (s) 
was discovered to have authenticated counterfeit bottles and offered them for sale.  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠0 if 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 0 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠1 if 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 1  
If we assume demand and supply for the entire market remained constant, the effect of the 
discovery of an auction house authenticating counterfeit wines could be measured as 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠0 + (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠1 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠0)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
where the difference between 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1 and 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0 is equal to the size of the effect.  
 23 
 
 However, as displayed in Figure 1, the assumption that demand12 remains constant over 
time is highly suspect. As with nearly all collectable items, the demand for investment grade 
wines varies over time due to factors unrelated to discoveries of counterfeit bottles, including the 
state of the global economy and changes in consumer tastes.  To control for these shifts in 
demand, one can include a sample group of control observations separate from the treatment 
group.  
 In this study, treatment (House) is a binary variable differentiating firms discovered to 
have accepted/authenticated counterfeit bottles (House=1) from firms not implicated (House=0). 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0𝑠𝑠 if 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇 = 0 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1𝑠𝑠 if 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇 = 1  
Under this model, the size of the effect is measured as 
(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖11 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖10) − (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖01 − 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖00) 
By separating the effects of two different binary variables (Time and House), the equation above 
provides the basic difference in difference model.13  
 When aggregating multiple wines and observations, a regression model will likely 
improve the estimates of the treatment effect.  In the regression model, I control for the fixed 
effects of each individual wine, auction house, sales date, sales location, bottle size, and lot size.  
The regression difference-in-difference equation is provided below:   
 log(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+ 𝛽𝛽7𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (5.1) 
                                                          
12 Or supply, for that matter.  
13 A table showing an example calculation is provided in the appendix. 
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is price of bottle (i) from house (s) in time (t). Sales price is logged to allow for a direct 
comparison between wines of different values (i.e. hundreds. vs. thousands of dollars)14.   X 
denotes the continent of sale, number of bottles in the lot, bottle size, and a dummy for whether 
or not the designated lot consisted of an entire case of wine. 𝛿𝛿 represents individual bottle fixed 
effects, λ is a time variable with quarterly fixed effects, and γ represents the fixed effects for each 
auction house. The auction house fixed effects control for differences in the transaction costs of 
each auction house. It is also important to note that the fixed effects for each auction house and 
time period absorb the effects of the binary variables, House and Time.  The simplified model is 
shown below: log(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (5.2) 
The coefficient of interest, 𝛽𝛽5, determines whether auction houses receive lower sales prices after 
it is discovered that they sold or attempted to sell counterfeit wine, where: 
𝛽𝛽5 = [(𝑦𝑦|𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑇𝑇 = 1) − (𝑦𝑦|𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑇𝑇 = 0)] − [(𝑦𝑦|𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑇𝑇 = 1) − (𝑦𝑦|𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑇𝑇 = 0)] 
= 𝛥𝛥(𝑦𝑦|𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝛥𝛥(𝑦𝑦|𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) 
 One potential criticism of the difference-in-difference model is that it fails to control for 
outside factors that could also influence price (e.g. the amount of pre-auction advertising, 
available information about the consigner, auction attendance).  An auction including rarer wines 
may garner more attention from consumers, increasing the price of all wines offered at the sale.  
Lowering one’s certification standard is one method to increase the inventory of rare wines 
available for sale. 
                                                          
14 A Modified Park Test suggested that a generalized linear model using a gamma distribution may be preferable to 
the log-linear model presented in Section 5.2.  The results of this model are reported in the appendix.   Given that 
there are only minor differences between the estimates of the two models, I choose to direct most attention to the 
more basic OLS model. 
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5.1.2 Triple Difference Price Model 
Following the theoretical framework of Gruber (1994) and Chetty et al. (2009), I include a 
control group of less expensive bottles to create a triple difference regression to mitigate the 
potential effects of the factors mentioned above. Wines below a certain value are thought to be 
less attractive to counterfeiters, implying differences in reputation between auction houses 
should not affect prices.  
 The DDD model includes a third binary variable, fake, indicating whether or not the wine 
is likely to be counterfeited. 
𝑌𝑌0𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 if 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 = 0 
𝑌𝑌1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 if 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 = 1  
Using the same fixed effects as the difference-in-difference regression model, price is calculated 
as: 
 log(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+  𝛽𝛽10𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
(5.3) 
under the triple differences-in-differences model. In a similar manner to Equation 5.1, the bottle, 
house, and time fixed effects negate the vales for Fake, House, and Time. The triple difference 
equation thus becomes: log(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽7𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
(5.4) 
For this model, 𝛽𝛽8 is the main variable of interest used to examine changes in equilibrium prices 
after a counterfeiting scandal:     
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                      𝛽𝛽8 = [(𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 1, 𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑇𝑇 = 1) − (𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 1, 𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑇𝑇 = 0)]
− [(𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 1, 𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑇𝑇 = 1) − (𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 1, 𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑇𝑇 = 0)]
− [(𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 0, 𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑇𝑇 = 1) − (𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 0, 𝑆𝑆 = 1,𝑇𝑇 = 0)]
− [(𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 0, 𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑇𝑇 = 1) − (𝑦𝑦|𝐼𝐼 = 0, 𝑆𝑆 = 0,𝑇𝑇 = 0)] 
                         = 𝛥𝛥(𝑦𝑦|𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) − 𝛥𝛥(𝑦𝑦|𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐) 
This value is similar to 𝛽𝛽5 from Equation 5.2. 
5.2 Empirical Model for Auction House Quantity Supplied 
The quantity (M) of each wine an auction house sells during each time period is determined by a 
combination of individual house characteristics (reputation, commission fees, customer service) 
and the quantity of all bottles offered in the market (determined by market supply and demand). 
Without further information, any change in the number of bottles auctioned by a single house 
after a disclosure of negative information could simply be the result in the change in market 
forces affecting all firms. As with the model for prices described in the previous section, the 
inclusion of sales from auction houses not accused (House=0) is expected to control for any 
changes that affect the entire market.   
5.2.1 Difference-in-Difference Quantity Model 
By restricting the model to only include sales from wines likely to be counterfeited, the quantity 
of wine i sold by house s during time t can be estimated as: 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (5.5) 
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where 𝛿𝛿, 𝛾𝛾, and 𝜆𝜆 again represent the fixed effects of each bottle, auction house, and time 
period.15 As with the models for prices specified in Section 5.2, the fixed effects for each house 
and time period capture the values for House and Time. A simplified version of equation 5.5 is 
specified below: 
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽4𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (5.6) 
In this equation, 𝛽𝛽4 is our coefficient of interest used to determine changes in the quantity of 
bottles sold following the discovery that an auction house has authenticated counterfeit wine. 
5.2.2 Triple Difference Quantity Model 
The addition of a set of wines unlikely to be counterfeited (Fake=0) may help control for 
potential changes in house specific characteristics that don’t involve reputation. An auction 
house that improves its seller experience (e.g. lower commission fees, minimum price 
guarantees, payment schedule) may attract more sellers. For each wine, the quantity of bottles 
(M) sold in each time period is estimated as:  
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+  𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽𝛽9𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+ 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 
(5.7) 
Following the previous models, the values for 𝛿𝛿, 𝛾𝛾, and 𝜆𝜆 capture the effects of Fake, House, and 
Time; therefore, Equation 5.7 can be simplified to:   
𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽3𝜆𝜆𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠+  𝛽𝛽6𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖●𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠●𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 (5.8) 
                                                          
15 One minor change from the model specified in Equation 5.1 is that each time period now represents a half-year as 
opposed to a quarter.   
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The values for 𝛽𝛽7  in the DDD model determine whether auction houses have a decrease in the 
quantity of rare and expensive wine supplied following the disclosure of negative information. 
This information can be used in combination with the results from Equation 5.4 to test whether 
or not auction houses see a shift in the demand curve as a result of a counterfeiting disclosure.  A 
reduction in comparative prices coupled with a decrease (or unchanging) quantity of bottles 
supplied is indicative of a downward shift in the demand curve. 
6. Data   
The estimation strategy I employ requires a longitudinal dataset containing sales information 
before and after the treatment date. In total, I examine the sales data from 2005-2015 for the ten 
largest auction houses: Acker Merrall & Condit (Acker), Bonhams & Butterfields (Bonhams), 
Christies, Hart Davis Hart (HDH), Heritage, K & L, Morrell & Company (Morrell), Sothebys, 
Spectrum, and Zachys. In addition to price, other variables in the dataset contain information 
regarding the producer, vineyard, vintage, auction date, sales location, bottle size, and lot size for 
each bottle sold. 
6.1 Selection of Wines  
To minimize potential region and producer specific effects, I restrict attention to sales from 
wines produced in Bordeaux or Burgundy. Wines produced from these regions are often prized 
for both their quality and aging potential (Robinson, 1999). Given their demand, wines from 
Bordeaux and Burgundy are most targeted by counterfeiters (Kapon, 2006). Wines from other 
regions are also counterfeited16, but the list of potential marks is limited.   
                                                          
16 Wines from other regions targeted by counterfeiters include Screaming Eagle from California’s Napa Valley and 
Penfolds Grange from Australia. 
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 A further restriction limits attention to wines from highly rated vintages with at least 50 
sales observations17 from 2003-2015 in the effort to capture pre and post-intervention sales 
prices.  A highly rated vintage was given a rating of at least an 85/100 by tasting experts (Leve, 
2016; Parker, 2015). These wines often take longer to mature, appear more frequently at auction, 
and have a higher likelihood of being purchased as an investment. For example, a bottle of 1981 
Lafite (a vintage rated 84 by expert Jeff Leve) can be found for under $400 while a case of  the 
1982 vintage (with a rating of 96) recently sold for $55,000 ($4,600 a bottle) (Leve, 2016).  In 
total, the vintages selected range from 1929-2002 and include 116,094 observed sales of 286 
unique wines.18 These wine account for a significant percentage of all auction house sales. In 
2011, the sales of the included wines represented more than a third of the total sales revenue for 
all auction houses combined.  
6.2 Description of Independent Variables 
Each of the 286 wines is categorized by a unique combination of producer, vineyard, and 
vintage.  These individual wine fixed effects are used in the regression models to control for 
differences in value. In addition to capturing all producer, vineyard, and vintage effects, the 286 
fixed effects dummies also capture region specific effects.    
 The model also controls for auction date, location, and bottle size, and lot size. Dates of 
sale are grouped by quarter to control for changes in price not associated with counterfeiting 
accusations (i.e. market supply and demand).  The value of collectible wine tends to follow the 
                                                          
17 Sales observations are measured in lots.  Lots usually contain between 1-12 bottles of the same wine, and multiple 
lots of the same wine can be offered at a single auction. 
18 Due to the sales criterion and required designation of whether or not a wine is likely to be counterfeited, not all 
vintages could be included for each producer.  For instance, Margaux is only included for 11 of the 20 Bordeaux 
vintages. A listing of all wines and vintages is included in the appendix.  
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global economy.  Prices generally rise during economic expansions and wane during 
contractions.  
 Discrepancies between import fees, taxes, shipping, or other non-bottle specific costs 
may result in price differences between locations. Thus, I include dummy variables for each 
location (Asia, Europe, Internet, and North America).  
 Size dummies control for the volume of wine per bottle.  92% (N=106,255) of all sales 
observed were for 750ml bottles while the other 8% (N=9,809) were for larger format bottles 
(1.5L and larger).  Apart from the difference in volume, larger format wines are expected to age 
at a slower pace and are also often shown as centerpieces to a collection.  These bottles generally 
sell for a premium beyond that expected by volume alone (i.e. the larger the bottle, the higher the 
price/ml).  
 The number of bottles in each lot separated into two variables. The first variable controls 
for the number of bottles in the lot.  Generally, larger lots sell for a higher price per bottle than 
lots with fewer bottles. It is expected that wines from the same lot will have a similar storage 
history and taste more homogenous than wines from separate lots.  
 The second lot size variable is a binary variable designating whether the sale was part of 
a full case (or more) of twelve 750ml bottles, six 1.5L bottles, or two 3L bottles.  Cases of wine 
often come in decorative wooden crates providing aesthetic value for consumers wanting to 
display their collection.  A full case may also signal that the wine was originally purchased as an 
investment, increasing the chances that the bottles have been properly stored.  As such, there is 
generally a significant increase in price for wines sold by the case. 
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6.2.1 Determining Wines Likely to be Counterfeited 
The triple difference regression framework classifies each wine into one of two groups 
depending upon whether or not the wine has been or is likely to have been counterfeited. 
Counterfeiters may target certain wines based upon their value, perceived risk of discovery, or 
effort required to generate the counterfeit.  Wines were labeled as likely to be counterfeited 
based upon lists provided by third-party authentication experts (City National Bank, 2015; 
Downey, 2012; Gray, 2014; Haughney, 2015; Robinson, 2014).   In general, price appears to be 
the major factor for determining whether or not a wine is considered a potential for 
counterfeiting.  William Edgerton, a third-party expert, has noted that, “any wine over $1,000 is 
fair game [for counterfeiters] ” (City National Bank, 2015). 19 
 It is likely that the $1,000 price point is not a firm threshold for counterfeiters.  In the 
effort to create a rigid cut-point differentiating wines likely to be counterfeited from those 
unlikely to be counterfeited, all wines with a maximum annual average price between $601-$999 
were excluded from the triple difference regressions.  
 Wines deemed unlikely to be counterfeited have a maximum annual average of $600 for 
all years between 2006 and 2012.20  Given that these wines are unlikely to be faked, auction 
house reputation should only have a minimal effect (if any) on the price. Appendix 4 provides a 
list and designation (by counterfeit group) of the wines included in the regression model. 
                                                          
19 Wines considered likely to be counterfeited from the Bordeaux region include various vintages of Lafite, Latour, 
Mouton, Margaux, Haut Brion, Petrus, Cheval Blanc, Palmer, Lafleur, Latour a Pomerol, Trotanoy, and La Mission 
Haut Brion.  From Burgundy, producers include Domaine De La Romanee Conti (DRC), Ponsot, Dujac, Henri 
Jayer, and De Vogue. 
20  The control group includes less valuable vintages from the group above as well as wines from other respected 
producers (including Leoville Las Cases, Montrose, Ducru-Beaucaillou, Calon Segur, Leoville Barton, Leoville 
Poyferre, Lynch Bages, Talbot, La Lagune, Cos D’estournal, Palmer, and  Beychevell from Bordeaux and Jadot, 
Leroy, Louis Latour, Bonneau, Mommessin, and Faively from Burgundy). 
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6.3 Description of Dependent Variables 
The regression models used in this analysis focus on the effects of a counterfeiting disclosure on 
an auction house’s equilibrium sales prices and quantities.  The price of each bottle is first 
calculated by adding any buyer’s commission fees to the hammer price of each lot.  This number 
is then divided by the number of bottles in the lot to find the per bottle price.21 In the regressions 
using price as the dependent variable, each observation represents the sale of a single lot.   
 For the regressions with quantity as the dependent variable, each observation represents 
the number of bottles of wine i that were sold by one auction house during a single time period. 
Unlike price, the values for quantity do take lot size into consideration.  
 For each wine included in the study, I observe all sales from the selected auction houses. 
Provided two minor assumptions, it is important to note that the data on quantity does not suffer 
from any censoring issues. The first assumption states that there are still authentic bottles of each 
wine sold in the market.  I also assume that each auction house is willing to sell authentic bottles 
of each wine selected.  By making these assumptions, we have no missing observations.  If an 
auction house doesn’t sell a wine during the specified time period, the value for 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is 0. 
Without these assumptions, we would not be able to differentiate between auction houses with 
no sales and those not in the market.22  
 
 
                                                          
21 Given a buyer’s commission fee of 20%, the price per bottle from a 12 bottle lot with a hammer price of $5,000 
would be $500. ($5,000*1.2)/12 
22 For instance, these assumptions prevent the study of the counterfeit Ponsot wines from the 2008 counterfeiting 
discovery.  Because the authentic wines were never produced, some houses may have been unwilling to sell any 
bottles. I try to avoid this issue by limiting the selection to only include wines with at least 50 sales observations. 
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6.4 Disclosure Dates and Selection of Houses Implicated 
2008 Study  
On April 23, 2008, Acker Merrall & Condit was sued by Bill Koch for selling counterfeit bottles 
consigned by Rudy Kurniawan in 2005-2006. Two days later, only minutes before an Acker 
auction, bottles consigned from Kurniawan were withdrawn from sale after they were declared 
counterfeit (Hellman, 2008). The identified winemaker for those bottles was at the auction and 
publicly declared he never produced those specific wines. For this case, Acker is the treatment 
house (House=1) accused of selling/authenticating counterfeit wine and Bonhams & Butterfields, 
Hart Davis Hart, Morrell & Company, Sotheby’s, and Zachys are the control houses not 
implicated (House=0).23 The 2008 study includes sales from April 1, 2007-March 31, 2009. 
Because no auction house sales were held between April 23-April 25, 2008, April 23, 2008 is 
used as the treatment date for the DD and DDD regressions.   
2012 Study 
The second disclosure studied in this manuscript involves the arrest of Rudy Kurniawan in 
March 2012 for counterfeiting wine. To test whether or not auction house reputation suffered 
after this scandal, I treat Acker, Christies, and Spectrum as the treatment group of auction houses 
accused of selling counterfeit bottles. Acker publicly accepted consignments of Kurniawan’s 
wines from 2006-2008 and continued to privately accept consignments until at least 2011, 
Christie’s accepted consignments from 2006-2012, and Spectrum held the February 2012 auction 
that helped lead to Kurniawan’s arrest (Hellman, 2017; Hernandez, 2012; Wine Berserkers, 
2012). Bonhams & Butterfields, Hart Davis Hart, Heritage Auctions, K&L Wines, Morrell & 
                                                          
23 Christies is not included in this set of regressions because of a similar, but less publicized, withdrawal of 
counterfeits in 2007.  
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Company, Sotheby’s, and Zachys are the control houses not implicated (House=0). The time 
dummy in the model denotes whether the sale occurred before or after March 8, 2012 (the date 
Rudy Kurniawan was arrested). Sales observations range from April 1, 2011-March 31, 2013.  
7 Results  
7.1 Equilibrium Prices Following the 2008 Disclosure  
The base 2008 Difference-in-Difference regression model covers 8,785 sales of 178 unique 
wines, an average of 49.2 sales per wine.  As indicated in Column 1 of Table 3, the results 
appear contrary to expectations. Equilibrium prices for bottles auctioned by Acker, Merrill and 
Condit, the wine house implicated in the 2008 fraud allegations, rose by more than 8% (Time and 
House) compared to those from auction houses not accused in the year following the disclosure. 
 A possible factor for the base model findings may be due to Acker’s timely expansion 
into the Asian market after Hong Kong’s February, 2008 removal of beer and wine duties (See 
Table 4). Asian auction prices during the model time period were generally higher than their 
European, North American, and internet counterparts, possibly a result of their relative market 
infancy and relatively limited susceptibility to reputational changes. Given that both the 2008 
and 2012 fraud discoveries were primarily based on North American auctions, it is possible that 
consumers in other locations were less aware of those charges and thereby less prone to make 
changes in the prices they were willing to pay. For this reason, Column 2 in Table 3 only reflects 
sales conducted from North America. Yet, restricting the model to the North American market 
(Column 2) found Acker’s prices rose nearly 9% compared to other houses in the year following 
the counterfeiting scandals.   
 Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 limit the regression model to sales of cases/large-format 
bottles and very expensive ($2,000+) bottles, respectively. Twelve-bottle cases, large-bottle 
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wines and expensive wines are often purchased for investment rather than consumption.  As 
such, many of these lots are accompanied by original purchase receipts and a full-storage history 
to address concerns that the bottles may be either counterfeit or have been poorly stored.  
Investors may be more concerned with auction house reputation if wines would require re-
authentication for future resale. The coefficients for β5  (Time and House) in both Columns 3 and 
4 are smaller than those from the Base DD and North American Columns, but remain both 
positive and significant.  Acker’s prices for cases and large formats rose by 5% after April 2008 
while the prices for very expensive bottles rose by more than 7%. To study the full equilibrium 
effects of the disclosure, we must also look at the equilibrium quantities of bottles sold for these 
specifications. The findings are presented in Section 7.2. 
 Another rationale for the increase in equilibrium prices involves unobservable factors 
unique to each individual auction. Acker was often praised for providing customers with highly 
detailed catalogs, pre-auction wine tastings, and gourmet dinners that may have enhanced 
consumer experience (Kapon, 2007; McInerney, 2008). Other unobservable characteristics 
include shipping fees, bidder excitement, auction timing (e.g., currency fluctuations), and 
personal relationships with the auctioneer.  Including wines unlikely to be counterfeited should 
help control for the unobservable characteristics of each auction.  
 7.1.1 Triple Difference Estimates (DDD)  
The 2008 triple difference regression (Table 5) includes an increased sample size, bringing the 
totals to 286 wines and 14,189 observed sales.  Column 1 of Table 5 displays the estimates for 
the full DDD model.  These figures show positive, yet insignificant, results for 𝛽𝛽8 (Time, Fake, 
and House). The coefficient for 𝛽𝛽5 (Time and House) appears to capture many of the unobserved 
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effects of the DD model, noting that prices for all wines sold by Acker rose compared to those 
sold by other auction houses.  
 As with the DD model, this finding can at least partially be attributed to Acker’s position 
as a leading house in the Asian market. Including the data from all sales, from 2007-2009, 
auctions in Asia generated sales prices more than 20% higher than auctions elsewhere. Column 2 
limits the model to only include North American sales.  While the DDD coefficient is smaller 
than that found in the DD model for North American sales, it remains significantly positive. The 
response is also more than three times larger than that of the base model.  In North America, 
Acker’s price for wines likely to be counterfeited rose by more than 4% in the year following the 
April 2008 events compared to other auction houses. 
 Column 3 limits the analysis to sales of wines from Burgundy. Burgundy represents a 
much smaller geographical region than Bordeaux and only accounts for 13% of all sales in the 
dataset.   However, due to its limited production and increasing popularity among collectors, 
many of the most expensive wines in the world originate from this region.  One particular 
example, Domaine de la Romanee-Conti’s Romanee Conti, was also the favorite of Rudy 
Kurniawan (Hernandez, 2012).24 As the wines pulled from auction were also Burgundy, it is 
possible prices of Burgundy sold by Acker would decrease more than the prices of other wines 
after April 2008. The results show the opposite to be true.  In the DDD regression (Time, Fake, 
and House) including wines unlikely to be counterfeited, prices of Burgundy auctioned by Acker 
rose by nearly 12% relative to those sold by the control houses.25   
                                                          
24 Due to his affinity for DRC, Rudy earned the moniker Dr. Conti.  It was even included as his alias during trial in 
2012. 
25 It should be noted that this model produces results with the poorest fit among the six DDD equations.  The 
average number of observations per wine (22.5) is significantly lower than that of the next lowest model (Equation 2 
averages 38.4).  
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 Column 4 reflects sales of older wines produced before 1986.26  Experts have noted a 
higher ratio of counterfeit-to-authentic bottles for older vintages, leading to speculation that 
consumer response to fraud may be stronger for this subgroup (Bell, 2014; City National Bank, 
2015; Hirsch, 2012).  This estimation does result in a negative, albeit insignificant, coefficient 
for the DDD term in support of this theory.    
 All models in this analysis rely on the assumption that changes in sales prices are 
consistent for all regions (i.e. no arbitrage).  Even for auctions held only a few weeks apart, 
product availability and fluctuation in exchange rates may cause uneven shifts in prices the base 
DDD model cannot capture. The base model uses continent and quarterly fixed effects, and, if 
prices in one part of the world changes at a different pace than others, the model estimates may 
be confounded. Through the use of semiannual continent fixed effects, Column 5 tests whether 
price follows similar trends worldwide. The strong resemblance between these estimates and 
those for Column 1 supports this assumption, suggesting the price differential between sales 
locations remained consistent over time. 
 Column 6 limits the regression to the sale of bottles produced after 1994.27 This helps 
provide a comparison to the results of Column 4 to test whether reputation is more important for 
older wines. The coefficients for the DDD term are again insignificant, but the reduction in 
significance for many of the auction house fixed effects does hint that consumers may be more 
                                                          
26 Laurent Ponsot has claimed that as much as 80% of pre-1980 Burgundy on the market is counterfeit. Restricting 
the model to pre-1980’s vintages produces similar results to Column 4, but with much larger standard errors.  Both 
1982 Bordeaux and 1985 Burgundy are considered fully mature and have been praised as outstanding vintages by 
critics. Given the high prices bottles from these vintages command, they are also commonly counterfeited. 
27 I chose this cutoff as bottles from 1990 (the last great vintage before 1995) were finally reaching the prime 
drinking window while the newer vintages were still likely to improve.   
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concerned with house reputation for older wines. A study of the equilibrium quantities is 
expected to provide additional evidence in regards to this theory. 
7.2 Equilibrium Quantities  
In order to determine whether auction houses suffer a loss in reputation following a 
counterfeiting disclosure, we must also study the quantity of wine sold by each house. To 
account for the differences in frequency in which certain wines appear at auction, a logarithmic 
transformation was performed on the dependent variables for the OLS regressions, log(1+𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). 
 For these regressions, it is important to remember that quantity is a count variable with a 
lower bound of 0.  The use of linear regression models can provide good estimates for the 
average partial effects, but these estimates could also prove problematic, given that the estimates 
can produce negative values for quantity (Wooldridge, 2010). As such, each of the equations was 
also run using a negative binomial regression model (NegBin II). Along with Poisson regression 
models, negative binomial models are often used when the outcome of interest is a count 
variable. These models use an exponential functional form and have the added advantage of 
being able to directly estimate the effects of each model, E(y|x) without the logarithmic 
transformation used with the OLS model, E[log(1+y)|x].   
 Negative binomial models are often preferred to Poisson models when the data suffers 
from overdispersion (i.e. the conditional variance is greater than the mean). Specifically, the 
NegBin II model assumes that the amount of overdispersion is expected to increase with the 
mean. For the regression estimating the quantity of bottles supplied, it is expected that the 
NegBin II model specification will provide more accurate and interpretable estimates than an 
OLS or Poisson model.  
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 7.2.1 Equilibrium Quantities Following the 2008 Disclosure 
Table 8 displays the difference-in-difference estimates for changes in the quantity of bottles 
Acker sold following the 2008 counterfeiting study. Given the results for the prices models, the 
findings for quantity sold are not surprising.  While statistically insignificant, the results from the 
base NegBin II DD model in Column 2 suggest Acker was able to increase the quantity of wines 
sold following the discovery. When combined with the results from Column 1 of Table 3, these 
estimates indicate an increase in the demand curve for wines offered by Acker that are valuable 
enough to counterfeit.  
 Column 3 displays estimates from a model restricting observations to wines produced 
before 1986. While the estimates for the change in equilibrium quantities of older wines are still 
positive, they are only a seventh of the size of the base model. These findings provide further 
evidence about the relationship between product uncertainty and firm reputation. Of all the 
model specifications performed on the prices following the 2008 event (Tables 3 and 5), the only 
estimate with a negative coefficient for the treatment effect dealt with older wines.    
 Columns 4 of Table 8 focuses on the sales of cases and large format bottles The negative 
coefficient for the treatment variable suggests that, like consumers of older wines, buyers of full 
cases and large format bottles may be more sensitive to the disclosure of negative information. 
The increase in equilibrium prices found in Table 3 may have been a result of a decrease in the 
supply curve of these wines, and not from an outward shift in demand curve (as found in the base 
model). 
 The results from a model restricting the selected wines to only include sales from 
expensive $2,000+ wines (Column 5) in largely reflects the base model, noting an increase in 
Acker’s demand curve for these wines in the year following the April 2008 discovery. 
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 7.2.2 Triple Difference Estimates  
Estimates from models including sales from wines unlikely to be counterfeited are displayed in 
Table 9. Interpreting the treatment effect for the DDD models on quantity supplied is not as 
straightforward as with the DD models for supply or DDD models for prices.  It is likely that 
consignments of wine unlikely to be counterfeited are at least partially dependent upon house 
reputation.  
 When individuals decide to sell wine at auction, they generally consign all bottles (to be 
sold during that time period) through a single auction house due to negotiation costs and 
consignment fees (larger consignments often have lower fees). Frequently, these consignments 
contain wines of varying price points. Some wines may be valuable enough to counterfeit while 
others are not. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in auction house reputation is likely to affect the 
quantity of all bottles supplied.  Any reputation loss lowers the expected price sellers receive for 
wines likely to be counterfeited, decreasing the total benefit for the entire collection, and thus, 
the likelihood that an auction house is offered the consignment. For this reason, it is not clearly 
apparent how to interpret treatment effects with the DDD models. If we believe that the supply 
of wines unlikely to be counterfeited is not independent from the supply of wines likely to be 
counterfeited, it may be best to interpret the treatment effect by adding the coefficient for 𝛽𝛽6 
(Time and House) to 𝛽𝛽7 (Time, Fake, and House).  
 Using this method to calculate the treatment effect, we see a strong resemblance between 
the DD and DDD models. The base model (Column 2) shows a 9% increase in the quantity of 
bottles supplied by Acker following the disclosure. When combined with the 1% increase in 
equilibrium prices found with the base DDD prices model (Column 1 of Table 5), it is evident 
that Acker did not suffer a loss in reputation following the 2008 disclosure.  
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 A model restricting the sales to North America (Column 3) does shows a 24% reduction 
in the quantity of bottles sold by Acker in the year following the disclosure.  Yet, it is expected 
that the real cause for this result was due to Acker’s choice to focus on expanding sales in Asia.  
The base DDD price model found that auctions in Asia generated sales prices more than 20% 
higher than auctions in other locations, and the results from this regression and Table 4 simply 
show Acker chose to focus on the Asian marketplace more than nearly all other auction houses. 
7.3 Equilibrium Prices Following the 2012 Disclosure 
The 2012 difference-in-difference base equation (Column 1 of Table 6) covers a total of 15,471 
sales observations of 178 unique wines. The most important finding is the significantly negative 
coefficient for the treatment effect, Time and House, noting that relative prices for Acker, 
Christies, and Spectrum dropped by more than 4% in the year following Mr. Kurniawan’s arrest. 
Unlike the 2008 case, the evidence obtained from the formal arrest of Rudy Kurniawan may have 
been too much for consumers to overlook or ignore.  The 2008 study involved significantly 
fewer counterfeit bottles and was based on allegations of fraud by the purported winemaker 
rather than criminal charges from law enforcement (Hellman, 2015; Wallace, 2012). 
 Although, as in 2008, bottles sold in Asia sold for a higher price than those auctioned 
elsewhere, the price differential is much smaller than those from the 2008 case.  For example, 
sales prices from North American auctions were 18% lower relative to Asia for the 2008 study 
(Table 3), but only 9% for the 2012 study (Table 6). The results displayed in Table 4 suggest a 
possible explanation. As more auction houses focused on the Asian market, the increase in the 
quantity of bottles supplied likely contributed to the lower price premiums.   
 As with the 2008 DD regression, Column 2 of Table 5 restricts sale price data to the 
North American market.  The results, however, are very different. Whereas prices in the North 
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American sustained the highest relative gains in the 2008 study, they show the highest relative 
losses in the 2012 study of more than 7%.  Column 3 also indicates a significant drop of nearly 
7% for the prices of cases and large formats sold by the houses accused of accepting counterfeits. 
 In addition to sales of cases and larger volume bottles, buyers of the most valuable wines 
may behave in a different manner due to higher prices and increased rarity.  Column 4 explores 
this possibility to see if buyers of the most expensive bottles (having an average annual sales 
price of at least $2,000) were more sensitive to the counterfeiting allegations. The coefficient for 
this Column is the only insignificant finding for the treatment effect in the DD regressions.  The 
relative price decrease for these very expensive wines was less than 1.5 %.   
 The DD model does not control for outside factors affecting the prices of all wines, and it 
is possible that the houses implicated could have reduced advertising expenses or suffered a loss 
in auction turnout as a result of the negative information.  As with the 2008 case, the full DDD 
model will address this consideration.  
 7.3.1 Triple Difference Estimates (DDD)  
The base triple difference regression (Table 7) covers 25,078 observations, representing the sale 
of 170,711 total bottles and 286 different wines. This regression, like the DD models, indicates a 
decrease in equilibrium prices for the wine houses associated with the 2012 disclosure. The 
inclusion of an additional control group for wines unlikely to be counterfeited produced a smaller 
relative loss (3%) than the base DD regression (4.4 %), but the result remains significant.   
 Column 2 restricts sales to North America, and finds that prices from the treatment group 
for all wines (Time and House) showed a significant relative loss of 6+ %.  The coefficient for 
wines likely to be counterfeited (Time, Fake, and House) indicates an additional relative loss of 
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only 0.1% compared to the treatment group of wines unlikely to be counterfeited. Some buyers 
may have chosen to boycott all sales from the auction houses implicated. 
 Column 3 tested if there was a stronger reaction for older bottles of wine, using the same 
model as Column 4 from Table 5.  As noted previously, many of the wines Mr. Kurniawan 
consigned were from older vintages. A lack of production records and anti-counterfeiting 
measures make many older wines an easy target for counterfeiters. In this model, I find a 
treatment effect of more than 8% following the disclosure. These results are fairly consistent 
between Asia and North America, with both regions showing a similar relative drop in 
equilibrium prices for wines sold by Acker, Christies, and Spectrum. 
 Another explanation for the price drop of Acker, Christies, and Spectrum is through a 
change in average observable characteristics during the time period. Once Mr. Kurniawan was 
arrested, the average bottle condition may have suffered for the houses if no other counterfeiters 
were able to supply bottles of the same observable quality.  Instead of punishing the auction 
houses implicated, the price drop may be due to a change in the average observable condition for 
each wine.   
 To test whether changes in observable bottle condition caused the drop in prices, Column 
4 uses sales of cases or large format bottles while Column 5 contains wines produced after 1994.  
The tighter dispersion of auction house and geographic fixed effects as well as the improved 
model fit suggest bottle condition is more uniform for cases, large formats, and newer wines. The 
significant relative drop in prices of more than 6% for case and large format sales largely 
supports the base model, implying that a change in bottle condition was not the cause for the 
price decrease. 
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 Column 5 limits the regression to bottles produced after 1994 and uses the same setup as 
that restriction from the 2008 study.  This regression model also allows us to test for differences 
in purchasing behavior for wines from newer vintages when these results are compared to those 
from Column 3.  Many producers began taking significant steps to prevent counterfeiting in the 
latter stages of the 20th Century (McCoy, 2007). These techniques began with specific bottle 
etchings or label identifiers and have continued to become more sophisticated with each passing 
year.   
 As the results show, sales prices for newer bottles were not affected to the same degree as 
sales of older wines.  Knowledge of anti-counterfeiting measures may have given consumers 
increased confidence in the authenticity of younger wines, regardless of seller reputation.  Newer 
wines were offered during the Cellar I, Cellar II, and subsequent Kurniawan auctions, but most 
of the contested bottles were from older vintages (Hellman & Frank, 2009; Kapon, 2006).  While 
the 2008 comparison between older and younger wines yielded insignificant results, both studies 
provide evidence that reputation is more valuable when buyer uncertainty increases.   
 The retail sector may also be a cause for the diminished DDD coefficients found with 
younger wines. Relative Differences in auction house fixed effects are smaller for newer 
vintages, likely due to both similarities in observable characteristics and availability of these 
wines in the retail sector.  The increased availability means that the price differences between 
retail and auction are likely smaller for newer vintages, leaving less room for reputational losses 
in the model. 
 Other regressions (including those using semiannual region controls) were also tested, 
and the results were near identical to their base model counterparts.   
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7.4 Equilibrium Quantities Following the 2012 Disclosure  
Results from the effects of the 2012 disclosure on equilibrium sales quantities are displayed in 
Tables 10 and 11. While insignificant, the estimates for the base DD NegBin II model in Column 
2 show that Acker, Christies, and Spectrum sold 6% fewer bottles of wines likely to be 
counterfeited in the year following the arrest of Rudy Kurniawan. Column 3 shows a decrease of 
nearly 9% in the quantity of older bottles sold, and Column 5 shows a highly significant 
reduction of more than 32% in the quantity of very expensive $2,000+ bottles sold.  
 The only regression showing a positive change in quantity dealt with the sales of full 
cases and large format bottles (Column 4). A time lag between the date bottles are consigned and 
when they are sold may mitigate the size and significance of our findings from Columns 2-5.  
The process of cataloging, shipping, authenticating, and advertising a consignment often takes 
months. Seller’s midway through the auction process when Kurniawan was arrested could have 
decided to continue with a planned sale due to the additional costs associated with starting the 
process over again using another firm. These costs are likely higher for shipments of full cases 
and large format wines, due to the additional shipping costs associated with each lot. 
 To test whether a potential lag could be affecting the estimates for the treatment effect, I 
compared sales from March 2011-March 2012 with those from September 2012 (six months 
after Kurniawan’s arrest) to September 2013. The results, displayed in Column 4 of Table 9, 
show a significant decrease in the quantity of wines sold by Acker, Christies, and Spectrum. A 
model using sales from September 2011-September 2012 as the control time period also yielded 
similar results. In general, the DD results show a decrease in the quantity of all wines sold by the 
three auction houses implicated. This is evidenced by a negative coefficient for Time and House 
across nearly all models.  
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 7.4.1 Triple Difference Estimates Following the 2012 Disclosure 
Table 11 provides the estimates using a DDD model and shows. These estimates are again 
largely supportive of the DD regressions displayed in Table 10. The base NegBin II model 
(Column 2) shows a 6% decrease in equilibrium sales quantities for the houses implicated while 
the model using lagged sales notes a decrease of nearly 20% from September 2012-September 
2013 (Column 4). 
8. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
8.1 Observations from the 2008 Study  
The results for the 2008 analysis suggest Acker did not suffer a loss in reputation after it was 
discovered the auction house authenticated 22 lots of counterfeit wines. These findings closely 
mirror the media coverage describing the events, which generally exonerated Acker for its role in 
the sale of counterfeits (Hellman, 2008; Hellman & Frank, 2009; McInerney, 2008; Wise, 2008). 
This lack of retribution may have provided encouragement for other auction houses (Christies 
and Spectrum) to accept bottles from Mr. Kurniawan (Wine Berserkers, 2012). 28 
 There are a few possible explanations for Acker’s ability to maintain its reputation after 
this incident.  Individuals may have felt this to be an isolated incident, and thus below the 
threshold needed to reconsider house reputation.   
 Another explanation involves the personal reputation of Rudy Kurniawan. After the April 
2008 auction, Acker publicly cut ties with Rudy Kurniawan and John Kapon (Acker’s CEO) 
offered an apology on a popular wine forum (Squires, 2008). Other individuals also came to 
                                                          
28 Mr. Kurniawan largely disappeared from public events after this event and began using middlemen in order to 
hide his consignments from the public. These middlemen include Darmawan Saputra, Antonio Castanos, Marc 
Lazar and Richard Brierley. However, it has been discovered that the auction houses often knew Kurniawan was the 
source behind bottles consigned by these individuals.  
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Kapon’s aid, providing personal testimonials on his behalf.  While the stories were not widely 
published until years later, it appears that some collectors may have become weary of wines 
consigned by Rudy Kurniawan before the April 2008 auction (Barzelay, 2012).  Because Rudy 
Kurniawan consigned so much wine through Acker, it is possible that consumers associated 
Kurniawan’s personal reputation with Acker’s. Unless the consignor was specifically named 
before the auction, some consumers may have assumed that Kurniawan was the source for all 
rare wines offered by Acker. This association could have depressed Acker’s prices prior to the 
2008 auction, in turn artificially increasing the results for the post-intervention change in prices.  
8.1.1 Acker’s Guarantee as Insurance 
For many years, Acker has offered a money back guarantee for all wines purchased at auction. 
Previous research on baseball cards suggests that having a product guarantee may have 
cushioned Acker from a drop in prices following the 2008 discovery of counterfeit wine (Haley 
& Van Scyoc, 2010; Jin & Kato, 2006). Auctions with buyers insurance were able to generate a 
significantly higher final sales price. A study on used tractors also hinted that warranties could 
downplay the importance of reputations, although many of the results were of little or no 
statistical significance (Roberts, 2011). Acker’s guarantee acts as a form of insurance for 
customers against counterfeit bottles, making the buyer feel more assured about the authenticity 
of each bottle offered.   
 Acker’s guarantee was also likely a major reason why Rudy Kurniawan was able to 
continue consigning wines after the April 2008 discovery (Hellman & Frank, 2009). As was later 
discovered, Acker previously accepted a series of returns from The Cellar auctions due to 
suspicions that the bottles were counterfeit. (Hellman, 2012; Hernandez, 2012; Wallace, 2012).  
In exchange for returning the counterfeit bottles, individuals may have been asked to sign non-
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disclosure agreements to prevent the information from becoming publicly available. This 
concealment may have limited the damage to Acker’s reputation while also allowing Kurniawan 
to continue consigning wine.  
8.2 Observations from the 2012 Study 
The arrest of Rudy Kurniawan and negative publicity surrounding the Spring 2012 Spectrum 
auction provide a stark contrast to the 2008 scandal.  Unlike the 2008 case, the FBI investigation 
provided concrete evidence against Mr. Kurniawan and the auction houses with which he was 
associated.  The regression estimates show Acker, Christies, and Spectrum suffered a loss in 
reputation as a result of the scandal.  The DDD estimates for prices indicate a relative price 
decrease between 3-8% from March 2012-March 2013 for the auction houses implicated. During 
the same time period, equilibrium sales quantities decreased by between 6-9%. A model looking 
at sales quantities from September 2012-September 2013 found a significantly larger effect of 
more than 20%.  Combined, these results indicate that Acker, Christies, and Spectrum suffered a 
downward shift in the demand curve caused by a loss in reputation as a result of the 
counterfeiting discovery.   
8.3 General Findings and Study Implications  
The cases studied in this manuscript track consumer behavior following two recent disclosures 
that auction houses had authenticated and offered counterfeit wine for sale. While the risk of 
fraud detection may be higher for auction houses selling a higher proportion of counterfeit wines, 
the discovery of a counterfeit bottle is a discrete event.  It is difficult to predict when the next 
counterfeiting allegation will be made, but recent evidence suggests the punishment received by 
the auction houses after the 2012 case was not strong enough for all firms to significantly 
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improve their authentication standards. Three new counterfeiting claims were brought against 
international auction houses from May 2015-April 2017; one of which involved counterfeit 
Burgundy authenticated by Acker Merrall & Condit  (Gray, 2015; Lichfield, 2016; Millar, 2017; 
Wang, 2017; Wine Berserkers, 2012).  
 Meanwhile, the number of remaining authentic bottles of each collectible wine decreases 
every year as some are consumed. Coupled with a growing worldwide demand for wine, the 
market has experienced in a steep increase in prices for older wines. In 2003, a bottle of 1945 
DRC Romanee-Conti could be purchased for less than $3,000.  At the height of the market in 
2011, a bottle of that same wine sold for $124,000.  While the appreciation has been most 
spectacular for the rarest bottles, nearly all collectable wines have become more valuable (Figure 
1).  
 An increase in the sales prices attracts more counterfeiters, and likely also increases 
consumer skepticism. It has been estimated that as much as 20% of the fine wine currently 
bought and sold worldwide is counterfeit (Krebiehl, 2017; Richard, 2013; Taylor, 2013). This 
ratio may only increase in the future as more counterfeit bottles are produced and authentic 
bottles are consumed. Results from the DDD model on prices (Table 7) note that the punishment 
received by auction houses was strongest for the wines most appealing to counterfeiters (older 
vintages and larger quantities). The negative coefficients for 𝛽𝛽6 (Time and Fake) also note that 
consumers may have felt growing distrust for all auction houses.  Increasing concerns regarding 
the authentication standards of all auction houses has led to the establishment of third-party firms 
that solely function as an authentication service. 
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8.3.1 Increasing Use of Third-Party Experts  
In May 2016, Sotheby’s auctioned 20,000 bottles from the collection of Bill Koch. In addition to 
the authentication offered by Sotheby’s, these wines were also inspected by third-party experts 
(Bloomberg Markets, 2014). Nearly all of the 2,730 lots sold above their pre-auction estimates as 
Sotheby’s CEO noted, “[buyers] were prepared to spend more money to acquire wines of 
impeccable quality (Meltzer, 2016).”  Many of the rarest wines from the collection sold for more 
than double the expected price. Results from this auction (and others where the wines have been 
vetted by a neutral party) can be used in future studies to estimate the adverse selection discount 
consumers place on wines sold at auction. 
 If neutral party experts are shown to instill more consumer confidence than the auction 
houses themselves, we may eventually find a scenario where auction houses solely function as a 
connecting agent between sellers and consumers (à la ebay). The separation of sales and 
authentication has become widely accepted in other collectibles markets with adverse selection; 
namely coins, autographs, and sports cards. 
8.4 Study Limitations and Future Projects 
Due to its reliance on repeat sales, the model used in this study is unable to assess the effects of 
counterfeiting scandals on reputation for the rarest and most expensive wines. As the rarest 
bottles most often receive the most pre-auction publicity, it is possible that reputation is even 
more valuable for these wines. The results for the limited number of older wines in this data set 
suggest that the three auction houses associated with Rudy Kurniawan may have suffered a 
larger decline in prices and quantities sold (compared to the results) for the rarest wines after his 
arrest.  
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 8.4.1 Future Projects 
The results from the 2012 study suggest that all auction houses suffered a decrease in demand as 
a result of the counterfeiting discovery. While most of the decrease was likely due to outside 
forces, some of the decrease may have been caused by a decrease in the reputation of all firms. 
Two approaches have been identified to provide further evidence in future studies of 
counterfeiting. The first involves tracking private and retail sales over the same time frame to 
study if the frequency and price of private trades also change after each case of fraud. The 
second involves a similar comparison between wines authenticated by auction houses and those 
from third-party experts.  
 The growing use of third-party experts also affords a variety of other new study topics. 
One involves a deeper investigation on the underlying incentives experts face.  The use of a 
third-party expert does not necessarily prevent fraud. If the individual buyer is not paying for the 
authentication, there may be incentives for an expert to authenticate counterfeit wine in order to 
increase future business (Hubbard, 1998). If the seller (or auction house) pays for the third-party 
authentication, we are left with the same potential issues consumers already face with the auction 
house authentication practices.  Nonetheless, recent sales from collections authenticated by third-
party experts obtained substantially higher prices than expected (Abernethy, 2017; Meltzer, 
2016). Will this trend continue over time?  
 To date, most of the research conducted on the theory of credence goods has focused on 
markets where the expert faces differential treatment costs (Bonroy, Lernarie, & Tropeano, 2013; 
U. Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006; Emons, 1997). An expert performing car maintenance, even if 
it isn’t necessary, faces higher costs than if no maintenance was performed at all. Unlike the 
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expert who provides a diagnosis and treatment, an authentication expert only performs a 
diagnosis (i.e. a certifying agent).  
 If certifiers are required to be truthful, it is possible to eliminate fraud in the market 
(Stahl & Strausz, 2017). Yet, requiring the certifier to be truthful may not always be applicable 
to real-world situations (Dranove & Jin, 2010). Some unique factors in the authentication of 
collectibles (i.e. technological advances, likelihood of product resale, possibility that the 
consumer utilizes multiple third-party experts) may allow for the derivation of certain 
equilibriums where third-party experts always provide the correct diagnosis, even if they are not 
required to. 
 However, there could be incentives for the expert to provide false information about other 
parts of the market.  An expert may overstate the true amount of fraud present in the market to 
increase the price differential between wines authenticated by a neutral expert and the auction 
house and bottles only authenticated by the auction house. Expert authenticators, such as Carfax, 
often employ scare tactics to induce consumers to have a product authenticated (Carfax, 2016).  I 
plan to test if, under certain conditions, experts will purposefully overstate the number of 
counterfeit goods publicly offered for sale.  These general market claims are separate from the 
individual bottle authentications, meaning that an expert caught overstating the number of 
counterfeit goods in the market may suffer no loss in individual reputation (i.e. consumers still 
believe the expert always provides the correct diagnosis for each individual bottle).  
8.5 Conclusion 
This manuscript analyzes consumer behavior following a discovery that an expert has 
authenticated counterfeit goods.  The results of this study show that, in the market for fine and 
rare wine, consumer reliance upon firm reputation can be an effective tool to punish firms for 
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authenticating counterfeit bottles. While not all disclosures result in a reputation loss, I find that 
three auction houses suffered significant reputation losses following the discovery that each 
house had authenticated a significant amount of counterfeit wine. This is shown through a series 
of difference-in-difference and triple difference regressions that control for other factors 
affecting consumer demand. 
 This study confirms results from multiple previous studies on credence goods, showing 
that reputation value increases with product uncertainty. It is hopeful that the theoretical model 
and estimation strategy used in this study will also prove useful for future studies on firm 
reputation in the market for credence goods. 
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Table 1.1: Bottle Characteristics- Producer Sales Volume per Year 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Auction House
Acker Merra l l  Condit 1,355 1,397 1,798 2,158 2,001 2,893 2,966 2,512 1,669 1,457 1,484
Bonhams & Butterfields 252 429 516 602 438 492 778 493 452 415 352
Chris ties 2,499 2,494 1,928 2,033 1,800 1,962 2,409 2,249 1,867 1,499 1,054
Hart Davis  Hart 582 653 1,057 1,408 931 1,616 1,863 1,028 1,247 1,123 1,020
Heri tage Auctions 520 302 228 325 221
K & L Wines 842 851 857 939 899
Morrel l  & Company 335 327 361 260 265 264 404 258 208 146 42
Sothebys 1,638 1,684 2,085 1,880 1,480 2,587 2,870 2,281 1,745 1,914 991
Spectrum Wine Auctions 178 1,200 1,418 759 396 482 393
Zachys 1,566 1,708 1,671 2,040 1,988 1,963 2,815 2,297 1,379 1,350 1,251
Producer
Lafi te 900 884 1,084 1,404 1,085 1,954 2,983 1,813 1,163 1,047 784
Latour 794 780 836 952 831 1,273 1,522 1,225 829 827 634
Mouton 956 1011 1,166 1,220 1,127 1,725 2,134 1,667 1,123 1,121 773
Margaux 668 741 832 961 867 1,220 1,612 1,184 944 862 630
Haut Brion 565 553 611 715 631 856 1,116 854 738 661 408
DRC La  Tache 216 318 342 355 365 400 437 465 313 348 258
Ponsot Clos  de la  Roche 81 41 43 45 58 41 35 60 47 62 31
DRC Romanee Conti 125 190 204 198 172 234 304 232 214 169 133
DRC Romanee St. Vivant 71 98 103 109 113 109 150 160 137 143 104
DRC Richebourg 129 130 144 134 134 165 200 188 157 137 108
Petrus 361 433 427 386 350 506 576 433 379 311 287
Cheval  Blanc 419 470 454 438 447 583 716 573 442 426 307
Le Pin 18 44 41 48 25 36 40 39 35 35 36
Dujac Clos  de la  Roche 19 30 30 20 24 33 20 27 36 32 32
Henri  Jayer Echezeaux 15 21 15 17 5 15 21 23 18 11 16
DRC Echezeaux 44 76 76 79 82 86 120 107 83 114 74
DRC Grands-Echezeaux 62 73 91 103 107 106 128 136 101 118 72
Ducru-Beaucai l lou 261 208 262 267 183 286 417 313 307 263 231
Calon Segur 90 78 132 148 90 136 143 131 117 142 146
Leovi l le Barton 192 199 165 168 133 198 299 204 234 192 187
Leovi l le Poyferre 110 102 93 125 87 127 159 114 114 122 109
Lynch Bages 336 444 408 454 350 502 821 550 507 472 422
Talbot 102 117 84 108 73 86 122 111 91 102 88
La Lagune 64 35 38 35 28 41 52 31 42 45 47
Beychevel le 85 137 55 94 83 96 120 109 93 126 88
Les  Forts  de Latour 27 24 27 61 47 62 117 65 85 91 60
Cos  d'Estournel 252 237 286 308 256 343 453 396 309 344 315
Mommess in Clos  de Tart 26 25 40 40 29 53 51 58 71 60 38
De Vogue Bonnes  Mares 36 40 34 53 49 43 48 56 43 42 44
Louis  Latour Corton-Charlemagne 21 38 39 27 19 18 19 24 13 35 27
Bonneau Corton-Charlemagne 19 21 20 16 25 22 27 35 17 20 19
Lafleur 62 78 83 89 78 92 89 77 82 48 59
Latour a  Pomerol 18 18 14 18 21 20 22 24 17 11 16
Trotanoy 31 33 40 42 27 43 39 43 36 31 21
La Miss ion Haut Brion 245 246 311 257 277 348 429 407 281 224 224
Leovi l le Las  Cases 335 270 337 428 336 563 640 503 345 429 361
Palmer 189 161 142 152 135 178 226 200 153 127 145
Montrose 184 178 195 196 229 249 345 242 198 223 222
Henri  Jayer Richebourg 6 14 5 4 8 16 17 18 9 4 7
Henri  Jayer Cros  Parantoux 42 37 52 34 25 60 58 63 62 26 67
De Vogue Mus igny 51 59 55 73 70 53 58 70 63 47 77
Continent
As ia 794 2,058 3,958 6,335 3,790 2,244 2,039 1,431
Europe 2,243 2,688 2,430 2,484 1,734 1,819 2,266 2,004 1,697 1,418 877
Internet 445 622 1,144 1,856 2,362 2,263 2,464 2,053
North America 5,984 6,004 6,986 6,658 4,667 6,056 6,428 4,874 3,844 3,729 3,346
Mean Price 
Bottle Unl ikely To be Faked $181 $214 $273 $250 $232 $293 $323 $282 $284 $278 $274
Bottle Likely to be Counterfei ted $1,388 $2,018 $2,550 $2,373 $2,241 $3,074 $2,981 $2,511 $2,656 $2,613 $2,769
Tota l 8,227 8,692 9,416 10,381 9,081 12,977 16,885 13,030 10,048 9,650 7,707
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Table 1.2: Auction House Sales by Year (in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Acker 16.6 17.0 20.9 60.3 59.9 59.8 44.2 98.5 111 83.3 63.8 61.8 69.9 
Zachys 15.3 26.0 33.8 34.7 52.4 47.7 50.7 56.5 79.0 70.2 53.0 45.2 55.5 
Sothebys 24.0 21.0 29.1 37.4 49.3 44.6 41.8 88.3 85.5 64.4 57.8 65.3 60.4 
Christies 31.0 36.0 42.0 58.6 58.1 55.7 42.4 71.5 85.3 83.8 68.0 53.0 57.2 
Hart Davis Hart   9.5 13.8 26.9 32.3 24.0 39.2 37.4 26.3 36.1 42.8 41.5 
Bonhams    7.5 7.3 9.83 4.87 7.19 16.5 16.1 18.2 13.3 17.9 
Spectrum       3.5 15.7 24.2 11.9 10.1 5.6 7.0 
Morrell & Co     6.1 4.1 1.87 5.8 3.9 2.9 1.7 2.4   
Heritage         11.9 7.1 7.1 12.3 7.2 
World Total 96 109 166 241 301 276 233 408 478 389 337 352 346 
Source: Wine Spectator            
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Table 1.3: 2008 Difference-in-Difference Price Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Base DD North America Case and Large  
Very 
Expensive 
    Format   
Acker Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.133*** -0.153*** -0.121*** -0.149*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0201) (0.0232) (0.0311) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0494*** -0.0510*** -0.0552*** -0.0837*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0202) (0.0197) 
Morrell & Company -0.174*** -0.172*** -0.164*** -0.207*** 
  (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0267) (0.0517) 
Sothebys 0.00378 0.00204 -0.0229 0.00566 
  (0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0223) (0.0384) 
Zachys -0.0663*** -0.0700*** -0.0913*** -0.0993*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0171) (0.0171) 
Time and House (DD) 0.0810*** 0.0849*** 0.0504** 0.0770*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0195) (0.0263) 
Asia Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Europe -0.138***  -0.101*** -0.183*** 
  (0.0223)  (0.0257) (0.0481) 
Internet -0.227***  -0.336*** -0.266*** 
  (0.0211)  (0.0826) (0.0324) 
North America -0.181***  -0.187*** -0.172*** 
  (0.0146)  (0.0172) (0.0163) 
Lot Size 0.00610*** 0.00565***  0.0149*** 
  (0.00155) (0.00141)  (0.00250) 
Case Dummy 0.0371*** 0.0472***  -0.0176 
  (0.0131) (0.0124)  (0.0154) 
Observations 8,785 7,017 3,669 3,001 
R-squared 0.816 0.830 0.921 0.758 
Number of Unique Wines 178 177 133 100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 1.4: Expansion of Sales into Asia 
Percentage of Lots Sold in Asia               
House 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Acker Merrall & Condit 18.54% 30.68% 49.12% 49.22% 37.06% 43.08% 40.77% 40.97% 
Bonhams & Butterfields 16.28% 21.69% 13.62% 17.74% 16.23% 15.04% 5.30% 9.09% 
Christies 3.59% 8.94% 23.29% 37.73% 29.44% 22.60% 24.28% 19.92% 
Sothebys  27.50% 50.06% 45.09% 37.62% 35.30% 38.40% 26.54% 
Spectrum Wine Auctions    73.70% 56.52%             
Zachys 10.93% 39.29% 36.58% 52.90% 36.13% 30.38% 24.00% 25.42%          
Percentage of Total Bottles Sold in Asia       
House 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Acker Merrall & Condit 25.35% 40.90% 61.80% 65.21% 55.36% 58.39% 55.32% 50.82% 
Bonhams & Butterfields 24.28% 25.91% 14.18% 20.18% 16.72% 12.17% 6.28% 7.31% 
Christies 3.38% 14.58% 29.43% 41.96% 33.62% 29.44% 30.47% 22.76% 
Sothebys  26.45% 49.32% 47.86% 37.41% 39.14% 42.67% 29.20% 
Spectrum Wine Auctions    86.55% 72.33%             
Zachys 14.07% 43.22% 42.46% 59.29% 42.61% 37.90% 30.89% 31.83%          
Percentage of Expensive ($2,000+/Bottle) Lots Sold in Asia     
House 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Acker Merrall & Condit 38.56% 52.43% 86.18% 79.84% 65.82% 71.68% 67.84% 65.90% 
Bonhams & Butterfields 24.43% 22.94% 44.67% 24.41% 18.60% 15.38% 4.31% 9.76% 
Christies 12.01% 26.03% 31.78% 53.40% 34.91% 50.66% 44.77% 26.00% 
Sothebys  47.09% 54.96% 60.05% 49.40% 44.03% 46.92% 42.89% 
Spectrum Wine Auctions    97.39% 58.06%             
Zachys 16.30% 48.60% 56.08% 76.38% 53.29% 55.87% 45.00% 55.27% 
Note: HDH, Heritage, K & L, and Morrell & Company have not auctioned wine in Asia. 
The values reported represent percentages based upon sales included in the data set. 
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Table 1.5: 2008 Triple Difference Price Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Base DDD North 
America 
Burgundy Old Wines Semiannual 
Continent 
New Wines 
Acker Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.111*** -0.122*** -0.196*** -0.186*** -0.0953*** -0.0704** 
  (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0403) (0.0390) (0.0188) (0.0310) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0238 -0.0129 -0.151*** -0.0694* -0.0275 -0.00585 
  (0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0417) (0.0394) (0.0178) (0.0274) 
Morrell & Company -0.138*** -0.124*** -0.203*** -0.198*** -0.141*** -0.0897** 
  (0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0492) (0.0355) (0.0174) (0.0349) 
Sothebys 0.0321 0.0444** -0.0684 -0.00454 0.0175 0.0250 
  (0.0201) (0.0207) (0.0485) (0.0377) (0.0205) (0.0384) 
Zachys -0.0491*** -0.0386** -0.178*** -0.0704* -0.0685*** -0.0632*** 
  (0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0162) (0.0237) 
Time and House 0.0580*** 0.0431** 0.0279 0.0978*** 0.0444*** 0.0568*** 
  (0.0145) (0.0175) (0.0474) (0.0340) (0.0152) (0.0199) 
Time and Fake -0.00431 -0.00494 -0.0262 0.00125 -0.0101 0.00330 
  (0.00895) (0.0101) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.00931) (0.0129) 
Fake and House 0.00887 0.0300 -0.151*** 0.0201 0.00477 -0.0323 
  (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0375) (0.0416) (0.0191) (0.0305) 
Time, Fake, and House(DDD) 0.0127 0.0436* 0.117** -0.0321 0.0156 0.0224 
  (0.0199) (0.0234) (0.0529) (0.0407) (0.0213) (0.0313) 
Asia Base  Base Base  Base 
  -  - -  - 
Europe -0.221***  -0.0929* -0.265***  -0.212*** 
  (0.0206)  (0.0560) (0.0365)  (0.0381) 
Internet -0.240***  -0.234*** -0.299***  -0.242*** 
  (0.0151)  (0.0349) (0.0289)  (0.0227) 
North America -0.207***  -0.171*** -0.217***  -0.203*** 
  (0.0118)  (0.0201) (0.0254)  (0.0157) 
Lot Size 0.00191 0.00148 0.00573** 0.00206 0.00147 0.00500** 
  (0.00137) (0.00130) (0.00235) (0.00234) (0.00135) (0.00210) 
Case Dummy 0.0434*** 0.0569*** 0.0136 0.0848*** 0.0562*** -0.0190 
  (0.00958) (0.00936) (0.0214) (0.0159) (0.00960) (0.0160) 
              
Observations 14,189 10,837 2,390 5,555 14,189 4,679 
R-squared 0.787 0.808 0.501 0.719 0.774 0.840 
Number of Unique Wines 286 282 106 141 286 86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 1.6: 2012 Difference-in-Difference Price Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Base DD North America Case and Large 
Format 
Very 
Expensive 
Acker Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.140*** -0.200*** -0.0636*** -0.101** 
  (0.0214) (0.0180) (0.0220) (0.0449) 
Christies 0.0237* -0.0484*** 0.0459** 0.0542** 
  (0.0127) (0.0110) (0.0190) (0.0261) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0721*** -0.103*** -0.0783*** -0.0411** 
  (0.0116) (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0183) 
Heritage Auctions -0.124*** -0.148*** -0.115*** -0.0867*** 
  (0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0224) (0.0222) 
K & L Wines 0.0163  -0.0700* 0.0736 
  (0.0192)  (0.0362) (0.0580) 
Morrell & Company -0.120*** -0.112*** -0.0475* -0.132*** 
  (0.0219) (0.0254) (0.0243) (0.0394) 
Sothebys -0.0254** -0.0768*** -0.00605 -0.0147 
  (0.0122) (0.0162) (0.0136) (0.0183) 
Spectrum Wine Auctions -0.144***  -0.0922*** -0.143*** 
  (0.0175)  (0.0245) (0.0295) 
Zachys -0.0726*** -0.0933*** -0.0744*** -0.0746*** 
  (0.0113) (0.0107) (0.0147) (0.0192) 
Time and House (DD) -0.0441*** -0.0710*** -0.0682*** -0.0145 
  (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0151) (0.0209) 
Asia Base  Base Base 
  -  - - 
Europe -0.116***  -0.0928*** -0.163*** 
  (0.0147)  (0.0148) (0.0302) 
Internet -0.183***  -0.130*** -0.271*** 
  (0.0193)  (0.0280) (0.0363) 
North America -0.0949***  -0.0982*** -0.117*** 
  (0.00825)  (0.0122) (0.0129) 
Lot Size -0.000230 0.000456  0.00740** 
  (0.00122) (0.00120)  (0.00361) 
Case Dummy 0.0670*** 0.0583***  0.0288 
  (0.0119) (0.00932)  (0.0257) 
          
Observations 15,471 6,090 6,657 4,908 
R-squared 0.775 0.778 0.892 0.669 
Number of Unique Wines 178 177 143 100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 1.7: 2012 Triple Difference Price Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Base DDD North 
America 
Old Wines Case and Large 
Format 
New Wines 
Acker Base Base Base Base Base 
 - - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.116*** -0.174*** -0.183*** -0.0539*** -0.0572*** 
  (0.0147) (0.0146) (0.0289) (0.0175) (0.0201) 
Christies 0.0174* -0.0317*** 0.0193 0.0322** 0.0377*** 
  (0.00950) (0.00957) (0.0203) (0.0136) (0.0115) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0229** -0.0568*** -0.0541** -0.00379 0.00948 
  (0.0113) (0.0147) (0.0231) (0.0141) (0.0154) 
Heritage Auctions -0.104*** -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.0866*** -0.119*** 
  (0.0122) (0.0157) (0.0241) (0.0193) (0.0154) 
K & L Wines 0.0364***  0.0153 -0.0152 0.0367* 
  (0.0119)  (0.0225) (0.0280) (0.0189) 
Morrell & Company -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.197*** -0.0645** -0.0428** 
  (0.0173) (0.0230) (0.0301) (0.0252) (0.0179) 
Sothebys 0.0103 -0.0500*** -0.0288 0.0365** 0.0265 
  (0.0108) (0.0151) (0.0228) (0.0143) (0.0160) 
Spectrum Wine Auctions -0.127***  -0.205*** -0.0991*** -0.0593*** 
  (0.0117)  (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0162) 
Zachys -0.0426*** -0.0638*** -0.0830*** -0.0289** -0.0289* 
  (0.00960) (0.0138) (0.0176) (0.0127) (0.0148) 
Time and House -0.0167 -0.0662*** 0.0192 -0.0145 -0.0249 
  (0.0114) (0.0163) (0.0254) (0.0147) (0.0160) 
Time and Fake -0.0334*** -0.0330*** 0.00174 -0.0392*** -0.0438** 
  (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0188) (0.0127) (0.0197) 
Fake and House 0.0338*** 0.0265* 0.0284 0.0573*** 0.0188 
  (0.0112) (0.0152) (0.0223) (0.0161) (0.0186) 
Time, Fake, and House (DDD) -0.0303* -0.00112 -0.0843** -0.0638*** -0.0123 
  (0.0179) (0.0211) (0.0383) (0.0237) (0.0264) 
Asia Base  Base Base Base 
 -  - - - 
Europe -0.110***  -0.185*** -0.0899*** -0.0711*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0272) (0.0116) (0.00959) 
Internet -0.164***  -0.239*** -0.126*** -0.108*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.0229) (0.0201) (0.0117) 
North America -0.100***  -0.142*** -0.0969*** -0.0843*** 
  (0.00710)  (0.0151) (0.00908) (0.00951) 
Lot Size -0.00256*** -0.00154 -0.00538***  -0.00105 
  (0.000732) (0.000946) (0.00162)  (0.000871) 
Case Dummy 0.0690*** 0.0641*** 0.119***  0.0377*** 
  (0.00684) (0.00668) (0.0149)  (0.00664) 
Observations 25,078 9,686 9,031 11,697 8,688 
R-squared 0.740 0.729 0.634 0.859 0.860 
Number of Unique Wines 286 284 141 249 86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 1.8: 2008 Difference-in-Difference Estimates for Quantity of Bottles Sold  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  OLS DD Negative  Old  Case and Very 
   Binomial  Wines  Large Format Expensive 
Acker Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -1.080*** -1.982*** -1.688*** -2.136*** -2.483*** 
  (0.0732) (0.138) (0.199) (0.209) (0.230) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.322*** -0.427*** -0.547*** 0.130 -0.667*** 
  (0.0665) (0.0957) (0.146) (0.167) (0.165) 
Morell & Company -1.227*** -2.395*** -2.069*** -2.053*** -3.135*** 
  (0.0749) (0.183) (0.221) (0.271) (0.374) 
Sothebys -0.0548 -0.00868 0.0183 0.344* -0.189 
  (0.0798) (0.104) (0.139) (0.198) (0.176) 
Zachys 0.174** 0.0925 0.238* 0.167 -0.0834 
  (0.0672) (0.0930) (0.130) (0.191) (0.148) 
Time and House (DD) 0.206*** 0.136 0.0181 -0.0641 0.103 
  (0.0682) (0.0998) (0.148) (0.210) (0.182) 
One Year-Six Months Prior Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - 
Six Months Prior-Disclosure  0.390*** 0.563*** 0.496*** 0.549*** 0.598*** 
  (0.0337) (0.0604) (0.0834) (0.113) (0.0915) 
Disclosure-Six Months Post -0.0137 -0.0296 -0.252** 0.0807 -0.293** 
  (0.0372) (0.0763) (0.110) (0.131) (0.145) 
Six Months -One Year Post 0.0859** 0.114 -0.00447 0.249* 0.104 
  (0.0406) (0.0833) (0.124) (0.134) (0.151) 
Observations 3,888 3,888 2,304 3,216 1,608 
R-squared 0.302      
Number of Unique Wines 162 162 96 134 67 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 1.9: 2008 Triple Difference Estimates for Quantity of Bottles Sold 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  OLS DDD Negative  North  
    Binomial  America 
Acker Base Base Base 
  - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.747*** -1.241*** -1.779*** 
  (0.0998) (0.133) (0.126) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0887 -0.152 -0.0803 
  (0.0975) (0.120) (0.111) 
Morell & Company -0.963*** -1.761*** -1.644*** 
  (0.0974) (0.150) (0.138) 
Sothebys 0.312*** 0.394*** -0.238** 
  (0.111) (0.123) (0.106) 
Zachys 0.435*** 0.349*** 0.322*** 
  (0.0972) (0.111) (0.104) 
Time and House 0.283** 0.0710 -0.122 
  (0.111) (0.138) (0.153) 
Time and Fake -0.0604** -0.0890* -0.0765 
  (0.0299) (0.0468) (0.0542) 
Fake and House 0.292** 0.339** 0.163 
  (0.113) (0.132) (0.120) 
Time, Fake, and House (DDD) -0.0766 0.0205 -0.150 
  (0.131) (0.169) (0.189) 
One Year-Six Months Prior Base Base Base 
  - - - 
Six Months Prior-Disclosure  0.308*** 0.394*** 0.391*** 
  (0.0319) (0.0509) (0.0551) 
Disclosure-Six Months Post 0.0391 0.0430 -0.0896 
  (0.0383) (0.0644) (0.0711) 
Six Months -One Year Post 0.0726* 0.0845 -0.0888 
  (0.0391) (0.0648) (0.0740) 
Observations 6,696 6,696 6,648 
R-squared 0.231    
Number of Unique Wines 279 279 277 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 1.10: 2012 Difference-In-Difference Estimates for Quantity of Bottles Sold 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS  Negative  Old  Case and  Very  Time Lag 
   Binomial  Wines  Large Format Expensive   
Acker Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -1.227*** -1.973*** -1.744*** -2.112*** -2.073*** -1.797*** 
  (0.0736) (0.154) (0.179) (0.256) (0.277) (0.131) 
Christies -0.139** -0.0807 0.102 -0.122 -0.172 0.321*** 
  (0.0567) (0.0774) (0.109) (0.129) (0.114) (0.0761) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.805*** -1.096*** -1.613*** -1.150*** -1.946*** -0.911*** 
  (0.0658) (0.109) (0.187) (0.159) (0.196) (0.104) 
Heritage Auctions -1.269*** -2.128*** -2.063*** -2.293*** -2.521*** -2.125*** 
  (0.0704) (0.128) (0.203) (0.206) (0.257) (0.121) 
K & L Wines -1.414*** -2.881*** -2.727*** -4.525*** -3.682*** -2.800*** 
  (0.0765) (0.127) (0.186) (0.296) (0.222) (0.121) 
Morell & Company -1.553*** -3.179*** -2.953*** -3.278*** -3.794*** -3.187*** 
  (0.0834) (0.141) (0.184) (0.197) (0.244) (0.141) 
Sothebys -0.253*** -0.197** -0.209 -4.15e-05 -0.736*** -0.0637 
  (0.0648) (0.0942) (0.139) (0.148) (0.144) (0.0867) 
Spectrum Wine Auctions -0.840*** -1.116*** -0.862*** -1.584*** -1.286*** -1.197*** 
  (0.0667) (0.0906) (0.122) (0.163) (0.167) (0.101) 
Zachys 0.0385 -0.0141 0.0374 -0.128 -0.642*** -0.0482 
  (0.0663) (0.0868) (0.113) (0.143) (0.141) (0.0833) 
Time and House (DD) -0.0457 -0.0671 -0.0927 0.0932 -0.387*** -0.230** 
  (0.0442) (0.0843) (0.129) (0.145) (0.143) (0.0940) 
One Year-Six Months Prior Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - - 
Six Months Prior- Disclosure 0.0739** 0.110* 0.116 -0.0130 0.311*** 0.124** 
Date (0.0285) (0.0604) (0.0875) (0.103) (0.106) (0.0603) 
Disclosure Date- Six Months -0.160*** -0.346*** -0.421*** -0.586*** -0.219   
Post (0.0303) (0.0727) (0.122) (0.122) (0.144)   
Six Months – One Year Post 0.0130 -0.0116 0.0456 -0.171 0.142 0.0293 
 (0.0335) (0.0750) (0.112) (0.128) (0.132) (0.0783) 
One Year Post- 18 Months       -0.490*** 
Post           (0.0740) 
Observations 6,480 6,480 3,840 5,520 2,680 6,480 
R-squared 0.309       
Number of Unique Wines 162 162 96 138 67 162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 1.11: 2012 Triple Difference Estimates for Quantity of Bottles Sold 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS  Negative  North Time  
   Binomial  America Lag  
Acker Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -1.244*** -1.573*** -1.286*** -1.433*** 
  (0.0728) (0.119) (0.130) (0.109) 
Christies -0.0514 -0.00692 -0.334*** 0.213*** 
  (0.0519) (0.0619) (0.0842) (0.0659) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.746*** -0.782*** 0.615*** -0.766*** 
  (0.0639) (0.0855) (0.103) (0.0861) 
Heritage Auctions -1.465*** -2.133*** -0.679*** -2.071*** 
  (0.0662) (0.101) (0.124) (0.0983) 
K & L Wines -1.422*** -2.399*** -14.18*** -2.289*** 
  (0.0653) (0.102) (1.289) (0.100) 
Morell & Company -1.680*** -2.807*** -1.918*** -2.777*** 
  (0.0691) (0.117) (0.151) (0.119) 
Sothebys -0.280*** -0.198** -0.124 -0.137* 
  (0.0657) (0.0846) (0.113) (0.0832) 
Spectrum Wine Auctions -0.839*** -1.024*** -14.83*** -1.125*** 
  (0.0540) (0.0731) (1.706) (0.0841) 
Zachys 0.00699 -0.0338 0.740*** -0.0958 
  (0.0631) (0.0782) (0.104) (0.0806) 
Time and House -0.0521 -0.0885 0.0680 -0.301** 
  (0.0684) (0.111) (0.158) (0.130) 
Time and Fake 0.0732*** 0.0505 0.101* 0.0171 
  (0.0247) (0.0473) (0.0586) (0.0432) 
Fake and House -0.0794 -0.0571 0.153 -0.0232 
  (0.0667) (0.0849) (0.131) (0.0876) 
Time, Fake, and House (DDD) 0.00644 0.0242 -0.0753 0.105 
  (0.0814) (0.138) (0.212) (0.158) 
One Year-Six Months Prior Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Six Months Prior-Disclosure Date 0.128*** 0.188*** 0.316*** 0.190*** 
  (0.0257) (0.0440) (0.0565) (0.0437) 
Disclosure Date--Six Months Post -0.224*** -0.348*** -0.383***   
  (0.0309) (0.0586) (0.0754)   
Six Months -One Year Post -0.0150 -0.0275 0.0524 0.0167 
  (0.0302) (0.0559) (0.0789) (0.0569) 
One Year Post- 18 Months Post    -0.433*** 
        (0.0525) 
Observations 11,160 11,160 11,120 11,160 
R-squared 0.283     
Number of Unique Wines 279 279 278 279 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Figure 1.1: Sales Patterns 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
TRANSITIVITY OF STATED PREFERENCES AND INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISITICS 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most common assumptions used in economics states that, given a set of feasible 
options, individuals will always choose the one that maximizes their well-being. Revealed 
preference theory allows for a variety of rationality tests regarding this assumption when 
multiple choices from the same individual can be observed. To satisfy the rationality tests, 
preferences must remain complete and transitive.  
 In this chapter, I study the rationality of stated preferences (referred to in the following as 
preferences) by examining whether they satisfy the principle of transitivity. The principle of 
transitivity states if A is revealed preferred to B and B is revealed preferred to C, then it should 
not be the case that C is revealed preferred to A.  Any response pattern failing to meet this 
criteria represents a failure of transitivity and is inconsistent with utility maximizing behavior.  
 A number of studies have utilized transitivity tests to study rationality, and it has been 
widely observed that individuals do not always satisfy transitivity (Lancsar & Louviere, 2006). 
Yet, in the field of health specifically, most studies have only evaluated transitivity on a binary 
scale (i.e., investigating only whether an individual’s preferences are transitive), ignoring both 
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the frequency and severity of any transitivity violations.29 A few studies have combined the 
frequency and severity of transitivity violations into a single measure, but no study has separated 
the two into individual measures of transitivity (Devlin, Hansen, Kind, & Williams, 2003; 
Lamers, Stalmeier, Krabbe, & Busschbach, 2006). This is likely due to the joint identification 
problem of quantity and severity. Using only a single measure of transitivity, it is impossible to 
differentiate respondents suffering multiple, less severe, failures of transitivity from those 
exhibiting fewer, but more severe, failures.  There may be important differences between these 
individuals that go unnoticed when the quantity and severity of transitivity failures are not 
evaluated individually. 
 I solve the identification problem by including two transitivity measures (Count and 
Order), one of which is nested inside the other, to evaluate both the quantity and severity of 
failures of transitivity displayed by each individual. The Order Measure of transitivity calculates 
the number of transitivity failures, while the Count Measure of transitivity combines both the 
number and severity of transitivity failures into a single value. The average severity of 
transitivity failures can then be determined by dividing values for the Count Measure by the 
Order Measure.   
 I employ these measures using responses from the Timing, Duration, and Lifespan (TDL) 
Study, an online, cross-sectional, survey of adults from the U.S. general population. In addition 
to various questions regarding each individual’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, 
respondents were asked to complete a series of questions regarding their preferences for health. 
These questions asked individuals to state their preferences over trade-offs between a longer 
                                                          
29 The severity of a transitivity violation has been measured in a variety of ways.  Some studies measure severity by 
calculating the required adjustment to the budget constraints for choices to remain rational.  A failure of 
transitivity requiring a larger adjustment is determined as more severe.   
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lifespan with health problems and a shorter lifespan with no health problems. By varying the 
intensity of health problems and lifespan over a series of 30 questions, we are able to determine 
whether each respondent remained transitive in their preferences. 
 In addition to measuring the number and severity of non-transitive preferences exhibited 
by each respondent, another aim of this manuscript is to evaluate the relationship between 
response transitivity and the individual characteristics of each respondent under the premise that 
high quality decisions are the result of greater decision-making ability. Specifically, I test the 
hypothesis that fewer failures of transitivity are associated with positive real-world outcomes.  
 The two real-world outcomes I study in this paper include income and health. An 
individual’s income is the result of a lifetime of choices. The better decisions an individual 
makes, the more likely they are to earn higher incomes.  A similar rational may be used when 
evaluating the relationship between failures of transitivity and health.  While some aspects of 
health are predetermined by outside factors, including genetics and geographic environment, 
many others represent a choice (e.g., diet, activity level, annual check-ups). Even after 
controlling for education and demographic characteristics, individuals with more non-transitive 
responses may also be more likely to make poor health-related decisions. 
 I find that failures of transitivity are common for the individuals in my sample; more than 
52% of respondents suffer at least one failure of transitivity during the experiment. In addition, 
greater numbers of transitivity failures are associated with lower incomes and poorer health. 
Specifically, a standard deviation decrease in the number of transitivity failures is associated 
with a $3,100 to $3,400 increase in household income. Conditional on an individual suffering 
from at least one failure of transitivity, more severe failures are also associated with lower 
incomes. These findings largely align with previous preference research on the topic, suggesting 
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that individuals with a greater decision-making ability enjoy better real-world outcomes (Brown, 
Kapteyn, Luttmer, & Mitchell, 2017; Choi, Kariv, Muller, & Silverman, 2014; Echenique, Lee, 
& Shum, 2011). 
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the 
literature analyzing stated preferences, while Section 3 outlines the transitivity measures used in 
this manuscript. The estimation strategy and methodology are provided in Section 4, and Section 
5 describes the data. The results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the major 
findings, implications, limitations, and future work. Conclusions are summarized in Section 8. 
2. A Review of the Literature 
2.1 Rationality and Real-World Outcomes 
Recently, a number of papers have examined the relationships between the rationality of 
preferences and real-world outcomes. Saelensminde (2002) studied individual preferences for 
public transport and found that nearly two-thirds of the respondents reported at least one failure of 
transitivity. Individuals with lower education levels were found to be more likely to respond in a 
non-transitive manner. 
 Other research has focused on the transitivity of financial decisions. Echenique, Lee, and 
Shum (2011) measured the severity of violations to the general axiom of revealed preferences 
(GARP).30 The severity of each violation is equivalent to the amount of money an individual 
could save by making rational decisions. The authors used scanner-level data to track grocery 
store purchases and found, on average, households “waste” about 6% of their monthly food 
                                                          
30 GARP extends the weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP) by allowing for ties. GARP states that, if “A” is 
revealed preferred to “B” when both are available, then “B” must not be strictly revealed preferred to “A.” 
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expenditures as a result of irrational purchasing patterns. Older, less educated, and poorer 
households were found to make more severe violations. 
 Studies by Choi, Kariv, Muller, and Silverman (2014) and Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and 
Mitchell (2017) evaluated the relationships between transitivity and real-world outcomes in 
experimental settings. The results from each were largely supportive of the findings presented by 
Echenique, Lee, and Shum.  Brown et al. used an annuity valuation experiment of social security 
benefits.  In addition to age and education, the authors also found associations between irrational 
responses and individuals with weaker numerical abilities.  
 Choi et al. took the additional step of investigating the causal relationship between 
rationality and wealth in an analysis of risk preferences.  Controlling for income, education, 
work status, and other individual characteristics, stronger adherence to GARP was found to 
correspond to greater household wealth. The intuitive nature of these results helps provide a 
basis for the present study.  
2.2. Transitivity in the context of Preferences for Health 
Multiple studies have also evaluated the transitivity of health preferences (Bleichrodt & Prades, 
2009; Engel, Bansback, Bryan, Doyle-Waters, & Whitehurst, 2016; Johnson & Mathews, 2001; 
Lamers et al., 2006; McIntosh & Ryan, 2002; Ryan, Watson, & Entwistle, 2009; Schwappach & 
Strasmann, 2006; Yang, van Busschbach, Timman, Janssen, & Luo, 2017).31 Some of these used 
a similar set of questions to those asked in the TDL Study we employ, whereas others investigated 
the transitivity of preferences for medications, surgeries, screening tests, and physician visits. In 
nearly all of the studies, failures of transitivity were common occurrences. A study by Devlin, 
                                                          
31 In health, failures of transitivity are often described as a “logical inconsistency.” 
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Hansen, Kind, and Williams (2003) focusing on individual preferences for health found that nearly 
80% of respondents reported at least one failure over a series of 13 choice tasks. Non-transitive 
preferences have been shown to be correlated with age, education, and socioeconomic status 
(Andrade, Noronha, Kind, Reis, & de Carvalho, 2016; Badia, Roset, & Herdman, 1999; Craig & 
Ramachandran, 2006; Devlin et al., 2003; Dolan & Kind, 1996). 
 Apart from transitivity, other commonly used rationality tests to evaluate preferences for 
health involve monotonicity and preference reversals. The monotonicity assumption of normal 
goods states that individuals should never choose a weakly dominated option from a given set of 
choices. Preference reversals involve a situation in which an individual first states that A is 
preferred to B and then later states that B is preferred to A. Three of the most relevant studies to 
examine the rationality of stated preferences for health are described below. 
 San Miguel, Ryan, and Amaya-Amaya (2005) examined the rationality of preferences for 
physician visits using tests for monotonicity and preference reversals. The authors found that 
tests for preference reversals captured more failures of rationality than those involving 
monotonicity. Younger and older individuals and those with less education were also discovered 
to be more likely to exhibit irrational preferences. 
 A study by Ozdemir, Mohamed, Johnson, and Hauber (2010) used four rationality tests 
(monotonicity, preference reversals, and two involving transitivity) to analyze preferences for 
medical treatments. The results showed that, of the four tests, respondents were most likely to 
fail the less-restrictive transitivity measure.32 Specifically, 32% of respondents failed the 
transitivity measure, 25% had at least one preference reversal, and 18% failed the monotonicity 
test. This finding suggests that individuals are more likely to break transitivity than the other 
                                                          
32 This measure is very similar to the one used in this study (described in Section 3.1).  
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axioms of rationality. Results from the four tests were then combined into a single binary 
variable (i.e., to determine whether respondents failed at least one of the tests) to study the 
relationship between irrational preferences and individual characteristics. Male respondents, 
individuals with fewer years of education, and those with lower incomes were more likely to fail 
at least one of the rationality tests. 
 Al Sayah, Johnson, Ohinmaa, Xie, and Bansback (2017) assessed the rationality of health 
preferences using a combination of preference reversals and monotonicity. Respondents were 
deemed inconsistent (i.e., they failed the rationality test) if they gave a weakly dominated option 
an equivalent or higher value than a dominant one. Using a lenient rationality test that only 
captured severe errors, the authors still found that more than 11% of respondents exhibited 
irrational preferences. Individuals with inadequate health literacy (assessed using the three-
question Brief Health Literacy Screen), lower incomes, and more than 59 years of age were 
significantly more likely to fail the rationality test.33 
3. Examining the Transitivity of Preferences 
3.1 Experimental Design  
Economic valuation studies are often performed to help determine preferred options when 
budgets are limited. One of the fastest growing and increasingly popular valuation methods 
involves the use of discrete choice experiments (DCEs) (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan, & Gerard, 
2012).  Frequently, these questions present hypothetical situations mimicking choices individuals 
have previously faced or are expected to face in the future. Focusing on health specifically, 
                                                          
33 Consistency was also found to be correlated to chronic health problems. However, the only significant result 
compared individuals with at most one chronic condition (from a list of 15) with those who had at least three chronic 
conditions. The inclusion of two other health related questions in the regression model may have also confounded 
the results.   
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DCEs often require respondents to compare the opportunity costs of potential health 
interventions. A cancer treatment drug may extend lifespan but lower expected quality of life, 
and a surgery to relieve back pain could decrease mobility.  By varying the potential outcomes 
over a choice set, it is possible to measure individual and societal preferences for health. 
 The TDL Study asked individuals to complete a set of 30 paired comparison choice tasks 
using health states described by the EQ-5D-5L, one of the most commonly used instruments to 
measure health outcomes, along with a lifespan attribute (Euroqol, 2018; Herdman et al., 
2011).34 The EQ-5D-5L has five items (domains) regarding an individual’s problems with 
mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression.35 Responses to each 
domain have five incremental levels, and each increase is indicative of a greater severity of 
problems (no problems, slight, moderate, severe, and extreme problems). Figure 1 provides a 
sample version of the instrument. Since 2008, the EQ-5D has been the preferred measure of 
health-related quality for all health technology appraisals conducted by the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom (NICE, 2017). 
An example question may ask respondents to state a preferred option between the following 
choices: 
A. 30 days with the following health problems: severe problems with mobility, severe 
problems with self-care, severe problems performing usual activities, moderate pain 
or discomfort, and severe anxiety or depression. Following these 30 days, the 
individual will experience 25 days with no health problems  
 
B. 7 days with no health problems 
                                                          
 
34 An example version of the questionnaire is included in the appendix. 
35 Specifically, the EQ-5D refers to mobility as an individual’s ability to walk about, self-care as the level of 
difficulty an individual has washing or dressing oneself, and usual activities includes work, study, and family/leisure 
activities. There are no further descriptions for pain/discomfort or anxiety/depression. 
 80 
 
where, for each question, the pairs present a tradeoff between lifespan and health. Option A is 
composed of a longer lifespan while option B has a shorter lifespan with no health problems 
(TB). Option A can be decomposed into two separate parts: time spent with health problems 
(HS), and time with no health problems (TA).  Each option begins “today” and culminates in 
death (i.e., the respondent dies in 55 days in option A and in 7 days in option B).36  
 Individuals were also randomly assigned to one of six time groups at the beginning of the 
survey corresponding to the duration of time in health state HS (1 day, 7 days, 30 days, 9 weeks, 
12 months, or 10 years) for all of the 30 questions. For each individual, TA and TB also followed 
the same time frame (days, weeks, months, or years) as HS. 
 Within each of the six time durations, questions varied by EQ-5D-5L health state HS, 
duration of time with no problems following the time with health problems TA, and the duration 
of time with no health problems as the alternate choice TB. The pair selection was randomized 
by individual, and no two respondents were exposed to the same 30 questions. In total, the 
sample included 1,965 unique paired-comparison questions. A similar design has been used in 
previous health valuation experiments (Craig et al., 2014; de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012; Oppe, 
Devlin, van Hout, Krabbe, & de Charro, 2014). 
 Before completing the paired comparison choice tasks, each respondent was also asked to 
complete a series of questions regarding their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, as 
well as current health. Health was assessed using the EQ-5D-5L questionnaire (Figure 1), and the 
                                                          
36 Including death at the end of each option is required to determine the logical order of each health state. Without 
death, it is impossible to state that 10 years with slight health problems has a greater value than 1 year with severe 
health problems. Individuals with no health problems may see the 10 years as a negative attribute, while those 
currently experiencing moderate/severe health problems are likely to view the longer time with only slight problems 
as a positive attribute. 
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socioeconomic questions provide details regarding an individual’s household income, work 
status, and level of education.   
3.2 Defining a Failure of Transitivity 
Assuming that preferences remain stable over the course of the experiment, all failures of 
transitivity meet the following two conditions. First, question 2 must contain a health state that 
weakly dominates the health state provided in question 1 (i.e. one health state always has a lower 
or equivalent level of problems than the other across every domain; HS2≥HS1). Second, the 
individual must prefer a shorter lifespan with no health problems (option B) in question 2 and a 
longer lifespan with health problems (option A) for question 1. In addition, one of the following 
three specifications must also be met:  
 1) TA2 ≥ TA1 and TB1 ≥ TB2  
 2) TA1 ≤ TB1 or TA2 ≥ TA1, and TB2 = 0  
 3) TB1 – TA1 ≥ TB2.  
A visual example for a failure of transitivity is provided in Figure 2. 
3.3 Measuring Each Failure of Transitivity 
I use two methods to examine each failure of transitivity. Among four options, suppose that 
option A objectively dominates options B and C (e.g., A has fewer health problems than either B 
or C across all domains). Assume that over the course of three choice tasks, an individual reveals 
that options B and C are both preferred to option D, but option D is preferred to option A. Should 
this be counted as two failures of transitivity, given that there are two sets of responses failing 
the transitivity test? Or, because both failures originate from the same response (option D 
revealed preferred to A), is this better represented as a single failure of transitivity? In this study, 
I choose to utilize both methods for the analysis. The Count Measure classifies this response 
 82 
 
pattern as two failures of transitivity, whereas the Order Measure counts this as a single failure.37 
A visual representation of both measures is provided in Figure 3. 
 The Order Measure of Transitivity, denoted trano, is nested within the Count Measure, 
tranc (i.e., the Count Measure includes all failures observed using the Order Measure). By 
definition, tranc ≥ trano. If an individual suffers only a single failure of transitivity, both 
measures will have a value of one. However, if the same question is involved in multiple 
failures, it will only be counted once with the Order Measure. Conceptually, trano represents the 
fewest number of responses that would need to be changed in order for all responses to behave in 
a transitive manner.  
 The Count Measure of Transitivity, tranc, represents the total number of response pairs 
that generate a failure of transitivity. With the Count Measure, a more irrational response is 
likely to be connected to multiple failures of transitivity. The Count Measure combines both the 
frequency and severity of transitivity failures into a single value. By incorporating the values of 
the Order Measure with the Count Measure, we are able to individually examine both the 
frequency and severity of transitivity failures suffered by each respondent. 
3.4 Determining the Severity of Each Failure of Transitivity 
In a financial experiment in which each item in a bundle has a given monetary value (e.g., 
grocery items, investments), multiple mechanisms have been developed to evaluate the severity 
of each failure of transitivity (Afriat, 1972; Echenique et al., 2011; R. Varian, 1994). The 
severity of each failure is often calculated by examining the fraction of money that is “wasted” 
                                                          
37 Rezaei and Patterson (2015) used a similar setup to study the effects of transitivity failures on population values 
for transportation. However, the authors did not measure transitivity on a respondent level. Instead, single responses 
were removed if they met certain criteria (e.g., a response was linked to at least two failures of transitivity). 
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on irrational choices by each individual (Choi et al., 2014). However, these mechanisms are 
difficult, if not impossible, to implement when multiple domains of each bundle are on different 
scales. In the context of the TDL study, each choice task involves a trade-off between a longer 
lifespan and better health.  Because respondents have heterogeneous preferences, there is no 
method to directly compare the severity of a failure of transitivity involving lifespan to one 
involving health. For example, which is failure of transitivity is more severe? Responses to two 
questions reveal a 5-year lifespan is preferred to a 10-year lifespan, or, responses reveal a health 
state with slight health problems is preferred to one with extreme health problems.   
 I develop a new method to measure the average severity of transitivity failures for each 
respondent by dividing the values from the Count Measure by the Order Measure (tranc/trano). 
Using the Count Measure, it is likely that a response connected to a greater number of transitivity 
failures would display a larger dissonance from utility maximizing behavior. However, this 
would only be considered as a single failure of transitivity using the Order Measure. While this 
measure is certainly cruder than the financial measures mentioned above, it has a wider range of 
potential applications (e.g., in transportation and health).  
4. Estimation Strategy and Methodology 
4.1 Number of Opportunities for a Failure of Transitivity to Occur 
The random selection of pairs provided to each respondent affects the number of chances 
(denoted, chan) that a failure of transitivity can occur. Comparisons can only be made when the 
health state in one pair weakly dominates the health state in the other across all domains.  In the 
TDL study, many of the questions are not directly comparable. The health state in one pair may 
have more severe problems with anxiety/depression, while the health state in the other may 
present greater problems with mobility. Figure 4 displays a set of questions from the TDL study 
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where one health state does not objectively dominate the other.  Values for chan are likely 
correlated with the number of times that a respondent fails transitivity.  
4.2 Willingness to Trade 
Willingness to trade also has an effect on the potential number of times that an individual’s 
responses can constitute a failure of transitivity. In each paired comparison question, individuals 
were required to state their preferences between a longer lifespan with health problems and a 
shorter lifespan with no health problems. For a failure in transitivity to occur, an individual must 
display a willingness to make tradeoffs between lifespan and quality of life (denoted, trade). 
When an individual splits the number of times they choose between longer lifespan and no health 
problems evenly, the potential number of times that transitivity can be broken also increases. 
 Previous research regarding preferences for health has found that a significant portion of 
the population will always choose the option with the longer lifespan (Fowler, Cleary, Massagli, 
Weissman, & Epstein, 1995; Nord, Daniels, & Kamlet, 2009).38 Yet, many previous studies have 
failed to exclude these individuals from their analyses, confounding the results. The answers 
from individuals exhibiting lexicographic preference are uninformative with respect to the 
rationality test performed in this study; therefore, I exclude these respondents from the analysis. 
A comparison between individuals displaying lexicographic preferences and those with 
continuous preferences is provided in the appendix. 
 
 
                                                          
38 Apart from the individuals who always choose the option with the longer lifespan, some individuals may always 
select the option with fewer health problems.  
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4.3 Empirical Model for Income and Transitivity 
I employ a series of ordered probit and interval regression models to estimate the relationship 
between failures of transitivity and two real-world outcomes: income and health. Ordered probit 
models are often used when the dependent variable is observed as an ordered outcome. While they 
are useful for determining the sign and significance of a relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables, ordered probit models have one major limitation; it is often difficult to 
interpret the partial effects of each independent variable on the outcome of choice (Greene, 2012). 
 If the ordered levels have defined intervals (e.g. income categories), it may be preferable 
to use an interval regression approach instead.39 Ordered probit models estimate the cut points 
between levels (e.g., slight and moderate pain), while interval models have the ability to directly 
measure the effect of the parameters on the outcome of interest (Wooldridge, 2010).  
 Focusing on income, the interval regression models are able to estimate changes in income 
associated with each additional failure of transitivity. The basic model for income is provided in 
Equation 4.1 below: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = β0 + β1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖  + β5ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖  + εi (4.1) 
 
where X controls for education, age, employment status, race, gender, ethnicity, marital status, 
and geographic region of residence (e.g., New England). tran represents the number of times 
over the course of the survey that an individual’s responses failed transitivity. Regressions for 
each model specification are run using the Count and Order Measures as dependent variables 
separately. Given that the Count Measure includes all failures of transitivity reported in the 
                                                          
39 The overall setup for an interval regression is nearly identical to that of an ordered probit.  Both models assume 
that the error term has a standard normal distribution.  The main difference is that, for the interval regression 
models, the cut points between intervals have a defined value.  With the interval regression model, we are able to 
interpret the model coefficients in the same manner as a linear regression.  
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Order Measure as well as the number of additional failures to which each response can be linked, 
it is expected that the coefficients for β1 will be larger using the Order Measure. 
 trade is determined using the least frequently chosen of the two options (longer lifespan 
or better health) over the 30 paired comparisons. For example, if a respondent chose a longer 
lifespan with health problems for 20 of the 30 paired comparison tasks, they displayed a 
willingness to trade 10 times (i.e., the number of times a shorter lifespan with no health problems 
was selected). In this study, trade ranges from 1 to a maximum of 15. The relationship between 
trade and tran is likely non-linear in nature; as trade increases, tran is expected to increase at a 
decreasing rate.40 To account for this, I also include trade2 as an additional dependent variable in 
the regression models. Some specifications even include trade3. 
 On average, respondents were provided 153 chances to fail transitivity with an 
interquartile range from 136 to 170. To account for individual differences, the regressions 
include both chan and chan².  
4.4 Empirical Model for Health and Transitivity 
Because the health questions lack a defined interval for each level of problems, the relationship 
between transitivity and health is evaluated using only ordered probit models.  Equation 4.2 
provides the basic model: 
 ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑖 = β0 + β1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽3𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + β5𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + εi (4.2) 
 
where ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡ℎ represents responses to one of five health-related questions in the questionnaire 
(Figure 1). income is again a categorical variable, and the other independent variables in 
                                                          
40 Using Figure 2 as an example, suppose all comparable health states provided to each respondent are ordered from 
most to least severe. As the disparity between the health states or lifespans increases, it is expected that the 
likelihood of a failure of transitivity will decrease. 
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Equation 4.2 are identical to those from Equation 4.1. 
5. Data  
5.1 Description of the TDL Study 
The TDL Study was conducted from December 16, 2015 through January 11, 2016 using 
participants from a nationally representative online panel. A total of 3,909 respondents 
completed the survey. However, more than 17% (675) exhibited lexicographic preferences. 12% 
or respondents always chose the option with the longer lifespan, and 5% always selected the 
option with no health problems. After dropping these individuals, the final sample was reduced 
to 3,234 respondents.  
5.2 Description of Independent Variables 
To evaluate the relationship between transitivity and income/health, the regression models also 
control for an individual’s education, age, gender, marital status, race, ethnicity, and region of 
residence. Apart from marital status and region of residence, the categories for each of these 
variables are provided in Table 1. The marital status variable categorized each individual as 
married, widowed, separated or divorced, never married, or living with a partner. In addition to 
its possible association with an individual’s health, marital status is expected to be an important 
factor in determining household income. Given the potential for a second earner in the 
household, it is likely that individuals who are currently married or living with a partner have 
higher incomes than those who are single. Health and income may also vary by region.  Using 
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the U.S. Census definitions, each respondent was categorized into one of nine geographic regions 
according to their state of residence (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015).41 
5.3 Description of Dependent Variables 
 5.3.1 Income 
Respondents self-categorized their income into one of 11 groups.42 The categories ranged from a 
household income of less than $15,000 per year (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1) to an income of at least 
$500,000 (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 11). It is expected that individuals with higher household incomes will 
demonstrate greater levels of transitivity. 
 5.3.2 Health 
There are well-established links between health and socioeconomic status (Smith, 1999), but few 
studies have examined the relationship between rationality and health. Many of the actions 
commonly associated with a healthy lifestyle must be practiced regularly to remain effective, and 
these actions are likely correlated with health status and literacy. Medicines should be taken 
following a prescribed regimen, exercise should be part of a daily routine, and safety precautions 
should be practiced at all times. Individuals who display higher levels of transitivity, a proxy for 
decision-making ability,  may be more likely to practice behaviors that result in better health.   
 Separate regressions are run using responses to each domain of the EQ-5D-5L 
questionnaire (mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, anxiety/depression) as the 
dependent variable. Each domain uses a similar five-level index, where a one level increase 
                                                          
41 We could have also categorized individuals by state, but there were multiple states with less than 10 respondents.  
By comparison, the smallest region (East South Central) contained 178 respondents. 
42 Some individuals may consider income a sensitive subject; therefore, respondents were also allowed to state that 
they didn’t know or could refuse to answer the question.  Of the 3,234 completed surveys, 247 individuals (8%) 
chose to withhold this information. Missing is included as an income category for the regressions using health as the 
dependent variable. 
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corresponds to a greater severity of problems experienced (i.e., no problems, slight problems, 
moderate problems, severe problems, or extreme problems).  
6. Results 
Over the course of the experiment, respondents suffered an average of 2.70 failures of transitivity 
using the Count Measure and 0.99 failures of transitivity using the Order Measure.  Conditional 
upon an individual trading between lifespan and health at least once, nearly 52% of respondents 
registered at least one failure of transitivity. Table 1 summarizes failures of transitivity across 
various demographic and socioeconomic groups.  In general, older individuals, and those with 
higher education levels suffered fewer failures of transitivity than their younger, less educated 
counterparts. 
 As expected, individuals who displayed a greater willingness to trade between lifespan 
and health were more likely to experience failures of transitivity. Figure 5 displays the frequency 
individuals selected the option incorporating a longer lifespan with health problems along with 
the mean number of transitivity failures for each group. On average, individuals who traded more 
than 10 times suffered more than twice as many transitivity failures than those who traded five 
times or fewer (3.93 vs. 1.71 using the Count Measure and 1.43 vs. 0.64 using the Order 
Measure). 
6.1 Transitivity and Income 
Ordered probit and interval regression models are used to examine the relationship between 
income and transitivity. The results for the Count and Order Measures are presented in Tables 2 
and 3. Estimates for the ordered probit model are displayed in Column 1, while Columns 2 to 5 
display estimates using the interval approach.  
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 Using the Count Measure of transitivity (Column 2 of Table 2), a standard deviation 
decrease in the number of non-transitive responses is associated with $3,100 increase in 
household income. If we restrict the sample to individuals who are currently working (Column 
3), the effect rises to nearly $4,300. 
 In this study, we are unable to differentiate between single-income and multi-income 
families. The income question specifically asked, “What is your best estimate of your total 
income plus the total income of all family members from all sources?” Column 4 of Table 2 
provides estimates for individuals who are currently married. Focusing on married individuals 
does not solve the single/dual income problem, but it does help to even the playing field by 
eliminating responses where there is no potential of a second income. The similarity between 
these results and those from the base model helps strengthen the argument that greater levels of 
transitivity are associated with positive real world outcomes. A standard deviation decrease in 
failures of transitivity is associated with a $3,000 increase in household income. 
 Column 5 provides estimates for individuals who were at least 26 years old at the time of 
the survey. Younger individuals may still be in school and, for those in the labor force, there may 
also be a smaller wage spread between education levels. Interestingly, this model results in the 
smallest coefficients for each failure of transitivity. However, the results remain highly 
significant. 
 In general, the estimates using the Order Measure of transitivity (Table 3) are largely 
congruent with those using the Count Measure.  The coefficient estimates for each failure of 
transitivity are larger using the Order Measure, but the Count Measure captures more failures of 
transitivity. Using the base model (Column 2 of Table 3), a standard deviation decrease in 
failures of transitivity is associated with a $3,400 increase in household income. If we focus on 
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individuals who are currently working (Column 3), the Count and Order Measures provide 
nearly identical results. A standard deviation increase in failures of transitivity corresponds to a 
$4,300 decrease in household income.  
 The largest difference between the Order and Count Measures for any of the regression 
models involved married individuals. A standard deviation decrease in failures of transitivity is 
associated with an increase in household income of more than $3,600 using the Order Measure 
(Column 4); 20% higher than the estimate using the Count Measure. Looking at individuals at 
least 26 years of age (Column 5), we again observe a smaller effect for transitivity on household 
income than in the base model. 
 6.1.1. Severity of Failures and Income 
Given that the Order Measure of transitivity is nested within the Count Measure, it is not 
surprising to see that both measures provide similar estimates for the relationship between 
transitivity and income. The two measures are strongly correlated to one another (𝜌𝜌=.88). The 
main benefit from including both measures in the study arises through our ability measure the 
average severity (severity=tranc/trano) of transitivity failures for each respondent.  
 By itself, the average severity of transitivity failures provides limited information 
concerning respondent rationality.  A respondent with high average severity is not necessarily 
more irrational than someone with a lower one. However, by also controlling for the Order 
measure of transitivity in the regression models, we can determine whether the severity or 
number of transitivity failures has a stronger relationship with household income. 
 Results from models evaluating the relationship between the severity of transitivity 
failures and income are displayed in Table 4. For these regressions, the sample was restricted to 
respondents who reported at least one failure of transitivity during the experiment. In the sample, 
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values for severity ranged from 1 to 17 with a mean of 2.32. In other words, each irrational 
response (using the Order Measure) was often associated with multiple failures of transitivity. 
Higher values for severity represent a larger conflict with utility maximizing behavior. 
 Estimates using interval regression models are displayed in Columns 1 and 2, and those 
using ordered probits are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. Even after controlling for the 
number of transitivity failures (using the Order Measure) the results show more severe failures of 
transitivity are associated with lower incomes. Conditional on the respondent suffering at least 
one failure of transitivity, a standard deviation increase in the average severity of each failure 
coincides with a $1,300 decrease in household income (Column 1). For respondents who are 
currently employed, the value increases to nearly $4,800 (Column 2). As with Tables 2 and 3, the 
ordered probit models (Columns 3 and 4) produce estimates of a similar sign and significance to 
the interval regression models. 
 Comparing the relationships between the severity and quantity of failures of transitivity 
and household income, it appears that the frequency of transitivity failures has a stronger 
association with income using the full sample (Column 1).  A standard deviation decrease in the 
number of transitivity failures is associated with a $3,600 increase in household income, nearly 
three times the effect of a standard deviation decrease in severity.  However, after restricting the 
sample to individuals who are currently employed, the severity of failures has a stronger 
relationship.  This finding hints that both the frequency and severity of transitivity failures are 
important predictors for an individual’s overall level of rationality.      
6.2 Transitivity and Health 
It is also intriguing to examine the relationship between failures of transitivity and current health. 
The results are displayed in Columns 1 to 5 of Tables 5 and 6 and show failures of transitivity 
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are associated with two health outcomes in two domains: self-care and usual activities. The 
results are fairly similar for both transitivity measures; however, the relationship between health 
and transitivity appears to be more significant using the Order Measure. 
 The association between both transitivity measures and problems with self-care is highly 
significant (p<0.01), and it appears individuals experiencing problems with self-care are the 
driving force for the association found between failures of transitivity and problems with usual 
activities. Of 3,234 respondents included in the final sample, 156 reported problems with self-
care; of these individuals, more than 90% also reported problems with usual activities. When 
self-care is added as an independent variable to the regression model for usual activities, or when 
respondents experiencing problems with self-care are excluded from the model, we no longer 
find any significant association between transitivity failures and usual activities. 
 A variety of other health-related dependent variables were also used to assess the 
relationship between failures of transitivity and health. Two of these include binary measures 
denoting whether the respondent is experiencing multiple (problems on at least two domains of 
the EQ-5D-5L) or intense health problems (severe or extreme problems with at least one 
domain). The results, estimated using a binary probit model, are displayed in Columns 6 and 7 of 
Tables 5 and 6. Although the estimates are insignificant for each of the transitivity measures, 
there does appear to be a relationship between failures of transitivity and intense health 
problems. Of the 3,234 respondents who displayed a willingness to trade between lifespan and 
health, only 175 were currently experiencing intense health problems on any domain. A larger 
sample size of these respondents may result in a significant finding. 
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 6.2.1 Severity of Failures and Health 
Table 7 displays the estimates when the severity of transitivity failures is added as an additional 
independent variable to the base model. Unlike the regression models for income, the 
coefficients for the quantity and severity of failures of transitivity have opposite signs when 
health is the dependent variable. An increase in the quantity of non-transitive responses is 
associated with greater problems with self-care and usual activities as well as a greater likelihood 
of experiencing intense health problems, but an increase in the severity of each failure of 
transitivity is associated with fewer health problems.  
7. Discussion 
7.1 General Findings 
Nearly 52% of the respondents suffered at least one failure of transitivity during the experiment.  
Overall, these individuals averaged 2.70 failures of transitivity using the Count Measure and 0.99 
failures using the Count Measure. I also find that failures of transitivity are associated with lower 
household income and greater health problems. These findings largely align with previous 
preference research on the topic. Focusing on income, I observe a positive relationship between 
transitivity and household income. A standard deviation decrease in the number of failures of 
transitivity is associated with a $3,100 to $3,400 increase in household income. When the sample 
is restricted to individuals that are currently employed, this number rises to $4,300. 
 Concerning the relationship between transitivity and health, I find problems with self-
care has the strongest association with non-transitive preferences. There has been a substantial 
amount of research outside economics linking cognitive ability with the struggle to care for 
oneself (Cramm et al., 2013; Fong, Chan, & Au, 2001; Levinthal, Morrow, Tu, Wu, & Murray, 
2008; Mottus et al., 2014), and my results offer additional confirmation for these earlier findings. 
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Restricting the sample to individuals who are currently working or below the age of 65 does not 
diminish the magnitude or significance of the estimates. 
7.2 A Comparison of the Count and Order Measures of Transitivity  
Both the Count and Order Measures use the same requirements to determine each failure of 
transitivity. The difference between the two measures arises through the manner in which each 
failure of transitivity is counted. The Order Measure determines the number of transitivity 
failures, whereas the Count Measure also accounts for the severity of each error. The fact that 
both measures produce similar results is somewhat expected. The main value provided by 
calculating both measures stems from the ability to examine both the quantity and severity of 
non-transitive responses. I discover that more severe transitivity violations are associated with 
lower incomes but not with greater health problems. 
7.3 Robustness Checks 
Previous studies have identified two concerns that may affect how the results from this study can 
be interpreted. The transitivity tests require preferences to remain stable throughout the 
experiment, yet it has been widely acknowledged that there may be a learning curve in many 
experimental settings as respondents adjust to an unfamiliar task (Johnson & Mathews, 2001; 
Lancsar & Louviere, 2006). It is unlikely that many individuals have ever thought about health in 
such a manner, and preferences may change if a respondent has not previously considered 
preferences for life and death.43 To address this, the regression models were rerun after dropping 
                                                          
43 The TDL offered three warm-up problems to help respondents get accustomed to the survey interface and type of 
questions that would be asked.  Respondents were also allowed to return to previous questions to change any 
answers.  However, given that respondents were provided a fixed amount of money for completing the study, we 
find it unlikely that many would return to change previous responses on account of a shift in preferences midway 
through the experiment. 
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responses to the first three questions. The results using the Count Measure of transitivity are 
displayed in Tables 8 and 9. As it can be seen, the results shown here are similar to those 
displayed in Tables 2 and 5. Failures of transitivity are still associated with lower household 
incomes and problems with self-care. 
 7.3.1 Transitivity and Moderate Health States 
The second concern involves potential issues with the level descriptions of the EQ-5D-5L. To 
evaluate transitivity, the levels of each domain must have a dominant order; having moderate 
problems must be at least as detrimental as slight problems. One potential issue with this 
questionnaire presents itself through comparisons made between severe and extreme problems 
with pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. The EQ-5D-5L orders “extreme problems” worse 
than “severe problems,” yet a previous study found many respondents viewed “severe problems” 
to be worse than “extreme problems” (Craig, Pickard, & Rand-Hendriksen, 2015). To account 
for this, a model specification was run that dropped all comparisons between health states where 
both had severe or extreme problems.44 As shown in Tables 8 and 9, the results again appear to 
be highly consistent with the findings from the base models. 
7.4 Study Limitations and Future Work 
One of the major limitations of this study regards the requirement that individuals be willing to 
trade at least once during the experiment. Studies incorporating a wider variety of health states 
may reduce the prevalence of individuals displaying lexicographic preferences, but it is possible 
that some individuals may never be willing to trade between lifespan and better health. Logit 
models (displayed in the appendix) comparing individuals who traded at least once to those 
                                                          
44 Comparisons between extreme/moderate and severe/moderate health states were still used, as there has been no 
evidence of any issues between these levels. 
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exhibiting lexicographic preferences found significant differences in the characteristics of each 
group, but it is possible that other variables not included in the TDL Study (e.g., religious 
preferences) also play a role. The fact that we no longer have a representative sample may reduce 
the generalizability of our results. 
 Another limitation of this study involves the amount of personal information available for 
each respondent. Ideally, future studies will obtain more information about each respondent’s 
health (including history of diagnosed conditions, family history, and certain health behaviors) 
and socio-economic status (e.g., job description, individual income, or wealth). Within the 
current framework, it is difficult to prove a causal relationship between transitivity of 
preferences, as a proxy for decision-making ability, and individual outcomes. 
8. Concluding Remarks 
This study analyzes the transitivity of stated preferences for health as a possible proxy for 
decision-making ability. I employ a novel approach to measure individual preferences using two 
measures of transitivity. Using a large sample of respondents from the U.S. general population, I 
find failures of transitivity in a health valuation experiment to be associated with various socio-
economic characteristics. Non-transitive patterns are associated with lower household incomes 
and poorer health.   
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Table 2.1: Demographics 
    
Participants 
% (#) 
Failures of 
Transitivity 
Count Measure 
Mean (Std. Dev) 
Failures of 
Transitivity 
Order Measure 
Mean (Std. Dev) 
   
    
Gender     
  Male 50.40% (1630) 2.62 (5.36) 0.94 (1.32) 
  Female 49.60% (1604) 2.77 (5.32) 1.05 (1.41) 
Age, years    
  18-29 14.41% (466) 3.51 (6.50) 1.20 (1.47) 
  30-39 19.91% (644) 3.16 (6.36) 1.08 (1.53) 
  40-49 16.26% (526) 2.29 (4.74) 0.88 (1.25) 
  50-59 21.30% (689) 2.70 (5.22) 1.01 (1.41) 
  60-69 18.74% (606) 2.22 (4.28) 0.88 (1.26) 
  70+ 9.37% (303) 2.13 (3.76) 0.89 (1.11) 
Race    
  African American/ Black 11.01% (356) 3.85 (6.75) 1.29 (1.64) 
  Asian/ Asian American 2.44% (79) 3.81 (8.14) 1.09 (1.73) 
  Caucasian/ White 82.28% (2661) 2.44 (4.88) .94 (1.30) 
  Native American/ Inuit/ Aleut 0.74% (24) 3.33 (4.69) 1.21 (1.18) 
  Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 0.25% (8) 11.13 (10.66) 2.38 (1.85) 
  Other 3.28% (106) 3.72 (6.77) 1.21 (1.52) 
Ethnicity    
  Non-Hispanic 87.91% (2843) 2.64 (5.28) 0.98 (1.36) 
  Hispanic 12.09% (391) 3.11 (5.77) 1.08 (1.44) 
Work Status    
  Working 61.56% (1991) 2.66 (5.42) 0.98 (1.37) 
  Looking for Work 4.27% (138) 4.24 (6.61) 1.33 (1.49) 
  Not Working, Not Looking for Work 9.28% (300) 2.93 (5.53) 1.02 (1.41) 
  Retired 23.50% (760) 2.39 (4.77) 0.95 (1.33) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer 1.39% (45) 3.13 (4.48) 1.27 (1.34) 
Education    
  No Diploma 2.04% (66) 3.24 (5.57) 1.17 (1.63) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent 46.60% (1507) 2.92 (5.72) 1.04 (1.42) 
  Some College 10.14% (328) 2.85 (5.79) 1.05 (1.39) 
  Associates Degree/Equivalent 5.13% (166) 3.06 (5.90) 1.11 (1.50) 
  Bachelor's Degree 20.07% (649) 2.31 (4.43) 0.92 (1.25) 
  Advanced Degree (Masters, Doctorate) 16.02% (518) 2.26 (4.67) 0.86 (1.25) 
Health    
  Problems with Mobility 27.40% (886) 2.35 (5.41) 0.86 (1.38) 
  Problems with Self-Care 4.82% (156) 4.31 (8.41) 1.36 (1.88) 
  Problems with Usual Activities 19.23% (622) 2.89 (5.93) 1.06 (1.49) 
  Problems with Pain/Discomfort 53.40% (1727) 2.62 (5.23) 0.98 (1.37) 
  Problems with Anxiety/Depression 34.38% (1112) 2.85 (5.53) 1.04 (1.43) 
  Intense Health Problems 5.41% (175) 3.47 (7.27) 1.14 (1.66) 
Household Income    
  Less than $15,000 4.61% (149) 4.31 (6.70) 1.47 (1.71) 
  $15,000-$24,999 6.46% (209) 3.29 (6.42) 1.06 (1.48) 
  $25,000-$34,999 8.19% (265) 3.59 (7.49) 1.23 (1.73) 
  $35,000-$44,999 8.07% (261) 3.34 (6.26) 1.11 (1.49) 
  $45,000-$49,999 6.18% (200) 2.56 (5.15) 0.98 (1.31) 
  $50,000-$74,999 19.20% (621) 2.61 (4.97) 0.97 (1.31) 
  $75,000-$99,999 15.77% (510) 2.58 (4.89) 1.01 (1.35) 
  $100,000-$149,999 15.65% (506) 2.12 (4.30) 0.81 (1.16) 
  $150,000-$249,999 6.71% (217) 1.62 (3.75) 0.70 (1.10) 
  $250,000-$499,999 1.30% (42) 1.69 (2.86) 0.79 (0.95) 
  $500,000 or More 0.22% (7) 1.29 (1.98) 0.57 (0.79) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer 7.64% (247) 2.49 (4.67) 0.98 (1.28) 
Sample Average   2.70 (5.34) 0.99 (1.37) 
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Table 2.2: Income and Transitivity-Count Measure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Ordered  Interval Working Married At Least 
   Probit Regression   26 Years Old 
    Base Base       
Failures of Transitivity -0.0140*** -579.7*** -785.9*** -644.2*** -475.8*** 
   (0.00350) (132.6) (175.7) (221.2) (137.3) 
Education       
  No Diploma -0.102 -2,615 -13,024*** 1,281 -5,748 
   (0.149) (4,826) (4,992) (7,195) (4,815) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - - 
  Some College 0.264*** 12,175*** 11,380*** 16,143*** 12,591*** 
   (0.0728) (3,146) (3,317) (5,024) (3,307) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 0.291*** 11,269*** 13,059*** 17,797*** 12,928*** 
   (0.0841) (3,242) (4,229) (5,035) (3,377) 
  Bachelor's Degree 0.733*** 30,794*** 31,949*** 38,339*** 32,750*** 
   (0.0549) (2,668) (3,090) (3,755) (2,700) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) 0.969*** 43,573*** 46,408*** 50,686*** 43,979*** 
   (0.0593) (3,175) (3,635) (4,287) (3,035) 
Current Health       
  Problems with Mobility -0.0956** -1,737 -2,790 -549.2 -2,535 
   (0.0471) (2,016) (2,793) (3,359) (2,046) 
  Problems with Self-Care -0.00767 2,231 454.8 4,129 2,116 
   (0.0749) (2,926) (5,715) (6,364) (3,135) 
  Problems with Usual Activities -0.0843 -5,087** -1,324 -8,404** -3,659 
   (0.0549) (2,406) (3,599) (3,622) (2,507) 
  Problems with Pain/Discomfort -0.0559* -643.0 -739.6 379.0 -867.0 
   (0.0332) (1,422) (1,961) (2,037) (1,418) 
  Problems with Anxiety/Depression -0.0897*** -3,873*** -2,703* -3,768** -3,476*** 
   (0.0280) (1,069) (1,434) (1,705) (1,109) 
Work Status       
  Currently Working Base Base  Base Base 
   - -  - - 
  Looking for Work -0.800*** -23,254***  -41,018*** -28,721*** 
   (0.115) (3,677)  (5,359) (3,679) 
  Not Working, Not Looking for Work -0.509*** -11,029***  -10,588* -13,885*** 
   (0.0850) (3,722)  (5,673) (3,979) 
  Retired -0.387*** -13,346***  -11,737** -13,809*** 
   (0.0652) (3,589)  (4,775) (3,584) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer -1.252*** -31,031***  -24,558** -31,776*** 
   (0.245) (6,164)  (9,921) (7,017) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health 0.112** 5,846** 7,791** 6,323** 4,886** 
   (0.0517) (2,311) (3,038) (3,145) (2,350) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health² -0.0164** -862.2** -1,195*** -964.7** -757.8** 
   (0.00764) (347.2) (462.3) (465.1) (354.4) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health³ 0.000692** 36.71** 53.60*** 41.69** 33.94** 
   (0.000325) (15.06) (20.33) (19.78) (15.41) 
Chances 0.000847 77.06 -169.8 537.9 197.5 
   (0.00645) (273.6) (348.6) (379.6) (258.3) 
Chances² -5.19e-06 -0.382 0.365 -1.910 -0.789 
    (2.03e-05) (0.867) (1.112) (1.208) (0.807) 
Observations 2,987 2,987 1,873 1,702 2,809 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.3: Income and Transitivity-Order Measure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Ordered  Interval Working Married At Least 
   Probit Regression   26 Years Old 
    Base Base       
Failures of Transitivity -0.0600*** -2,461*** -3,173*** -2,802*** -2,107*** 
   (0.0141) (565.6) (777.5) (850.8) (584.3) 
Education       
  No Diploma -0.103 -2,684 -13,220*** 1,923 -5,790 
   (0.150) (4,828) (4,904) (7,150) (4,806) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - - 
  Some College 0.263*** 12,114*** 11,208*** 16,165*** 12,492*** 
   (0.0726) (3,143) (3,305) (5,017) (3,300) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 0.296*** 11,465*** 13,679*** 18,127*** 13,102*** 
   (0.0844) (3,262) (4,323) (5,108) (3,397) 
  Bachelor's Degree 0.740*** 31,100*** 32,605*** 38,657*** 32,975*** 
   (0.0548) (2,662) (3,091) (3,753) (2,695) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) 0.971*** 43,731*** 46,743*** 50,922*** 44,084*** 
   (0.0592) (3,180) (3,655) (4,271) (3,040) 
Current Health       
  Problems with Mobility -0.0972** -1,796 -2,912 -714.6 -2,633 
   (0.0474) (2,032) (2,831) (3,374) (2,051) 
  Problems with Self-Care -0.00866 2,139 525.6 4,038 2,115 
   (0.0751) (2,930) (5,715) (6,382) (3,139) 
  Problems with Usual Activities -0.0777 -4,781** -741.2 -7,744** -3,313 
   (0.0549) (2,409) (3,600) (3,599) (2,506) 
  Problems with Pain/Discomfort -0.0563* -658.2 -778.1 107.7 -888.0 
   (0.0332) (1,421) (1,963) (2,034) (1,416) 
  Problems with Anxiety/Depression -0.0901*** -3,888*** -2,789* -3,744** -3,525*** 
   (0.0280) (1,070) (1,436) (1,709) (1,111) 
Work Status       
  Currently Working Base Base  Base Base 
   - -  - - 
  Looking for Work -0.794*** -22,908***  -40,494*** -28,461*** 
   (0.115) (3,697)  (5,414) (3,695) 
  Not Working, Not Looking for Work -0.511*** -11,119***  -10,582* -13,957*** 
   (0.0850) (3,724)  (5,696) (3,979) 
  Retired -0.381*** -13,061***  -11,213** -13,551*** 
   (0.0651) (3,588)  (4,772) (3,584) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer -1.256*** -31,301***  -24,351** -31,873*** 
   (0.245) (6,152)  (10,126) (6,992) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  0.00870 356.7 -177.4 172.6 -192.2 
Health (0.0187) (870.4) (1,150) (1,176) (871.9) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  -0.000188 -1.611 57.81 7.040 38.07 
Health² (0.00121) (57.30) (78.16) (73.57) (57.64) 
Chances 0.000622 61.57 -196.8 531.3 185.2 
   (0.00644) (272.6) (346.8) (380.0) (257.4) 
Chances ² -4.75e-06 -0.343 0.430 -1.892 -0.757 
    (2.03e-05) (0.863) (1.105) (1.208) (0.804) 
Observations 2,987 2,987 1,873 1,702 2,809 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.4: Income-Severity and Frequency of Transitivity Failures 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Interval Interval Probit Probit 
   Base Working Base Working 
Failures of Transitivity (Order Measure) -2,610*** -2,089** -0.0733*** -0.0590** 
   (775.3) (1,059) (0.0208) (0.0273) 
Average Severity of Failure -799.2 -2,890*** -0.0100 -0.0575*** 
   (644.3) (806.9) (0.0164) (0.0194) 
Education      
  No Diploma -6,434 -11,777* -0.243 -0.353* 
   (4,729) (6,913) (0.168) (0.205) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - 
  Some College 11,494*** 10,080** 0.224** 0.289** 
   (4,449) (4,233) (0.0972) (0.113) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 10,462** 11,280* 0.222* 0.276* 
   (4,653) (6,226) (0.122) (0.151) 
  Bachelor's Degree 25,881*** 25,358*** 0.650*** 0.675*** 
   (3,401) (4,216) (0.0785) (0.0988) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) 41,640*** 42,064*** 0.915*** 0.985*** 
   (4,966) (5,508) (0.0852) (0.105) 
Current Health      
  Problems with Mobility 3,300 5,602 0.0589 0.110 
   (2,312) (3,611) (0.0622) (0.0786) 
  Problems with Self-Care 3,207 3,974 0.0170 0.0676 
   (3,673) (6,732) (0.0920) (0.151) 
  Problems with Usual Activities -9,219*** -12,055** -0.218*** -0.265** 
   (2,720) (4,884) (0.0707) (0.111) 
  Problems with Pain/Discomfort -682.1 -1,638 -0.0483 -0.0525 
   (1,879) (2,697) (0.0448) (0.0621) 
  Problems with Anxiety/Depression -4,557*** -2,527 -0.112*** -0.0599 
   (1,416) (1,965) (0.0385) (0.0496) 
Work Status      
  Currently Working Base  Base   
   -  -   
  Looking for Work -19,774***  -0.745***   
   (4,815)  (0.149)   
  Not Working, Not Looking for Work -10,937**  -0.525***   
   (4,739)  (0.108)   
  Retired -10,844**  -0.328***   
   (4,662)  (0.0873)   
  Missing/Refused to Answer -35,169***  -1.373***   
   (7,901)  (0.325)   
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health 376.9 375.7 0.00950 0.00222 
   (1,259) (1,638) (0.0293) (0.0379) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health² -1.372 21.41 0.000122 0.00116 
   (74.58) (99.58) (0.00175) (0.00229) 
Chances -51.18 -499.1 2.72e-05 -0.00824 
   (414.3) (544.5) (0.00905) (0.0111) 
Chances ² 0.105 1.638 -1.91e-06 2.60e-05 
   (1.365) (1.812) (2.88e-05) (3.55e-05) 
Observations 1,540 941 1,540 941 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, work status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5: Health and Transitivity-Count Measure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Mobility Self-Care Usual  Pain or Anxiety or Multiple  Intense 
        Activities Discomfort Depression Problems Problems 
Failures of Transitivity 0.00372 0.0190*** 0.00548 0.00122 0.00292 -0.00320 0.00791 
   (0.00506) (0.00643) (0.00520) (0.00466) (0.00481) (0.00448) (0.00691) 
Education         
  No Diploma 0.0553 0.196 0.274* 0.0244 0.397*** 0.300* 0.0626 
   (0.162) (0.212) (0.144) (0.162) (0.149) (0.161) (0.223) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - - - - 
  Some College -0.0730 -0.0864 0.0603 -0.112 0.104 0.000691 0.0159 
   (0.0902) (0.147) (0.0901) (0.0749) (0.0746) (0.0811) (0.132) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 0.00151 -0.0464 -0.0732 -0.0278 0.0163 0.0150 -0.0864 
   (0.110) (0.158) (0.121) (0.0919) (0.101) (0.107) (0.190) 
  Bachelor's Degree -0.133* -0.157 -0.202** -0.196*** -0.0802 -0.171** -0.317** 
   (0.0714) (0.130) (0.0785) (0.0561) (0.0625) (0.0673) (0.130) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) -0.104 -0.138 -0.0561 -0.188*** 0.0297 -0.182** -0.290** 
   (0.0764) (0.139) (0.0799) (0.0626) (0.0673) (0.0739) (0.147) 
Household Income         
  Less than $25,000 0.313*** 0.281*** 0.342*** 0.281*** 0.178** 0.323*** 0.277** 
   (0.0854) (0.108) (0.0873) (0.0779) (0.0801) (0.0851) (0.115) 
  $25,000-$49,999 Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - - - - 
  $50,000-$74,999 -0.222*** -0.246* -0.0671 -0.117* -0.0218 -0.0639 -0.0750 
   (0.0759) (0.129) (0.0794) (0.0640) (0.0676) (0.0725) (0.122) 
  $75,000-$99,999 -0.293*** -0.314** -0.227*** -0.266*** -0.152** -0.189** -0.358** 
   (0.0820) (0.143) (0.0879) (0.0699) (0.0741) (0.0794) (0.156) 
  $100,000-$149,999 -0.222*** -0.324** -0.168* -0.173** -0.178** -0.151* -0.191 
   (0.0849) (0.150) (0.0902) (0.0718) (0.0770) (0.0819) (0.149) 
  $150,000+ -0.193* -0.206 -0.372*** -0.172** -0.312*** -0.252** -0.328 
   (0.109) (0.220) (0.129) (0.0857) (0.0967) (0.104) (0.235) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer -0.0717 -0.0344 -0.0884 -0.114 -0.162* -0.141 -0.178 
   (0.107) (0.160) (0.109) (0.0908) (0.0953) (0.0981) (0.164) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  0.0916 -0.0722 0.111 -0.00297 0.0155 0.0134 0.0248 
Health (0.0674) (0.108) (0.0701) (0.0570) (0.0598) (0.0638) (0.105) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  -0.0138 0.00696 -0.0165 0.00112 -0.000718 -0.000152 -0.00694 
Health² (0.00983) (0.0159) (0.0102) (0.00830) (0.00885) (0.00932) (0.0158) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  0.000583 -0.000223 0.000674 -5.98e-05 -2.54e-05 -3.87e-05 0.000316 
Health3 (0.000412) (0.000668) (0.000426) (0.000348) (0.000375) (0.000391) (0.000677) 
Chances 0.00950 0.0152 0.0100 0.0116 0.00541 0.00501 0.0361** 
   (0.00880) (0.0146) (0.00983) (0.00741) (0.00796) (0.00839) (0.0171) 
Chances ² -3.15e-05 -4.38e-05 -3.22e-05 -3.59e-05 -1.99e-05 -1.35e-05 -0.000116** 
   (2.77e-05) (4.57e-05) (3.11e-05) (2.35e-05) (2.51e-05) (2.65e-05) (5.44e-05) 
Observations 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,226 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, work status, and region of residence are not reported.   
Robust standard errors in parentheses.       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table 2.6: Health and Transitivity-Order Measure 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
   Mobility Self-Care Usual  Pain or Anxiety or Multiple  Intense 
        Activities Discomfort Depression Problems Problems 
Failures of Transitivity 0.0137 0.0844*** 0.0336* 0.0102 0.0132 0.00355 0.0293 
   (0.0189) (0.0268) (0.0199) (0.0167) (0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0288) 
Education         
  No Diploma 0.0491 0.185 0.265* 0.0237 0.396*** 0.300* 0.0584 
   (0.161) (0.212) (0.143) (0.162) (0.149) (0.161) (0.223) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - - - - 
  Some College -0.0763 -0.0910 0.0560 -0.111 0.104 0.00200 0.0118 
   (0.0901) (0.146) (0.0900) (0.0749) (0.0746) (0.0811) (0.132) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 0.00137 -0.0425 -0.0740 -0.0283 0.0159 0.0145 -0.0855 
   (0.110) (0.158) (0.121) (0.0918) (0.101) (0.106) (0.190) 
  Bachelor's Degree -0.134* -0.162 -0.203*** -0.196*** -0.0810 -0.168** -0.320** 
   (0.0712) (0.130) (0.0782) (0.0561) (0.0624) (0.0673) (0.129) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) -0.102 -0.139 -0.0515 -0.188*** 0.0297 -0.181** -0.287** 
   (0.0762) (0.140) (0.0798) (0.0626) (0.0672) (0.0738) (0.147) 
Household Income         
  Less than $25,000 0.310*** 0.283*** 0.340*** 0.282*** 0.179** 0.322*** 0.276** 
   (0.0855) (0.108) (0.0875) (0.0779) (0.0801) (0.0851) (0.115) 
  $25,000-$49,999 Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - - - - 
  $50,000-$74,999 -0.223*** -0.242* -0.0658 -0.116* -0.0216 -0.0620 -0.0751 
   (0.0759) (0.130) (0.0794) (0.0641) (0.0676) (0.0725) (0.121) 
  $75,000-$99,999 -0.296*** -0.314** -0.229*** -0.265*** -0.152** -0.188** -0.360** 
   (0.0821) (0.143) (0.0880) (0.0700) (0.0740) (0.0794) (0.156) 
  $100,000-$149,999 -0.219** -0.317** -0.161* -0.172** -0.177** -0.148* -0.188 
   (0.0849) (0.150) (0.0901) (0.0717) (0.0771) (0.0819) (0.148) 
  $150,000+ -0.190* -0.204 -0.365*** -0.170** -0.311*** -0.247** -0.330 
   (0.109) (0.220) (0.129) (0.0857) (0.0967) (0.104) (0.235) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer -0.0775 -0.0302 -0.0951 -0.113 -0.161* -0.139 -0.183 
   (0.107) (0.161) (0.109) (0.0910) (0.0953) (0.0980) (0.164) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  0.00193 -0.0449 0.00649 0.00553 0.0188 0.0186 -0.0240 
Health (0.0235) (0.0376) (0.0246) (0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0227) (0.0383) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  -8.37e-05 0.00198 -0.000598 -0.000281 -0.00130 -0.00108 0.000503 
Health² (0.00152) (0.00238) (0.00159) (0.00128) (0.00137) (0.00144) (0.00247) 
Chances 0.00915 0.0149 0.00945 0.0116 0.00538 0.00505 0.0358** 
   (0.00874) (0.0146) (0.00975) (0.00741) (0.00795) (0.00839) (0.0170) 
Chances ² -3.01e-05 -4.21e-05 -3.00e-05 -3.58e-05 -1.97e-05 -1.36e-05 -0.000115** 
   (2.76e-05) (4.57e-05) (3.09e-05) (2.35e-05) (2.51e-05) (2.65e-05) (5.40e-05) 
Observations 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,226 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, work status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Health- Severity and Frequency of Transitivity Failures 
    (1) (2) (3) 
   Self-Care 
Usual Activities 
Intense 
Problems    
Failures of Transitivity (Order Measure) 0.102*** 0.0596** 0.0413 
   (0.0381) (0.0301) (0.0428) 
Average Severity of Failure -0.0454 -0.0338 -0.0192 
   (0.0303) (0.0229) (0.0298) 
Education     
  No Diploma 0.352 0.422** 0.0289 
   (0.260) (0.187) (0.309) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base 
   - - - 
  Some College 0.0538 0.0238 0.0462 
   (0.187) (0.125) (0.173) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 0.319* 0.0164 0.0579 
   (0.184) (0.169) (0.238) 
  Bachelor's Degree -0.00940 -0.107 -0.394** 
   (0.176) (0.105) (0.191) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) -0.0196 -0.144 -0.613** 
   (0.189) (0.115) (0.239) 
Household Income     
  Less than $25,000 0.219 0.205* 0.118 
   (0.138) (0.117) (0.155) 
  $25,000-$49,999 Base Base Base 
   - - - 
  $50,000-$74,999 -0.291 -0.268** -0.113 
   (0.186) (0.111) (0.168) 
  $75,000-$99,999 -0.302 -0.376*** -0.443** 
   (0.187) (0.125) (0.224) 
  $100,000-$149,999 -0.487** -0.342*** -0.416* 
   (0.211) (0.122) (0.220) 
  $150,000+ -0.185 -0.424** -0.110 
   (0.299) (0.175) (0.308) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer 0.0234 -0.0954 -0.0548 
   (0.209) (0.149) (0.214) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  -0.0111 0.000970 -0.114** 
Health  (0.0549) (0.0370) (0.0562) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and  -0.000153 -0.000426 0.00573* 
Health²  (0.00330) (0.00222) (0.00340) 
Chances 0.0254 0.0236 0.0621** 
   (0.0210) (0.0148) (0.0258) 
Chances ² -8.31e-05 -7.88e-05* -0.000204** 
    (6.58e-05) (4.70e-05) (8.34e-05) 
Observations 1,672 1,672 1,648 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, work status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 2.8: Robustness Checks-Income 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Moderate Comparisons Learning Curves 
    Base Working Base Working 
Failures of Transitivity -673.3*** -877.5*** -692.2*** -890.6*** 
   (176.8) (222.2) (165.7) (216.7) 
Education      
  No Diploma -2,679 -13,343*** -2,506 -12,690** 
   (4,832) (4,989) (4,810) (4,968) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base 
   - - - - 
  Some College 12,300*** 11,539*** 12,103*** 11,322*** 
   (3,148) (3,316) (3,145) (3,297) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent 11,198*** 12,896*** 11,356*** 13,055*** 
   (3,253) (4,252) (3,243) (4,230) 
  Bachelor's Degree 30,894*** 32,121*** 30,807*** 31,823*** 
   (2,674) (3,102) (2,678) (3,080) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) 43,645*** 46,497*** 43,696*** 46,483*** 
   (3,169) (3,631) (3,201) (3,644) 
Current Health      
  Problems with Mobility -1,714 -2,819 -1,612 -2,632 
   (2,019) (2,789) (2,029) (2,830) 
  Problems with Self-Care 2,255 463.9 2,070 433.4 
   (2,923) (5,691) (2,913) (5,652) 
  Problems with Usual Activities -5,138** -1,395 -4,876** -1,103 
   (2,409) (3,601) (2,404) (3,589) 
  Problems with Pain/Discomfort -639.0 -599.6 -677.4 -942.4 
   (1,423) (1,956) (1,424) (1,973) 
  Problems with Anxiety/Depression -3,917*** -2,736* -3,922*** -2,915** 
   (1,068) (1,434) (1,068) (1,435) 
Work Status      
  Currently Working Base  Base   
   -  -   
  Looking for Work -23,326***  -23,008***   
   (3,685)  (3,683)   
  Not Working, Not Looking for Work -10,956***  -11,016***   
   (3,720)  (3,724)   
  Retired -13,515***  -13,161***   
   (3,589)  (3,589)   
  Missing/Refused to Answer -31,294***  -31,324***   
   (6,187)  (6,185)   
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health 5,681** 7,574** 3,441 7,010*** 
   (2,303) (3,033) (2,373) (2,632) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health² -842.1** -1,172** -569.6 -1,206*** 
   (346.3) (461.6) (406.3) (467.4) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health³ 35.86** 52.69*** 27.39 60.58*** 
   (15.02) (20.30) (19.77) (23.27) 
Chances 17.18 -210.4 208.6 41.95 
   (215.1) (277.3) (321.3) (429.0) 
Chances ² -0.396 0.718 -0.958 -0.305 
   (1.139) (1.467) (1.244) (1.677) 
Observations 2,987 1,873 2,987 1,873 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 2.9: Robustness Checks for Self-Care 
    (1) 
Moderate 
(2) 
Learning Curves     
Failures of Transitivity 0.0263*** 0.0270*** 
   (0.00831) (0.00812) 
Education   
  No Diploma 0.199 0.195 
   (0.212) (0.212) 
  High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base 
   - - 
  Some College -0.0943 -0.0852 
   (0.147) (0.145) 
  Associate's Degree/Equivalent -0.0456 -0.0574 
   (0.156) (0.158) 
  Bachelor's Degree -0.156 -0.151 
   (0.131) (0.132) 
  Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) -0.138 -0.135 
   (0.139) (0.139) 
Household Income   
  s than $25,000 0.280*** 0.277** 
   (0.108) (0.108) 
  $25,000-$49,999 Base Base 
   - - 
  $50,000-$74,999 -0.246* -0.250* 
   (0.130) (0.130) 
  $75,000-$99,999 -0.314** -0.321** 
   (0.144) (0.144) 
  $100,000-$149,999 -0.327** -0.318** 
   (0.151) (0.151) 
  $150,000+ -0.202 -0.204 
   (0.220) (0.220) 
  Missing/Refused to Answer -0.0353 -0.0292 
   (0.159) (0.159) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health -0.0717 -0.0328 
   (0.107) (0.104) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health² 0.00702 0.00529 
   (0.0158) (0.0181) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health³ -0.000228 -0.000345 
   (0.000665) (0.000892) 
Chances 0.0126 0.00739 
   (0.0114) (0.0164) 
Chances ² -5.73e-05 -2.04e-05 
   (5.92e-05) (6.18e-05) 
Observations 3,234 3,234 
Note: Gender, age, race, ethnicity, marital status, and region of residence are not reported. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2.1: EQ-5D-5L Instrument 
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Figure 2.2: Defining a Failure of Transitivity in the TDL Study 
For each question, A contains the option with a longer lifespan and health problems.  HS is the 
health state, and TA is the amount of lag time with no health problems following time with health 
problems. B contains the option with a shorter lifespan with no health problems (TB).  
All failures of transitivity require two necessary conditions: 
1. Each domain of HS2 must weakly dominate HS1 
2. The individual must also choose A for question 1 and B for question 2. In other words, an 
individual must prefer a more severe health state to time with no health problems in one question 
and then less time with no health problems to a less severe health state in another. 
 
In addition, at least one of the following specifications must also be met: 
3. TA2 ≥ TA1 and TB1 ≥ TB2 
4. TA1 ≤ TB1 or TA2 ≥ TA1, and TB2 = 0 
5. TB1 – TA1 ≥ TB2 
 
  
HS1 
TA1  
TB2 
 
TB1 
TA2 
 
HS2 
Question 1 
 
A 
 
B 
Question 2 
113 
Figure 2.3: Comparing Transitivity Measures: Count vs. Order 
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Using the Count Measure, the 
respondent has 12 failures of 
transitivity (each connected pair).  
Under the Order Measure, this is 
reduced to five failures of transitivity.  
In the Order Measure, I remove the 
question associated with the most 
failures until there are no remaining 
pairs (e.g., 4, 9, 5, 7, and 12). The 
average severity of each failure is 2.4 
(12/5). 
114 
Figure 2.4: Set of Pairs Where Dominance Cannot be Determined 
One pair describes a health state with more pain/discomfort, while the other describes a health 
state with a higher level of anxiety/depression.  
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Figure 2.5: Willingness to Trade and Failures of Transitivity 
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Appendix A.1: Basic Difference-In-Difference Example 
    Time   Δ Sales Price Δ Volume 
    Before After           
Acker Merrall & Condit Control 5.575 5.398 -0.177  
  (0.026) (0.025) (0.036)  
  [539] [621]  15.21%       
 Treated 7.505 7.486 -0.019  
  (0.023) (0.025) (0.034)  
  [1,183] [1,235]  4.40% 
  Difference   0.158 -10.82% 
   (0.050)  
All Other Houses Control 5.473 5.256 -0.217  
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)  
  [2,315] [1,929]  -16.67%       
 Treated 7.419 7.195 -0.224  
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)  
  [3,691] [2,676]  -27.50% 
 Difference  -0.007 -10.83% 
   (0.027)  
Zachys/Sothebys Control 5.511 5.225 -0.286  
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)  
  [1,523] [1,215]  -20.22%       
 Treated 7.449 7.190 -0.259  
  (0.016) (0.018) (0.024)  
  [2,501] [1,648]  -34.11% 
  Difference   0.027 -13.88% 
   (0.033)  
DD Estimate All   0.205 31.90% 
    (0.039)  
 Zachys/   0.240 38.51% 
 Sothebys   (0.042)  
DDD Estimate All     0.165 0.01% 
    (0.057)  
  Zachys/     0.131 3.07% 
 Sothebys   (0.060)  
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Appendix A.2: Wines Unlikely to Be Counterfeited 
  
4.
5
5
5.
5
6
6.
5
4.
5
5
5.
5
6
6.
5
2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 20162006 2008 2010 2012 2014 20162006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
1982 Ducru-Beaucaillou 1982 Leoville Las Cases 1989 Margaux
1990 Montrose 1996 Mouton 2000 Lynch Bages
Control Group Treatment Group
Lo
g 
Pr
ic
e
Date
Graphs by local polynomial smooth plot of wine price
 118 
 
 
Appendix A.3: Wines Likely to Be Counterfeited 
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Appendix A.4: 2008 Difference-in-Difference Price Estimates- Exponential Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Base DD North  Case and Very  
    America Large Format Expensive 
Acker Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.125*** -0.151*** -0.116*** -0.141*** 
  (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0201) (0.0234) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0452*** -0.0491*** -0.0521*** -0.0732*** 
  (0.00906) (0.00898) (0.0120) (0.0160) 
Morrell & Company -0.165*** -0.167*** -0.158*** -0.176*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0183) (0.0359) 
Sothebys 0.0156 0.0131 -0.0179 0.0232 
  (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0125) (0.0189) 
Zachys -0.0644*** -0.0697*** -0.0894*** -0.0932*** 
  (0.00846) (0.00822) (0.0116) (0.0140) 
Time and House (DD) 0.0834*** 0.0831*** 0.0537*** 0.0803*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0166) (0.0182) 
Asia Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Europe -0.124***  -0.0873*** -0.160*** 
  (0.0156)  (0.0194) (0.0287) 
Internet -0.227***  -0.326*** -0.269*** 
  (0.0169)  (0.0695) (0.0398) 
North America -0.179***  -0.181*** -0.172*** 
  (0.0100)  (0.0136) (0.0160) 
Lot Size 0.00634*** 0.00566***  0.0148*** 
  (0.00132) (0.00136)  (0.00236) 
Case Dummy 0.0327*** 0.0441***  -0.0203 
  (0.0109) (0.0114)   (0.0196) 
Observations 8,785 7,017 3,649 3,001 
Number of Unique Wines 178 177 133 100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Appendix A.5: 2008 Triple Difference Price Estimates-Exponential Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Base DDD North  Burgundy Old Wines Semiannual  New Wines 
    America     Continent   
Acker Base Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.109*** -0.125*** -0.211*** -0.185*** -0.0943*** -0.0724*** 
  (0.0124) (0.0130) (0.0391) (0.0245) (0.0125) (0.0204) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0270** -0.0148 -0.155*** -0.0736*** -0.0290*** -0.0108 
  (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0366) (0.0230) (0.0108) (0.0169) 
Morrell & Company -0.136*** -0.122*** -0.218*** -0.198*** -0.142*** -0.0845*** 
  (0.0130) (0.0132) (0.0503) (0.0251) (0.0128) (0.0240) 
Sothebys 0.0400*** 0.0550*** -0.0535 0.00353 0.0249** 0.0341* 
  (0.0123) (0.0131) (0.0422) (0.0250) (0.0124) (0.0196) 
Zachys -0.0534*** -0.0411*** -0.190*** -0.0754*** -0.0736*** -0.0692*** 
  (0.0106) (0.0111) (0.0345) (0.0217) (0.0105) (0.0168) 
Time and House 0.0563*** 0.0390** 0.0190 0.0995*** 0.0431*** 0.0521** 
  (0.0135) (0.0167) (0.0432) (0.0281) (0.0137) (0.0214) 
Time and Fake -0.00497 -0.00426 -0.0255 -0.00113 -0.00964** 0.00420 
  (0.00431) (0.00466) (0.0155) (0.00835) (0.00452) (0.00656) 
Fake and House 0.00222 0.0275** -0.171*** 0.0106 -0.000914 -0.0361* 
  (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0373) (0.0254) (0.0126) (0.0197) 
Time, Fake, and House (DDD) 0.0162 0.0456** 0.136*** -0.0272 0.0146 0.0232 
  (0.0168) (0.0203) (0.0479) (0.0337) (0.0172) (0.0256) 
Asia Base  Base Base  Base 
  -  - -  - 
Europe -0.216***  -0.0812** -0.254***  -0.212*** 
  (0.0120)  (0.0387) (0.0266)  (0.0171) 
Internet -0.242***  -0.230*** -0.311***  -0.241*** 
  (0.0120)  (0.0279) (0.0237)  (0.0179) 
North America -0.206***  -0.171*** -0.221***  -0.200*** 
  (0.00851)  (0.0160) (0.0203)  (0.0117) 
Lot Size 0.00219** 0.00135 0.00612** 0.00234 0.00185* 0.00578*** 
  (0.00107) (0.00113) (0.00249) (0.00173) (0.00109) (0.00195) 
Case Dummy 0.0389*** 0.0545*** 0.0112 0.0807*** 0.0521*** -0.0284* 
  (0.00823) (0.00865) (0.0240) (0.0143) (0.00839) (0.0152) 
Observations 14,189 10,837 2,390 5,555 14,189 4,679 
Number of Unique Wines 286 282 106 141 286 86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Appendix A.6: 2012 Difference-In-Difference Price Estimates- Exponential Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Base DD North  Case and  Very  
    America Large Format Expensive 
Acker Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.131*** -0.196*** -0.0582*** -0.0891*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0131) (0.0154) (0.0218) 
Christies 0.0461*** -0.0417*** 0.0599*** 0.0896*** 
  (0.00829) (0.00916) (0.00876) (0.0173) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0735*** -0.103*** -0.0823*** -0.0483*** 
  (0.00679) (0.00813) (0.0102) (0.0137) 
Heritage Auctions -0.128*** -0.150*** -0.121*** -0.104*** 
  (0.00936) (0.0104) (0.0170) (0.0182) 
K & L Wines 0.00914  -0.0861*** 0.0617** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0308) (0.0286) 
Morrell & Company -0.117*** -0.105*** -0.0573*** -0.126*** 
  (0.0136) (0.0159) (0.0207) (0.0317) 
Sothebys -0.0179** -0.0572*** 0.000529 -0.00951 
  (0.00729) (0.0130) (0.00806) (0.0144) 
Spectrum Wine Auctions -0.136***  -0.0827*** -0.136*** 
  (0.00897)  (0.0133) (0.0160) 
Zachys -0.0778*** -0.0925*** -0.0764*** -0.0885*** 
  (0.00618) (0.00874) (0.00799) (0.0127) 
Time and House (DD) -0.0556*** -0.0767*** -0.0805*** -0.0386** 
  (0.00780) (0.0107) (0.00996) (0.0164) 
Asia Base  Base Base 
  -  - - 
Europe -0.119***  -0.0973*** -0.168*** 
  (0.00787)  (0.00785) (0.0163) 
Internet -0.178***  -0.120*** -0.269*** 
  (0.00938)  (0.0220) (0.0244) 
North America -0.0985***  -0.0974*** -0.124*** 
  (0.00495)  (0.00661) (0.00985) 
Lot Size 4.95e-06 0.000148  0.00737*** 
  (0.000927) (0.00111)  (0.00209) 
Case Dummy 0.0667*** 0.0593***  0.0305 
  (0.00794) (0.00992)   (0.0189) 
Observations 15,471 6,090 6,657 4,908 
Number of Unique Wines 178 177 143 100 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Appendix A.7: 2012 Triple Difference Price Estimates- Exponential Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Base DDD North Old Wines Case and  New Wines 
    America   Large Format   
Acker Base Base Base Base Base 
  - - - - - 
Bonhams & Butterfields -0.0997*** -0.172*** -0.154*** -0.0463*** -0.0458*** 
  (0.00898) (0.0127) (0.0185) (0.0112) (0.0144) 
Christies 0.0381*** -0.0246*** 0.0608*** 0.0450*** 0.0442*** 
  (0.00631) (0.00746) (0.0144) (0.00650) (0.00638) 
Hart Davis Hart -0.0129* -0.0552*** -0.0343** -0.000179 0.0106 
  (0.00737) (0.0106) (0.0165) (0.00940) (0.00953) 
Heritage Auctions -0.0981*** -0.130*** -0.115*** -0.0845*** -0.119*** 
  (0.00888) (0.0119) (0.0181) (0.0130) (0.0124) 
K & L Wines 0.0419***  0.0236 -0.0159 0.0371*** 
  (0.00726)  (0.0156) (0.0241) (0.00999) 
Morrell & Company -0.0991*** -0.110*** -0.173*** -0.0618*** -0.0418*** 
  (0.0105) (0.0151) (0.0215) (0.0154) (0.0139) 
Sothebys 0.0289*** -0.0321** 0.00195 0.0494*** 0.0361*** 
  (0.00754) (0.0128) (0.0165) (0.00893) (0.00984) 
Spectrum Wine Auctions -0.119***  -0.193*** -0.0915*** -0.0546*** 
  (0.00641)  (0.0114) (0.0100) (0.00951) 
Zachys -0.0371*** -0.0624*** -0.0738*** -0.0257*** -0.0272*** 
  (0.00658) (0.0105) (0.0145) (0.00800) (0.00859) 
Time and House -0.0169** -0.0693*** 0.0137 -0.0132 -0.0244** 
  (0.00788) (0.0143) (0.0187) (0.00999) (0.00993) 
Time and Fake -0.0327*** -0.0314*** 7.22e-05 -0.0361*** -0.0412*** 
  (0.00343) (0.00468) (0.00783) (0.00463) (0.00458) 
Fake and House 0.0464*** 0.0272** 0.0497*** 0.0653*** 0.0227** 
  (0.00798) (0.0124) (0.0167) (0.00980) (0.00985) 
Time, Fake, and House (DDD) -0.0428*** -0.00400 -0.0998*** -0.0802*** -0.0198 
  (0.0113) (0.0177) (0.0241) (0.0143) (0.0140) 
Asia Base  Base Base Base 
  -  - - - 
Europe -0.115***  -0.195*** -0.0946*** -0.0748*** 
  (0.00591)  (0.0136) (0.00582) (0.00688) 
Internet -0.162***  -0.238*** -0.122*** -0.107*** 
  (0.00634)  (0.0120) (0.0149) (0.00876) 
North America -0.103***  -0.150*** -0.0964*** -0.0832*** 
  (0.00396)  (0.00808) (0.00474) (0.00518) 
Lot Size -0.00230*** -0.00183** -0.00519***  -0.000981 
  (0.000589) (0.000906) (0.00137)  (0.000662) 
Case Dummy 0.0674*** 0.0645*** 0.120***  0.0342*** 
  (0.00525) (0.00743) (0.0124)   (0.00631) 
Observations 25,078 9,686 9,031 11,697 8,688 
Number of Unique Wines 286 284 141 249 86 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix A.8: List of Wines Included in the Dataset 
  
1929 
1945 
1947 
1949 
1952 
1953 
1955 
1959 
1961 
1962 
1964 
1966 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1976 
1978 
1982 
1985 
1986 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1993 
1995 
1996 
1999 
2000 
2002 
Lafite  X  X  X X X X   N  N    X  X  X X   X  X  
Latour X X  X X X X X X   N  N    X  X   M   M  X  
Mouton  X X    X X X         X  M  N X   N  X  
Margaux  X    X  X X     N    X  N  N X   M  X  
Haut Brion X X  X   X X X   N  N    M    X X   N  M  
DRC La Tache        X  X  X   X X X  X  X  X  X X X  X 
Ponsot Clos de la Roche                       X  N N N  N 
DRC Romanee Conti          X X X   X X X  X  X  X  X X X  X 
DRC Romanee St. Vivant                X X  X    X  X X X  X 
DRC Richebourg        X    X X  X X X  X    X  X X X  X 
Petrus  X X     X X     X    X    X X  X   X  
Cheval Blanc   X    X X X  X N  N    X    N X  X   X  
Le Pin                  X X X   X       
Dujac Clos de la Roche                   X    X   N   N 
Henri Jayer Echezeaux                 X  X    X       
DRC Echezeaux                   X  X  X  X X X  X 
DRC Grands-Echezeaux               X  X  X  X  X  X X X  X 
Ducru-Beaucaillou         N     N    N  N   N   N  N  
Calon Segur         N         N        N  N  
Leoville Barton                  N  N   N   N  N  
Leoville Poyferre                  N     N   N  N  
Lynch Bages         N     N    N    N N   N  N  
Talbot                  N  N   N   N  N  
La Lagune                  N  N          
Beychevelle         N     N    N  N   N   N  N  
Les Forts de Latour              N    N     N   N  N  
Cos d'Estournel              N    N  N   N   N  N  
Mommessin Clos de Tart                   N    N   N N  N 
De Vogue Bonnes Mares                       N N  N N  N 
Louis Latour Corton-Charlemagne                       N   N N   
Bonneau Corton-Charlemagne                          N N  N 
Lafleur                  X     X   N  X  
Latour a Pomerol         X         N            
Trotanoy         X   N      N            
La Mission Haut Brion  X      X X   N  N    X    X N   N  X  
Leoville Las Cases         N   N  N    N     N   N  N  
Palmer  X      X X     N    N     N     N  
Montrose         N         N     N   N  N  
Henri Jayer Richebourg                 X  X           
Henri Jayer Cros Parantoux                 X  X  X  X  X X X   
De Vogue Musigny        X  X X N   X  N          N   
Note: The X denotes that the wine is likely to be counterfeited, N denotes a wine is unlikely to be counterfeited, and M denotes wines excluded from the regression models.  
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Appendix B.1: Example set of 30 Paired Comparison Questions 
Health states from the EQ-5D-5L are often described using a five-number nomenclature, where 
each number corresponds to the level of difficulties (no problems, slight problems, moderate 
problems, severe problems, and extreme problems) on each of the five domains. For example, 
21354 corresponds to slight problems with mobility, no problems with self-care, moderate 
problems with usual activities, extreme pain or discomfort, and severe anxiety or depression. For 
the 30 questions below, the health problems are expected to last for 30 days, with the lag time 
following the health problems and alternate choice of time with no health problems also 
represented using days. Specifically, question 1 asks respondents to state their preferences 
between: 
 
Option A) 30 days in health state 44424 followed by 33 days with no health problems 
Option B) 1 day with no health problems 
 
1.   44424 + 33 vs. 1 16. 33323 + 25 vs. 3 
2.   44444 + 0   vs. 1 17. 33323 + 60 vs. 30 
3.   44443 + 13 vs. 3 18. 33313 + 25 vs. 1 
4.   44434 + 60 vs. 3 19. 33333 + 33 vs. 30 
5.   44444 + 25 vs. 5 20. 33331 + 33 vs. 0 
6.   44443 + 0   vs. 5 21. 55553 + 60 vs. 0 
7.   44442 + 33 vs. 14 22. 55554 + 33 vs. 0 
8.   44424 + 25 vs. 14  23. 55555 + 60 vs. 30 
9.   44442 + 0   vs. 14 24. 55555 + 25 vs. 14 
10. 44434 + 60 vs. 30 25. 55545 + 33 vs. 30 
11. 33333 + 13 vs. 1 26. 55554 + 25 vs. 1 
12. 33332 + 60 vs. 14 27. 55535 + 25 vs. 14 
13. 33313 + 25 vs. 5 28. 55535 + 33 vs. 0 
14. 33332 + 0   vs. 5 29. 55553 + 0   vs. 1 
15. 33331 + 13 vs. 3 30. 55545 + 25 vs. 5 
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Appendix B.2: Negative Binomial Regressions Using Count Measure of Transitivity as the 
Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Base  Drops  Health  Intense Years of  Married Currently 
Non- Utility Health  Education Working 
Traders Value Problems 
Gender 
Female -0.0903 -0.0568 -0.0617 -0.0579 -0.0554 -0.0111 0.0214 
(0.0690) (0.0661) (0.0657) (0.0658) (0.0663) (0.0871) (0.0870) 
Age 
18-29 Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - - 
30-39 -0.00617 -0.0134 -0.0190 -0.0235 -0.00360 -0.101 0.00924 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.111) (0.178) (0.132) 
40-49 -0.168 -0.229* -0.250* -0.246* -0.216* -0.445** -0.117
(0.139) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.188) (0.155) 
50-59 -0.125 -0.122 -0.148 -0.140 -0.108 -0.287 -0.0426 
(0.127) (0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.179) (0.149)
60-69 -0.202 -0.219 -0.227 -0.238* -0.206 -0.355* 0.00138 
(0.155) (0.147) (0.143) (0.144) (0.146) (0.197) (0.195) 
70+ -0.292 -0.303* -0.317* -0.334* -0.290* -0.354 -0.0990 
(0.187) (0.176) (0.170) (0.172) (0.176) (0.227) (0.413) 
Race 
African American/ Black Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - - 
Asian/ Asian American -0.130 -0.158 -0.151 -0.148 -0.144 -0.130 -0.234
(0.238) (0.233) (0.234) (0.234) (0.234) (0.312) (0.314) 
Caucasian/ White -0.432*** -0.497*** -0.513*** -0.503*** -0.482*** -0.727*** -0.332*** 
(0.107) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.160) (0.126) 
Native American/ Inuit/ Aleut -0.0773 -0.169 -0.169 -0.174 -0.169 -0.0417 0.392 
(0.387) (0.335) (0.339) (0.335) (0.330) (0.431) (0.455) 
Native Hawaiian/ Pacific Islander 1.153*** 1.275*** 1.299*** 1.298*** 1.299*** 1.004* 1.398*** 
(0.446) (0.384) (0.387) (0.388) (0.387) (0.513) (0.406) 
Other -0.0817 -0.206 -0.188 -0.159 -0.201 -0.527* 0.128 
Ethnicity (0.264) (0.238) (0.237) (0.237) (0.236) (0.294) (0.286) 
Hispanic 0.142 0.182* 0.186* 0.179* 0.172* 0.212 0.0440 
(0.118) (0.104) (0.105) (0.106) (0.104) (0.149) (0.138) 
Marital Status 
Married Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - - 
Widowed -0.0658 0.0393 0.0451 0.0399 0.0447 0.387 
(0.194) (0.206) (0.205) (0.205) (0.206) (0.402) 
Divorced/Separated 0.0959 0.0454 0.0555 0.0582 0.0465 0.0364 
(0.130) (0.120) (0.121) (0.122) (0.120) (0.165) 
Never Married 0.0908 0.0632 0.0585 0.0578 0.0580 0.0956 
(0.0962) (0.0939) (0.0944) (0.0944) (0.0944) (0.117) 
Living with a Partner -0.0487 -0.0588 -0.0761 -0.0665 -0.0596 -0.123
(0.128) (0.121) (0.119) (0.120) (0.122) (0.146) 
Education 
No Diploma -0.00128 -0.00671 -0.00620 0.000605 0.168 0.446 
(0.210) (0.205) (0.204) (0.202) (0.281) (0.272) 
High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - 
Some College -0.115 -0.128 -0.124 -0.110 -0.123 0.0521 
(0.120) (0.115) (0.115) (0.116) (0.152) (0.158) 
Associate's Degree/Equivalent -0.244* -0.149 -0.123 -0.107 -0.210 -0.231
(0.137) (0.142) (0.144) (0.145) (0.185) (0.198) 
Bachelor's Degree -0.259** -0.272*** -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.425*** -0.171
(0.103) (0.0948) (0.0950) (0.0950) (0.120) (0.117) 
Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) -0.336*** -0.329*** -0.316*** -0.315*** -0.459*** -0.234* 
(0.104) (0.0976) (0.0973) (0.0974) (0.126) (0.131) 
Years of Education -0.0485*** 
(0.0138) 
Current Health 
Problems with Mobility -0.0808 -0.0766 -0.0770 -0.0699 0.0633 
(0.0725) (0.0689) (0.0689) (0.0937) (0.111) 
Problems with Self-Care 0.270*** 0.267*** 0.267*** 0.289** 0.335* 
(0.0903) (0.0891) (0.0894) (0.145) (0.179) 
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Problems with Usual Activities -0.0152 0.0201 0.0174 0.0201 -0.0250 
(0.0858) (0.0813) (0.0815) (0.112) (0.139) 
Problems with Pain/Discomfort 0.00789 -0.0169 -0.0151 -0.0331 -0.191** 
(0.0598) (0.0540) (0.0544) (0.0698) (0.0776) 
Problems with Anxiety/Depression 0.0339 0.0319 0.0325 -0.0754 -0.0625
(0.0557) (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0615) (0.0628) 
Health Utility Value -0.756** 
(0.312) 
Intense Health Problems 0.192 
(0.151) 
Household Income 
Less than $25,000 0.0432 0.0963 0.0956 0.102 0.0959 0.0882 0.0942 
(0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.199) (0.183) 
$25,000-$49,999 Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - - 
$50,000-$74,999 -0.107 -0.0937 -0.0873 -0.0982 -0.103 0.115 -0.287** 
(0.107) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.130) (0.141) 
$75,000-$99,999 -0.106 -0.118 -0.104 -0.115 -0.122 0.0315 -0.253* 
(0.116) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.139) (0.134) 
$100,000-$149,999 -0.203* -0.247** -0.235** -0.246** -0.261** -0.0625 -0.567*** 
(0.119) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.137) (0.148)
$150,000+ -0.499*** -0.519*** -0.520*** -0.529*** -0.526*** -0.246 -0.763*** 
(0.163) (0.149) (0.147) (0.148) (0.150) (0.187) (0.185) 
Missing/Refused to Answer -0.183 -0.180 -0.180 -0.159 -0.189 0.00695 -0.404** 
(0.137) (0.128) (0.128) (0.130) (0.127) (0.171) (0.191) 
Work Status 
Currently Working Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - - 
With a Job, but Not at Work -0.215 -0.258 -0.226 -0.222 -0.250 -0.127
(0.206) (0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.190) (0.273)
Looking for Work 0.286* 0.130 0.145 0.160 0.140 0.472** 
(0.169) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.215) 
Working, but Not for Pay, -0.491 -0.677* -0.632* -0.611* -0.659* -0.0820 
at a Family Business (0.395) (0.349) (0.353) (0.359) (0.349) (0.449) 
Not Working and Not Looking for Work -0.119 -0.123 -0.146 -0.136 -0.113 -0.0960 
(0.123) (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118) (0.147) 
Retired 0.0179 -0.00897 -0.0424 -0.0210 -0.00213 -0.0155 
(0.120) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111) (0.112) (0.135) 
Refused to Answer -0.132 0.0186 0.00964 -0.00371 0.0393 0.277
(0.268) (0.280) (0.288) (0.290) (0.280) (0.446) 
Don't Know -0.0171 0.0989 0.180 0.204 0.114 0.284
(0.259) (0.272) (0.323) (0.325) (0.269) (0.428) 
Duration of Health Problems 
1 Day Base Base Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - - - 
7 Days -0.196 -0.287** -0.280** -0.279** -0.300** -0.462*** -0.102
(0.130) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.154) (0.164) 
30 Days 0.0325 -0.0130 -0.00479 0.00538 -0.0174 -0.100 0.0929
(0.119) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.148) (0.156) 
9 Weeks -0.524*** -0.542*** -0.531*** -0.531*** -0.550*** -0.689*** -0.538*** 
(0.123) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.155) (0.155) 
12 Months -0.127 -0.162 -0.163 -0.161 -0.170* -0.236* -0.122
(0.106) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.132) (0.136) 
10 Years -0.812*** -0.891*** -0.865*** -0.854*** -0.906*** -0.928*** -0.808*** 
(0.179) (0.170) (0.169) (0.169) (0.170) (0.224) (0.238) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health 0.535*** 0.195*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.254*** 0.253*** 
(0.0273) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0345) (0.0344) (0.0449) (0.0443) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health² -0.0251*** -0.00646*** -0.00659*** -0.00662*** -0.00644*** -0.00982*** -0.00980*** 
(0.00173) (0.00206) (0.00205) (0.00206) (0.00206) (0.00265) (0.00266) 
Number of Observations 3,909 3,234 3,234 3,234 3,234 1,845 1,867 
Alpha 2.997 2.684 2.690 2.697 2.687 2.518 2.764 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix B.3: Willingness to Trade and Binary Transitivity Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Logit NegBin II NegBin II Logit Logit 
Willingness  Willingness  Drops At Least One Drops  
To Trade To Trade Non-Traders Failure Non-traders 
Education 
No Diploma -0.149 -0.126 -0.0930 0.0822 0.0990 
(0.274) (0.0991) (0.0775) (0.247) (0.276) 
High School Diploma/Equivalent Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - 
Some College 0.224 0.0168 -0.0210 0.108 0.0661 
(0.154) (0.0433) (0.0338) (0.124) (0.130) 
Associate's Degree/Equivalent -0.0569 0.00642 0.0224 -0.0619 -0.00995 
(0.181) (0.0596) (0.0439) (0.165) (0.177) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.547*** 0.0208 -0.0587** 0.0689 -0.0474 
(0.134) (0.0339) (0.0273) (0.102) (0.104) 
Graduate Degree (Masters, Doctorate) 0.425*** 0.0490 -0.0171 -0.131 -0.213* 
(0.147) (0.0374) (0.0297) (0.115) (0.115) 
Current Health 
Problems with Mobility 0.0952 0.0253 0.0101 -0.0606 -0.0744
(0.104) (0.0268) (0.0206) (0.0792) (0.0831) 
Problems with Self-Care -0.0275 -0.0483 -0.0414 0.340*** 0.382*** 
(0.126) (0.0434) (0.0353) (0.111) (0.120) 
Problems with Usual Activities -0.142 -0.0295 -0.00574 -0.0430 -0.0227 
(0.117) (0.0327) (0.0247) (0.0998) (0.105) 
Problems with Pain/Discomfort 0.162** 0.0356 0.00805 0.0258 0.000431 
(0.0778) (0.0218) (0.0169) (0.0635) (0.0649) 
Problems with Anxiety/Depression -0.0273 -0.00534 0.000998 0.00630 0.0163
(0.0637) (0.0180) (0.0137) (0.0521) (0.0550) 
Household Income 
Less than $25,000 -0.134 -0.00723 0.0259 -0.152 -0.120
(0.153) (0.0488) (0.0359) (0.134) (0.143) 
$25,000-$49,999 Base Base Base Base Base 
- - - - - 
$50,000-$74,999 0.137 0.00642 -0.0145 -0.0462 -0.0709 
(0.135) (0.0390) (0.0301) (0.112) (0.117) 
$75,000-$99,999 0.242 0.0514 0.0151 -0.0747 -0.0993 
(0.151) (0.0415) (0.0325) (0.121) (0.125) 
$100,000-$149,999 0.373** 0.0697 0.0159 -0.125 -0.171
(0.160) (0.0427) (0.0338) (0.127) (0.130) 
$150,000+ 0.405* 0.105** 0.0450 -0.332** -0.355** 
(0.210) (0.0528) (0.0422) (0.163) (0.163) 
Missing/Refused to Answer -0.134 -0.00807 0.0215 -0.103 -0.0870 
(0.170) (0.0541) (0.0410) (0.146) (0.156) 
Times Individual Traded Lifespan and Health 0.173*** 0.0854*** 
(0.00761) (0.00901) 
Number of Observations 3,909 3,909 3,234 3,909 3,234 
Alpha 0.730 0.203 
Note: Sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, duration of time with health problems, and work status are not reported. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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